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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
PIRATES, EXILES, AND EMPIRE: ENGLISH SEAMEN, ATLANTIC EXPANSION,
AND JAMAICAN SETTLEMENT, 1558-1658
by
Amanda Joyce Snyder
Florida International University, 2013
Miami, Florida
Professor Sherry Johnson, Major Professor
A life of piracy offered marginal men a profession with a degree of autonomy,
despite the brand of “outlaw” and the fear of prosecution. At various times throughout
history, governments and crowned heads suspended much of their piracy prosecution,
licensing men to work as “privateers” for the state, supplementing naval forces. This
practice has a long history, but in sixteenth-century England, Elizabeth I (1558-1603)
significantly altered this tradition. Recognizing her own weakness in effectively
prosecuting these men and the profit they could contribute to the government, Elizabeth
began incorporating pirates into the English naval corps in peacetime—not just in war.
This practice increased English naval resources, income, and presence in the emerging
Atlantic World, but also increased conflict with the powerful Spanish empire.
By 1605, making peace with Spain, James VI/I (1603-1625) retracted Elizabeth’s
privateering promotion, prompting an emigration of English seamen to the American
outposts they had developed in the previous century. Now exiles, no longer beholden to
the Crown, seamen reverted back to piracy. The Carolinas and Jamaica served as bases
for these rover communities. In 1650, the revolutionary leader Oliver Cromwell (1649-
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1658) once again recognized the merits of such policies. Determined to demonstrate his
authority and solidify his rule, Cromwell offered citizenship and state support to
Caribbean exiles in exchange for their aiding of his navy in the taking of Spanish
Jamaica. Official chartering of Port Royal, Jamaica served as reward for these men’s
efforts and as the culmination of a century-long cycle of piracy legislation, creating one
of England’s most lucrative colonies in the middle of a traditionally Spanish Caribbean
empire.
Through legal and diplomatic records, correspondence, and naval and
demographic records from England and Spain, this dissertation explores early modern
piracy/privateering policy and its impact on the development of the Atlantic World.
European disputes and imperial competition converged in these piracy debates with
significant consequences for the definitions of criminality and citizenship and for the
development of Atlantic empire.
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CHAPTER I
PIRACY AND THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1540-1650

Piracy is no novel trade. As long as there have been ships in which to sail, there
have been pirates. Over the centuries, the nature and practice of piracy have changed, as
have the ways in which governments address piracy. More often than not, governments
label pirates as criminals and seek their prosecution. There are times, however, when
these so-called criminals find a legitimate place in society as patriots. In the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, as England and Spain expanded their colonizing missions in
the Caribbean, the continuation of state-sponsored piracy became an increasingly
contentious political debate.
“Pirates, Exiles, and Empire” explores how changing English piracy legislation
affected Anglo-Spanish imperial competition during the development of the Atlantic
World in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The dissertation traces the transition of
English mariners from European pirates, to Atlantic privateers, to Caribbean exiles, and
finally, to English citizens once more with the establishment of an English colony at
Jamaica in 1655. Piracy and privateering became the vehicle through which England
established an Atlantic presence and challenged the dominance of the Spanish Empire in
the New World.
Under the last Tudor monarch, Queen Elizabeth I of England (1558-1603), and
the Commonwealth leader, Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell (1649-1658), pirates served
the state as “privateers” to bolster these rulers’ authority at home and abroad. Between
these two rulers, during the reigns of James VI/I (1603-1625) and Charles I (1625-1649),
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privateers lost favor with the crown and became exiles, forging new careers and
communities in the Atlantic World.1 English policies and the activities of English
seamen threatened traditional Spanish colonial hegemony. Successive Spanish
governments under Philip II (1556-1598), Philip III (1598-1621), and Philip IV (16211665) struggled with the diplomatic complexities of confronting English piracy while
simultaneously trying to avoid war and maintain control of vast Spanish territories.
Numerous scholars have highlighted the important role of piracy in the early
Atlantic world but the dissertation’s argument for the deliberate use of piracy legislation
by the English Crown is new. Historians have vigorously debated the legitimacy of
privateers, seen as pirates by all but the English, and their role in the Anglo-Spanish war
of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries,2 yet scholarship in this vein has not
considered the domestic social conditions that paralleled diplomatic tensions with Spain.
A study of Elizabethan proclamations and correspondence shows a distinct change in
privateering policy as Elizabeth realized she could not combat piracy on her shores, but
1. Crowned heads did not make policy completely by themselves. Numerous councilors,
secretaries, and advisors helped construct official state polices which were then issued and
published under the name of the king or queen. In the case of the rulers discussed in the
dissertation, letters of the rulers are also considered in determining the policy assigned to a
specific ruler. The dissertation does not delve into the councilor debates over each
proclamation—other scholars have done this at length. The dissertation is more concerned with
the diplomatic ramifications of policy and the correspondence between the kings and queens and
diplomats.
2. Kenneth Andrews remains one of the preeminent scholars on Elizabethan privateering,
however, his focus remains overwhelmingly domestic and discounts the wider, global impact of
these policies. Elizabethan Privateering: English Privateering During the Spanish War, 1585–
1603, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1964). See also R. B. Wernham, Before the
Armada: The Emergence of the English Nation, 1485–1588 (New York, NY: Harcourt, 1966);
Wernham, After the Armada: Elizabethan England and the Struggle for Western Europe, 1588–
1595 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, Oxford University, 1984); and Susan Doran, Elizabeth I and
Foreign Policy, 1558–1603 (London: Routledge, 2000).
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could perhaps find use for these pirates. Coincidentally, this change in policy also helped
increase her royal prerogative and gain the support of a previously untapped, fairly large
social group. Scholars further disagree as to whether this policy constituted a proactive
foreign policy on the part of the queen or whether Elizabeth simply experienced a
“remarkable reversal of alliances.”3 However ad hoc some scholars may paint
Elizabeth’s piracy solutions,4 this dissertation demonstrates that her decision to promote
privateering was both conscious and calculated. Even if Elizabeth initially constructed
her new policies as a short-term reaction to the problems she faced, the ways in which
she expanded and improved upon those policies constituted a departure from established
maritime practices and diplomacy, thus becoming new and distinct methods of foreign

3. R. B. Wernham, The Making of Elizabethan Foreign Policy, 1558–1603 (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1980), 23.
4. Many scholars debate whether Elizabeth had any proactive foreign policy at all. Charles
Wilson is chief among these scholars claiming that historians have simply “[rationalized] into
policies ex post facto” a succession of shifts and “muddles” that the Queen faced. Charles
Wilson, Queen Elizabeth and the Revolt of the Netherlands (London, UK: Macmillan, 1970), 6.
Wernham also claims that Elizabeth experienced a “remarkable reversal of alliances” more than
she fostered any “diplomatic revolution.” Wernham, The Making of Elizabethan Foreign Policy,
23. Though Elizabeth may have fallen into a foreign policy that capitalized on existing practices
(piracy) as a short term reaction/solution to the problems she faced, the way that she expanded
and improved upon that policy constituted a departure from established maritime practices and
diplomacy thus becoming a new and distinct method of foreign policy. G.J. Marcus supports the
idea that these policies became a factor of state policy and Elizabeth expanded them on an
unprecedented scale. G. J. Marcus, A Naval History of England (I-The Formative Centuries)
(London, UK: Longmans Green, 1961), 49. During wartime, piracy was generally statesanctioned, but Philip Gosse claims that Elizabeth’s policies were new in the fact that she
“connived” at piracy while England was at “peace with the world.” Philip Gosse, The History of
Piracy (New York, NY: Tudor, 1946), 113. Andrews denies that Elizabeth’s policies were in any
way planned or deliberate and remained a private practice for Englishmen, never a governmental
initiative. Andrews, “Elizabethan Privateering: The Harte Lecture, 1985,” in Raleigh in Exeter,
1985: Privateering and Colonisation in the Reign of Elizabeth I: Papers Delivered at a
Conference at Exeter University on 3–4 May 1985 to Mark the Four Hundredth Anniversary of
the First Attempt to Settle English People in North America, ed. Joyce Youings (Exeter, UK:
University of Exeter, 1985), 4; Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, 6+, 17.
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policy.5 Few modern studies have discussed at length how Elizabeth’s promotion of
piracy factored into official state policy and the unprecedented scale under which her
government enacted laws that legitimated privateering as a means to state ends.
A crucial recurring theme of the study is that because the English government
could not effectively prosecute piracy, they embraced it. Thus, Chapter 2 of the
dissertation argues that the English courts used a series of legal precedents to justify
English authority over piracy cases, thereby allowing the English government to expand
its privateering support with legal justification. These legal precedents allowed the
English to enter into competition with Spain in the burgeoning Atlantic World, using
legal precedent as a shield. English legal arguments led to the establishment of an
internationally-recognized maritime law court that frustrated the Spanish government.
The resulting imperial conflicts eventually led to war at the end of the sixteenth
century—twenty years after the implementation of the first privateering policies.
While most studies of piracy either focus on a revived culture of piracy in the
eighteenth century, or predominately discuss the more wealthy and well-known
Elizabethan privateers known as the “Sea Dogs,” the dissertation—while accounting
briefly for the Sea Dogs—instead contends that the making of English privateers was a
much more widespread practice, becoming an integral part of Elizabethan foreign policy.
This foreign policy directive comprised a series of conscious decisions on the part of the
queen, not just a haphazard series of events, as many political historians have argued. As
these historians note, channeling piracy into privateering did initially grow out of English
officials’ inabilities to police piracy. Yet, as the dissertation argues, the crown soon
5. Marcus, A Naval History of England, 49.
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realized the usefulness and profitability of these practices in supplementing an English
navy in disrepair and avoiding direct war with Spain.
Similarly, lawmakers in the early Elizabethan state compensated for the general
political and imperial weakness of the English courts by positioning themselves as the
arbiters of international maritime disputes between Spain, England, the Netherlands, and
even France and the Venetian Republic, as outlined in Chapter 3. The legal
developments they promoted allowed England to gain jurisdiction over maritime cases in
the English Channel, and in time, the Atlantic. As a result, English privateers expanded
into the Atlantic and played dramatic roles in transforming European political conflict
into imperial competition for the New World. Chapter 3 explores the nature of this
imperial competition. English mariners conducted raids on Spanish shipping and ports.
These seamen sought to establish supply bases on Caribbean islands and at the edges of
Spanish La Florida from which to attack Spanish ships. Their bases were more informal
than many contemporary Spanish settlements and were, therefore, less expensive for the
state to maintain, they were not initially formal English colonies. The Spanish, at the
receiving end of these seemingly constant raids, focused on fortification to rebuff English
attacks. In a very short time, the Spanish felt the pinch of this ongoing endeavor and of
the losses to English piratas.
Chapter 4 transitions to the more predominately Spanish section of the project,
and demonstrates that Atlantic imperial competition in the Caribbean played an important
role in sixteenth-century European diplomatic negotiations. The struggle for the Atlantic
prompted changes in each imperial power’s naval policies, resulting in full-blown war
towards the end of the sixteenth century. The chapter compares Spanish politics and
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naval policies to English naval policies of the time. Indulging in some of the Black
Legend history of Spain, the chapter claims that Spanish mismanagement of resources led
to decline at the turn of the seventeenth century. The Spanish crown and government
received numerous communications from the colonies about forming a Caribbean
Armada and fortifying islands like Jamaica, but the government either ignored those
requests or never followed through on the few plans it did approve.
The struggles of the seventeenth-century Spanish Empire in the case of Jamaica
frame Chapter 5, which demonstrates that Jamaica was not simply a backwater with little
value to the Empire, but was instead a crucial geopolitical bone of contention in Spain
and England’ competition for imperial dominance. Many modern scholars have
downplayed the value and importance of Jamaica in the early modern Caribbean, but the
dissertation shows how the island became the center of Anglo-Spanish imperial
competition in the seventeenth century. Under Spanish control from Columbus’ second
voyage until 1655, Jamaica is important for the study in a number of ways. Building on
the archival work of noted Spanish historians like Irene Wright and Francisco Morales
Padrón, this study illustrates that Jamaica was not simply a backwater with little value to
the Empire.6 Padrón’s Jamaica Espanola, written 50 years ago, is the last book to be
published on Spanish Jamaica and Irene Wright’s compilations were published twenty
and thirty years prior to that.
Archival research for the dissertation shows that Spanish officials, settlers, and
6. Francisco Morales Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle, 2003).
Originally published as Jamaica Española, 1953; Irene Wright, Spanish Documents Concerning
English Voyages to the Caribbean, 1527-1568, (London, UK: Hakluyt Society, 1929); Wright,
Documents Concerning English Voyages to the Spanish Main, 1569-1580, (London, UK: Hakluyt
Society, 1932).
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the island’s governors wrote to Spain regularly about the need to fortify the island
because of the amount of resources on the island that attracted pirates, and the amount of
Spanish trade regularly passing by the island to Tierra Firma. Regular correspondence
and requests, for example, noted that fortifications in Jamaica would ensure the safe
passage of the Spanish Plate Fleets and keep other nations from attempting an attack on
the island. These letters argued that losing Jamaica would be detrimental to Spanish
trade and the empire. Eventually, the Spanish crown took note and sent orders to fortify
the island. The Crown also wrote and approved plans for a permanent Caribbean
Armada. Unfortunately, continued English raids on Spanish shipping coupled with a
number of internal Spanish domestic problems (exacerbated by financial difficulties
stemming from English Atlantic raids) kept Spain from fully realizing these plan. Also,
in the mid-seventeenth century, former privateers played an important role in settling
these areas and used their years of expertise and knowledge of the Atlantic waters to aid
in the successful establishment of these colonies. During this time, Spain continued to
struggle with financial difficulties and internal uprisings, and saw continued English
encroachment on their New World empire. The English, meanwhile, used their naval
skills and resources gained from decades of privateering and raiding to establishment
settlements in Virginia (Jamestown, 1607), Bermuda (1609), St. Kitts, (1623), and
Barbados (1625) to name but a few.
Jamaica also occupied an important place in English policy in the 1650s. As
discussed in the final chapter of the dissertation, formally English seamen well knew the
island in the middle of important Spanish trade routes, having established bases around
the Caribbean from which to attack the island and the traders passing by. Elizabeth had
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supported privateers, but her Stuart successors had not. Thousands of English seamen
migrated to the New World, many choosing Caribbean exile and continued piracy over
service in the Stuart navy. These exiles were particularly important for the establishment
of Jamaica as an English colony under the Interregnum government during the
seventeenth century. Rover communities also existed on the island itself in some of the
harbors that proved too difficult for Spanish ships to navigate. Without adequate
protection on the entire island, these communities managed to remain on parts of the
island, taking advantage of the natural resources to survive.
When England’s new revolutionary leader, Oliver Cromwell, gained power in
1649 and crafted his “Western Design” in 1654, he was aware of these existing
communities and the importance of establishing an English colony in the heart of the
Spanish Caribbean. Like Spanish historians, many English historians downplay the
importance of Jamaica to imperial aims. These scholars consistently malign Cromwell’s
politics, largely ignoring his forward-thinking imperial and naval policies, and continuing
to paint his Western Design as a complete failure. The dissertation shows how
Cromwell’s Design refurbished popular Elizabethan policies and had a significant impact
on Caribbean imperial competition. In order to build his New Model Navy, Cromwell
garnered support from the same types of men who had once aided Elizabeth’s navy.
Cromwell reversed the Stuart policies of rejecting privateers as illegitimate to assert state
control and resuscitated Elizabeth’s far-sighted and ambitious policy of promoting,
legitimating, and embracing privateering for the furtherance of state interests. In so
doing, he recruited the same types of men forced into exile by Elizabeth’s successors and
the same types of men who had created rover communities throughout the Caribbean
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during Elizabeth’s reign. Cromwell, echoing Elizabeth’s maritime imperial policies,
embraced privateers in order to use them to further his imperial ambitions in the
Caribbean, and especially in Jamaica.
This study thus seeks to rehabilitate Cromwell’s Western Design. The
dissertation does so by using a framework similar to that of work on the Roanoke and
Providence Island colonies, a conceptual approach that employs “failure” as a means to
illuminate important political, strategic, and economic decisions made by the English
government in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century pertaining to Caribbean
settlement.7 Scholars often pay lip service to the much-touted truism that “history is told
by the victors,” but this near-clique has a seed of truth. Scholars have argued that
Cromwell’s Western Design largely failed. The dissertation refutes that contention, and
instead argues that the endeavor to take a Spanish Caribbean island and expand English
influence in the Americas was not a failure after all. Indeed, Cromwell’s Western Design
had important implications for the future British Empire.8 As the navy sailed initially for

7. Karen Kupperman remains one of few historians who have studied the Providence Island
colony and its role in English Atlantic settlement. The dissertation’s argument regarding the
“failure” of the Western Designs draws from Kupperman’s argument that by examining failure,
historians can better understand success: “only through looking at what failed ventures lacked can
we understand the ingredients of stability and growth. If the vital components are isolated, then it
becomes clear that all successful colonies shared key attributes, and the regional differences are
less fundamental.” Karen Kupperman, Roanoke: The Abandoned Colony (Totowa, NJ: Rowman,
1984); Kupperman, Providence Island, 1630–164: The Other Puritan Colony (Cambridge, UK,
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 18-19.
8. Menna Prestwich, “Diplomacy and Trade in the Protectorate,” The Journal of Modern
History 22, no. 2 (June 1950); Trevor Burnard, “European Migration to Jamaica, 1655–1780,”
The William and Mary Quarterly 53, no. 4 (October 1996); Carla Gardina Pestana, The English
Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 1640–1661 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004);
Pestana, “English Character and the Fiasco of the Western Design,” Early American Studies: An
Interdisciplinary Journal 3, no. 1 (Spring 2005). Pestana does acknowledge that Jamaica became
an important possession for the English through sugar production in the late eighteenth century.
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Spanish Hispaniola, Cromwell gave his generals orders to stop at various Caribbean
islands to recruit any able-bodied seamen, including men engaged in extralegal maritime
activity. Scholars have vastly understudied this part of English naval history. Bernard
Capp, for one, still one of the foremost English naval scholars, does not even discuss the
New Model Navy in the Caribbean.9 His only concern is that the majority of the king’s
navy rebelled and joined Cromwell, securing the Thames and English coastline for the
Interregnum rule.
Overall, historians have ignored the entire English Civil War in the Caribbean.
As prominent Civil War historians have begun to point out, for the last thirty years many
historians have also largely ignored the 1650s, the early years of the Interregnum.10 By
exploring the Civil War in the Caribbean, the project thus makes a new scholarly
contribution. By rehabilitating Cromwell’s Western Design and reassessing maritime
policy in the early interregnum, the study promises to add even more credence to its
claims that reexamining the importance of the early modern Caribbean in European
affairs is critical to understanding Anglo-Iberian imperial competition in the Caribbean.
The experiences of Caribbean settlers during the English Civil War differed from their
metropolitan counterparts with significant consequences for the development of political
ideas in the Atlantic versus in Europe.
In a paradoxical, under-examined, yet vitally important coda, Cromwell’s forces
lost the battle for Spanish Hispaniola yet took Jamaica as a consolation prize. Spain
9. Bernard Capp, Cromwell’s Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution, 1648-1660, (Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 1989).
10. See for instance Jason McElligott and David L. Smith, eds., Royalists and Royalism During
the Interregnum, (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2010).
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understandably downplayed the significance of the island and did not expect the English
to succeed there. England was not initially sure of what they had won. The army
constantly complained of the heat and disease, but the naval officers and rovers who
joined their forces easily settled into Port Royal. In 1655, Cromwell issued an official
charter for the city of Port Royal, making it an English city and claiming the colony for
his new regime. This chartering also served as a reward to the many rovers and exiles
who aided the English occupation of the island. Plantation designs initially begun by
Cromwell, eventually made Jamaica one of England’s most lucrative sugar colonies.
Scholars have not fully examined nor fully acknowledged the importance of Cromwell’s
conquest Port Royal—which was, after all, nicknamed the “Sodom of the New World.”
The conquest of Port Royal and the settlement of Jamaica were important as a
convergence of a century of English piracy legislation, Anglo-Spanish imperial
competition, and a place where outlaws once again found a place within the English state.
In the struggle for control over the expanding Atlantic World, pirates operated within a
liminal legal space—used by the government in times of need and prosecuted in times of
prosperity. The fine lines of criminality and citizenship established by these legal
practices and the way in which life in the far-off Caribbean affected these lines, shaped
the European, and an emerging Caribbean, identity.
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CHAPTER II
TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW
PIRACY AND THE EXPANSION OF ENGLISH ADMIRALTY COURTS FROM
HENRY VIII TO ELIZABETH I

A study of early modern piracy encompasses discussions about diplomacy,
economics, and most importantly, the laws and legal systems created to define and,
occasionally, prosecute piracy. In sixteenth-century England, piracy became the vehicle
through which a disputed queen and relatively weak government asserted themselves in
international politics. Through piracy and subsequent privateering, England inserted
itself into the competition for influence in the New World. Domestic rivalries between
England and Spain intensified imperial competition throughout the Atlantic. Exploring
the importance of piracy and the legal methods through which England established itself
as sovereign of the early modern Atlantic World, this chapter argues that Elizabeth and
the English Admiralty Court constructed a solid legal case for sovereignty based on
established precedents—precedents recognized by the various European powers
involved.
Developing piracy legislation under Elizabeth I (1558-1603) largely drew on the
Admiralty Court expansion of her father, Henry VIII (1509-1547), and the organization
of Henry’s Navy Board. Elizabeth’s admiralty courts relied heavily on fifteenth- and
early sixteenth-century precedents and used the debates surrounding piracy and
privateering legislation to establish the English court as the first attempt at an
international maritime law court. A court system that began as a domestic bureaucracy
and source of revenue developed into a diplomatic and legal tool for Elizabeth. The
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courts’ precedents regarding piracy trials allowed England to claim jurisdiction over
much of the sixteenth-century Atlantic World.

The Early Court
Piracy had been a problem for the English government for decades. With the rise
of commerce and exploration in the New World came a rise in piracy and the need of
ways to control that piracy. Originally created in 1260, the Admiralty Court of England
attended to all manner of maritime concerns from fishing rights to piracy. Theoretically,
at the inception of the court, all maritime rights belonged to the Crown. Every wreck,
every piece of wreckage, and any fish or bird caught off the coast belonged to the king.
The king also held the responsibilities of regulating fishing, collecting port dues, and
maintaining ports.1 Despite the power the courts held in this early stage, and came to
wield under Elizabeth I, the admiralty courts lost much of their rights and influence in the
intermediate centuries. By the sixteenth century, many of these rights had passed into the
hands of private corporations and private individuals through grants from the Crown.
Wherever sufficient need of a maritime court existed, that borough or district then
applied for a “fee farm” from the Crown. Similar to the medieval practice of burgage, a
fee farm was essentially rented land and rights from the Crown.2 In the case of English

1. Edwin Welch, Ed, The Admiralty Court Book of Southampton, 1566–1585 (Southampton, UK:
Southampton University, 1968), xi.
2. “Fee farm” generally refers to the medieval practice of burgage or burgage tenure. Based on
custom or a sort of ‘common law’ occupation of land, English could rent certain areas of land
from the king. With this rent, came jurisdiction over said land. Though more traditionally used
for renting of farmland, under Henry VIII, the practice extended to include the creation of coastal
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coastal boroughs, officials paid rent for the right to have a royal court and collect
revenues within that borough. The revenues collected by borough courts went to
maintaining their ports and enforcing the king’s admiralty laws. Thus the king gained
revenue, and coastal boroughs gained authority through the court. In many cases, this
handing over of rights to local parties often led to the corruption of the courts of
admiralty. Without a national court to answer to, local officials blurred the letter of the
law to suit their particular situations. For a period during the late fifteenth and early
sixteenth centuries, Englishmen regarded the admiralty as a source of profit more than a
body of law enforcement. Henry VIII, known for his bureaucratic and opportunistic
nature, aimed to correct this situation.
Henry looked to the English coastlines as one possible solution to increase Crown
control and revenue. In 1536, in need of money to pay for his annulment hearings and
the creation of the Anglican Church, Henry also needed to find ways of maintaining his
royal prerogative and currying favor with those citizens who opposed the “King’s Great
Matter.” In that same year, Henry issued the first “Act of Piracy.” The act created the
position of the “Vice-Admiral of the Coast” who was to “proceed in matters of
piracy…according to the order of the laws.” Also in 1536, Henry added statute laws and
courts to eliminate the “complications and contradictions” of existing civil and common
law. Dissatisfied with the way in which his officials dealt with “Traytors, Pirates,
Thieves, Murtheres and Confederates upon the Sea,” Henry and his Parliament passed an
act claiming that in the future all such offenses were to be tried by new commissioners
courts. Susan Reynolds, An Introduction to the History of English Medieval Towns (Oxford, UK:
Clarendon Press, 1977).
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appointed by the Crown. These new offices included that of Lord High Admiral, his
lieutenant or deputy, and three of four other “substantial persons.”3 These reforms did
not completely eradicate corruption. Henry’s desire to regulate and reorganize the courts
was, in this case, as with so many others during his reign, hampered by his constant need
to raise revenue and create support for his reign. Offices created by administrative and
legal reforms often wound up in the hands of the wealthy and powerful. The office of the
Lord High Admiral was no exception. Eight Lord High Admirals served under Henry,
only three of whose careers lasted ten years or longer. The Lord High Admiral changed
as political allegiances shifted and as noble purses opened wider in an effort gain political
favor. Even so, the expansion of royal borough courts increased the efficiency of the
admiralty courts and brought them more under the jurisdiction of the King than they had
been in almost two centuries. Henry also established the largest and most permanent
English navy yet. Only the fleets of the Mediterranean could equal his naval
advancements and administration.
Such efforts did not go unnoticed. Portuguese, Spanish, French, and Dutch sailors
and diplomats appealed to the English courts to arbitrate and settle maritime disputes

3. Act 28, Henry VIII, 1536, EEBO
They were: John de Vere, thirteenth Earl of Oxford: 1485-151), Sir Edward Howard, second
Duke of Norfolk: 1513, Thomas Howard, Earl of Surrey: 1513-1525, Henry Fitzroy, Duke of
Richmond: 1525-1536, William Fitzwilliam, first Earl of Southampton: 1536-1540, John Russell,
first Lord Russell: 1540-1542, Edward Seymour, first Earl of Hertford: 1542-1543, John Dudley,
Viscount Lisle: 1543-1547. Elizabeth had only two Lord High Admirals—Edward Clinton, first
Earl of Lincoln: 1558-1585, and Charles Howard, first Earl of Nottingham: 1585-1619. Oxford
Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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since the 1490s.4 Compared to the Habsburg, Burgundian, and Venetian dynasties of
Europe, the new, and often-labeled ‘illegitimate’ Tudor throne held relatively little power
in European political affairs. England as a power did begin to grow by leaps and bounds
under the Tudors, but it was precisely the relative weakness of the early Tudor dynasty
that encouraged the European nations to seek arbitration of maritime disputes in English
courts. Also, despite the initial lack of a cohesive admiralty court system, relying instead
on the local “fee farm” courts, England still possessed one of the more extensive
admiralty court systems in early modern Europe.
Many of the early cases brought to English courts concerned slave-trading rights
along both the African and Spanish American coasts. Diplomatic correspondence
between England, Spain, the Netherlands, and Venice attest to the precedents being set
for the expansion of English maritime jurisdiction during this period spanning the short
reigns of Elizabeth’s brother, Edward VI (1547-1553), and sister, Mary I (1553-1558).
English merchants had established trade with countries like East Friesland, one of the few
areas outside of Spain’s jurisdiction. Most of the expansion of English trade, however,
took merchants to the New World and to Africa—areas over which Spain claimed rule
and/or in which they claimed trade rights through their Portuguese alliance. From the
1530s through the 1550s, English merchants established direct trade with Portuguese
Brazil and Morocco.5 The English also had a significant trade market in West Africa,

4. P. E. H. Hair and J. D. Alsop, Englishmen and Trades in Guinea, 1553–1565: The New
Evidence of Their Wills (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992).
5. Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, 11.
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operating out of the Portuguese port of Elmina, Guinea. In the African port, the English
set a significant legal precedence set in 1555.
The correspondence between Portuguese officials in Elmina and the English
crown illuminates a critical juncture in Anglo-Spanish maritime debates. At this time,
prince of Spain and Lord Regent of the Netherlands Philip II (1555-1598), soon to be
King of Spain (1556) served as king consort to English Queen Mary I.6 Numerous letters
from the Portuguese officials complained to their Spanish ally about English traders
interfering in the trade around Elmina, Portugal’s West African trade headquarters. In
December of 1555, Portuguese officials wrote specifically to Mary and Philip that
English merchants “should be ordered to refrain from departing [to Elmina].” The
officials complained of the damages caused by such interference, likening the actions to a
sort of piracy.7

Morocco remained largely independent under Arab rulers until the nineteenth century, though
Portuguese trading posts dotted the Moroccan coastline during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. Elizabeth Isichei, A History of African Societies to 1870 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), 265–70
6. Mary was the daughter of Henry VIII and his first, Spanish Catholic wife, Catherine of
Aragon, the aunt of the mighty Spanish King Charles V/Charles I, Holy Roman Emperor.
Scholars have extensively studied Mary’s quest to make England Catholic again after her father’s
Anglican reforms and does not need repeating here.
7. C. S. Knighton, ed., Domestic Series, Mary I, 1553–1558, Calendar of State Papers (London,
UK: Antony Rowe, LTD, 1998), 11/14, no. 4, 124. Hereafter identified as CSP, Domestic, Mary.
See further complaints in Rowden Brown, ed., Foreign Series of the Reign of Elizabeth and
Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs Existing in the Archives and Collections of Northern
Italy, 1534–1554, Calendar of State Papers (London, UK: H.M.S.O, 1873); Brown, ed., Foreign
Series of the Reign of Elizabeth and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs Existing in the
Archives and Collections of Northern Italy, 1555–1558, Calendar of State Papers (London, UK:
H.M.S.O, 1877). Hereafter identified as CSP, Foreign, Italy, 1534-1554, and CSP, Foreign,
Italy, 1555-1558.
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The circumstances of this case, involving an English queen, a Spanish kingconsort, and a Spanish ally deferring to an English admiralty court’s decision about
piracy and contraband activity of supposedly English ships and seamen, makes the
court’s decision significant for a number of reasons. As the Portuguese ambassador
offered no direct proof as to the nationality of the ships, the English court ruled that
“nothing should be tried which is contrary to justice or impedes the amity which has long
existed between this realm [England] and Portugal,” and did not advise the king to stop
the trade. If such trade was hindered, “it would injure the fortunes of many distinguished
merchants of [Philip’s] city of London.”8 This complaint, however, was only nominally
about piracy. “Contraband” and “piracy” were highly flexible terms in this period, for
both the accusers and the judges. In this particular instance, the accusation of contraband
was used in an attempt to force trade bans on the English and reinforce Portuguese
authority. The complaint and the precedent set by the decision held important
implications for the argument about trade rights and sovereignty over various trade
routes. This case demonstrated that “free trade” did not exist, yet questions still remained
about which country could claim sovereignty over any particular trade route or port of
trade and how best to regulate such claims. Furthermore, rather than deal with these
grievances locally or in a Portuguese court, officials brought the case to an English
council and debated it in the English courts.9 With far-reaching consequences for the

8. Knighton, ed., CSP, Domestic, Mary, 11/14, no. 4, 124.
9. Horatio Brown and G. Cavendish Bentink, eds., Foreign Series of the Reign of Elizabeth and
Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs Existing in the Archives and Collections of Northern
Italy, Calendar of State Papers (London, 1864–98), vi, 251. Hereafter identified as CSP,
Venetian, vi. The case occurred under Mary but is also referenced in the Elizabethan papers.
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Anglo-Spanish contest soon to follow further west in the Atlantic, cases such as this one
show how European nations sought English decisions over maritime matters hoping to
gain sovereignty for themselves, but ultimately recognizing English sovereignty over
such matters.
England and Spain had debated nations’ rights to trade for years. Elizabeth had
never accepted Spanish sovereignty on the seas and had begun to assert sovereignty over
the ‘English’ Channel. The English argued that the seas were free and Englishmen had
the right to trade “where there was water to float [their] ships.” Spanish authorities
continued to cite centuries-old papal bulls, royal proclamations, and the theory of
occupation to affirm their sole right to trade with their possessions overseas.10 In 1561,
Philip’s ambassador informed him that Cecil, Elizabeth’s secretary, had claimed that
“The Pope had no right to partition the world and to give and take kingdoms to
whomever he pleased,” echoing the statements of Henry VIII and his government a
generation prior.11 This statement again expressed English disregard of Spanish claims
when it came to trade for as the ambassador also wrote Philip: “Nothing will bring these
people to their senses. They claim to have a right to go to all lands or provinces
belonging to friendly states without exception.”12 Philip felt he had a right to deny all
other nations trade in his domain. After all, he had the pope’s blessing to do so with the
10. Thomas Woodrooffe, The Enterprise of England: An Account of Her Emergence as an
Oceanic Power (London, UK: Faber and Faber, 1958), 160.
11. Martin Hume, ed., Elizabeth, 1558–1567, Calendar of Letters and State Papers Relating to
English Affairs, Preserved Primarily in the Archives of Simancas (London, UK: H.M.S.O,
1892), vol. 1, 218. Hereafter identified as CSP, Elizabeth, Spanish, 1558–1567.
12. Hume, ed., CSP, Elizabeth, Spanish, 1558–1567, 240.
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1494 Treaty of Tordesillas. Court decisions regarding piracy under Mary helped Philip
uphold the papal ruling, but Elizabeth felt no such obligation to Spain as did her sister.13
Even more galling to Philip was Elizabeth’s refusal to police piracy against Spain
in the colonies and throughout the Atlantic also directly challenged the authority he had
claimed for himself in “all the territories in the Western ocean, island or mainland,
discovered or undiscovered” in the Treaty of Crépy in 1544.14 Philip’s ambassador in
London wrote in 1558 that the King “deeply resented being interfered with” in his
western “navigations.”15 On 29 January 1559, in discussing English negotiations with
France, Cecil related that: “as to the reports made by Spaniards concerning a treaty
[Mary and Philip’s marriage treaty] whereby the realm of England rests bound to them,
[Elizabeth] (thanked be to God) remain[ed] a free prince and owner of her crown and
people.”16 Elizabeth broke with tradition as her father had broken away from Rome by
relying on precedents set under none other than her Catholic-crusading sister.
Aside from the above mentioned 1555 case, the English also answered earlier
Portuguese ambassadors who complained about Englishmen trading along the coast of

13. Paul Gottschalk, ed., The Earliest Diplomatic Documents on America: The Papal Bulls of
1493 and the Treaty of Tordesillas, trans. Paul Gottschalk (Berlin, Germany: P. Gottschalk,
1927); Christine Shaw, Julius II: The Warrior Pope (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1993).
14. Herbert Richmond, The Navy as an Instrument of Policy, 1558-1727, (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University, 1953), 7.
15. A.F. Pollard. The Political History of England: From the Ascension of Edward VI to the
Death of Elizabeth, 1547-1603, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 305.
16. Joseph Stevenson, ed., Foreign Series, of the Reign of Elizabeth, 1558–1559, Calendar of
State Papers (London, UK: H.M.S.O, 1863), vol. I, 107. Hereafter identified as CSP, Foreign,
Elizabeth, I.
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Africa with the argument that only effective occupation meant the English could not trade
in a particular place. So long as English traders stayed away from forts and traded with
independent parties, they could go wherever they pleased. Further establishing English
legal precedents, on 25 February 1563, special commissioners of the Admiralty Court
heard a number of complaints from Spanish subjects seeking return of goods and reprisal
for spoiled goods and ships.17 The English Court ruled that Spaniards seized other goods
“contrary to [the Queen’s] proclamation” and they therefore forfeited their goods stated
in this particular case.18 Such proceedings did not satisfy Spain and in 1564, Philip sent
an ambassador to propose a conference at Bruges to discuss maritime jurisdiction. Philip
objected to the English “constituting themselves judges of the seas as the high seas were
common property.”19
Recognition of the English court’s authority also occurred a decade prior. While
debating the Portuguese case, Spanish plaintiffs quarreled with the French over a similar
situation. Spain proposed the English Admiralty Court as a “suitable tribunal” to try the
case as England possessed the most extensive maritime court system in Europe.20 In this
1554 case, a French man-of-war captured a Venetian ship bound for Antwerp. At the
time, Charles V (1516-1556), also Charles I, Holy Roman Emperor (1520-1556), ruled
17. John Dasent, ed., Acts of the Privy Council of England, New Series, 1558–1570. (London,
UK: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1892), 106-107. Hereafter identified as ACP, 1558-1570..
18. Reginald G. Marsden, ed., The High Court of the Admiralty, 1547–1602, Select Pleas in the
Court of Admiralty, (London, UK: Bernard Quaritch for the Selden Society, 1897), vol. 2, 40.
19. Hume, ed., CSP, Elizabeth, Spanish, 1558-1567, 356-357. At present, I have not found
evidence of such a meeting actually occurring.
20. Hume, ed., CSP, Elizabeth, Spanish, 1558–1567, 356–57.
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Spain and warred with France. Venice was not part of Charles’ Italian holdings but the
French still captured the ship on the grounds that it carried vital supplies to Spanish
troops in the Netherlands. After the French seized the ship, Dutch pirates then captured
the French. Spanish and French authorities appealed to the English courts as to Dutch
legal claims to the goods. The courts ruled that the Venetian ship was never a lawful
prize to the French, therefore the Dutch could not retain it. Venice recovered its goods.21
This case served to legitimize English maritime courts’ authority yet again. Philip’s
father recognized English maritime jurisdiction once and the English continued to argue
in favor of the precedent for such claim since they had held such jurisdiction since the
reign of Henry VIII. Under Henry, English jurisdiction generally only included the
waters immediately surrounding England but with this particular 1544 case, the courts’
rule expanded and supported the Elizabethan argument for maritime jurisdiction.
As English jurisdiction expanded, so did the realm of English pirates.
Opportunities to broaden their operations and attack every avenue of the African, West
Indian, and New World trade increased. English Admiralty court records duly note the
corresponding rise of Atlantic piracy, often under the veil of privateering. Some scholars
have noted the fine legal distinction between piracy and privateering,22 but few have
connected early domestic English Admiralty courts and legal documents to the

21. TNA, CSP Domestic, Mary I, 11/4, no. 42. Also in Knighton, ed., CSP, Domestic,
Mary, 385.
22. Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering; Peter Gerhard, Pirates on the West Coast of New Spain,
1566–1742, (Glendale, CA: A.H. Clark and Co, 1960); Sean Kelsey, Inventing a Republic: The
Political Culture of the English Commonwealth, (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press,
1997), among others.
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development of a global maritime court and establishment of English jurisdiction in the
Atlantic that supported English privateers. Elizabethan political scholars largely ignore
the ramifications of Atlantic piracy on English law and policy.23 The studies of this
period of piracy, privateering, and expansion become overwhelmingly studies of Sea
Dogs, the Armada, and diplomatic wrangling. These are the ‘hot-button’ issues of the
early Elizabethan reign, but there is more of the story to tell. The bureaucratization and
expansion of English Admiralty courts under Henry created the system that allowed for
and enticed foreign claimants to petition English courts for address of grievances and
prosecution of trade-interlopers that developed into a burgeoning international maritime
court of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

“The whole Channel...is infested...”24

In a letter to Philip II in 1570, the Spanish ambassador in London, Don Gerau
Despes wrote about the infestation of pirates in the English Channel. He claimed that
pirates and rovers attacked any and every ship they came across, taking the captured
ships as their own, thereby ever increasing the size of the English fleet. Through this
means, he told Philip, the queen intends “to make war on [your] majesty...without costing
her anything and under the specious pretence that she is not responsible.”25 Despes knew
23. Wallace MacCaffrey, Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1968).
24. From a letter to Philip II from his ambassador in London, Don Gerau Despes, in 1570.
Hume, ed., CSP, Elizabeth, Spanish, 1558–1567, 250.
25. Hume, ed., CSP, Elizabeth, Spanish, 1558–1567, 250.
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his subject well. Tudor England experienced periods of significant naval growth and
periods of stagnation and decline. Elizabeth desired to build as her father had, but she did
not possess the funds to initiate ship-building plans. In reality, she barely had enough
money to repair England’s existing fleet. Historically, ships taken as prizes became a
part of the captor’s fleet. Pirates followed the same principal. Elizabeth, knowing her
own weaknesses and her fleet’s needs, rarely questioned how a captain obtained his ship.
When Spanish officials like Despes complained about seizures, Elizabeth, as always,
referenced her piracy legislation and court precedents. If the ship was taken as a reprisal,
it was a legal prize. The captain then applied for a privateering license and his ship and
men effectively joined the English fleet at no cost to the government. This was in large
part the way in which cash-strapped Elizabeth built her navy.
Edward VI does not figure into this particular study beyond his limited
continuance of Henry VIII’s ship-building plans. Mary I built a few ships of her own, but
did not pay a great deal of attention to the workings of the admiralty courts and the Navy
Board. She used the courts on occasions when Philip brought cases to her, but she made
no active effort to expand the courts, let alone maintain them. Mary did follow a harder
line against piracy in the last few years of her reign. This interest of the queen came
more from her husband than herself. Philip and Spain had many more ships at sea than
England and had surprisingly little physical protection for their otherwise intimidating
galleons. Stringent piracy laws and effective enforcement of those laws meant a great
deal to a man looking to protect his treasure-laden fleets. Elizabeth began her reign by
prosecuting these same pirates, but her policies towards these men changed quickly.
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As the sixteenth century progressed, accusations of piracy throughout the EuroAtlantic World flooded the courts. Elizabeth initially used this court system to combat
domestic piracy rather than influence foreign affairs. Elizabeth transformed domestic
piracy into international, state-sponsored privateering during the late 1500s. Struggling
to rebuild her father’s navy, and as pirate activity continued fairly unabated, Elizabeth
began to take note of the profits gained by those practicing the trade. Through a series of
proclamations beginning in 1569, she began offering licenses and reprisal letters to those
men previously prosecuted as “pirates.” With official license, Englishmen believed that
they enjoyed every right to seek reprisal from treasure-laden Spanish galleons and other
Atlantic trade ships. Philip II and preyed-upon captains appealed to the English courts
for justice, thus continuing to recognize English authority. With this support, English
claims for jurisdiction over naval matters increasingly expanded over Atlantic maritime
cases. Anglo-Spanish conflicts ranging geographically from the Carolinas south through
New Spain appeared in English coastal Admiralty Courts. In the 1580s, especially,
mirroring her father’s designs, Elizabeth sponsored a significant expansion of Admiralty
circuit courts to hear these cases.26
Many of these early piracy trials did not necessarily center on English pirates.
The nature of piracy implies a lack of national belonging and sovereign loyalty. Though
many of the pirates appearing in the trials operated out of England and neighboring
Ireland and Scotland, few cases labeled them as “English” pirates. As lawless rovers—
26. See Julius Caesar, The Ancient State Authoritie and Proceedings of the Court of Requests,
compiled by L.M. Hill, Cambridge Studies in English Legal History (London, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1975); L.M. Hill, Bench and Bureaucracy: The Public Career of Sir Julius
Caesar, 1580–1636 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988).
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without license—they remained simply men of the sea, not of a particular national
belonging in the eyes of the law. Though plaintiffs, like Philip, certainly believed many
of these pirates to be of English origin, the legal proof of such matters was harder to
ascertain.
Even Elizabeth’s Judge of the High Court of Admiralty, Julius Caesar, questioned
the legality of some of these letters. As the Commissioner for Piracy Causes in 1581,
Caesar lamented the network of aiders and abettors to piracy throughout the English
coast. He claimed that “private warrants or letters [were] in truth not warranted by the
law,” and that men who illegally obtained them “blunted and disgraced” the letters’
authority and purpose.27 Caesar’s zeal for prosecuting pirates earned him his eventual
appointment to Judge of the High in 1583, but the Queen and her Privy Council
constantly interceded in Caesar’s cases to make sure that privateers escaped execution or
extensive prosecution.28 While Caesar did not always agree with the Queen’s policies, he
readily admitted that the licensing of privateers brought England more than £200,000.29
Dissenters within Elizabeth’s own government recognized the profit possible from her
policies. With Caesar’s appointment, Elizabeth could also show Philip that she
(superficially) took his complaints into consideration.

27. Hill, Bench and Bureaucracy, 9; British Library (BL), Caesar Papers, Landsdowne MS,
1250.
28. BL, Caesar Papers, Landsdowne MS 1250.
29. BL, Caesar Papers, Landsdowne MS 157, f. 434, Caesar to Lord High Admiral Charles
Howard (1585-1619), 18 Dec 1590.
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Only when Elizabeth and the courts began issuing official licenses to these men
did they become “English” and then, they served the Queen as legal privateers, not as
lawless pirates. They held legal reprisal and exploration licenses, thereby once again
giving them legal authority for their actions against other ships. The English already
established their jurisdiction over such maritime matters, now they simply extended that
authority and jurisdiction, building ever more on the precedents of the preceding
centuries.30
Scholars discuss the legal knowledge and language of pirates in the “emerging
regulatory order of the Atlantic world” in the eighteenth century,31 but too often ignore
the sixteenth-century roots of that language. The circumstances of pirates’ and
privateers’ legal posturing and subsequent jurisdictional claims in the eighteenth century
differ very little over the course of two centuries. Such claims cannot be made in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but with the creation of official legal systems whose
(almost) sole purpose was to deal with these particular maritime cases and claims
beginning with Henry VIII and reaching an apex under Elizabeth I, English jurisdictional
claims over domestic maritime and Atlantic matters are important in the same vein that
scholars make for later periods and various other parts of the sprawling British Empire.

30. Scholars have written a great deal on the exploits of the most famous of these Atlantic
pirates/privateers, the Elizabethan Sea Dogs, however, very few of these studies link Atlantic
maritime exploits with domestic legal machinations and piracy legislation. Privateering support
was not a solely diplomatic issue (though diplomacy is certainly an integral piece of the puzzle
and cannot be ignored). There was an intricate legal network that supported and transformed
Atlantic seafaring.
31. Lauren Benton, A Search For Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 34.
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Whatever the reasons for reforming and expanding English admiralty courts, and
no matter the character of the men most present in the cases heard there, the English
government and crown actively cultivated a legal maritime culture. Maybe the argument
should simply be that English explorers and privateers were better educated in “legalese,”
thus making their claims more successful. French, Dutch, and Spanish sailors, officials,
and even crowned heads, helped to establish this authority of the English courts. In this
case, it is certainly true that these courts operated and gained their power from the
“shared understandings of the law of nations” and the need to have a legal order to
counter the lawlessness of new and expanding territories.32
If Spaniards did not recognize the authority of the English in these matters—
based on English precedent as well as previous Spanish acknowledgement of English
right to rule in these cases—then the English claimed the right to question Spanish legal
authority in colonial Spanish America. Spain established extensive law courts throughout
much of their territories including Inquisition courts and consulados, to handle local
disputes. The English found themselves subject to these courts on numerous occasions.33
One example, in 1569, concerned men captured from the “troublesome voyage” of John
Hawkins. When both the Spanish civil and Inquisitional courts around San Juan de Ulúa
tried the men, the English government did not intervene in the proceedings.34 Spain held

32. Benton, Search For Sovereignty, 34.
33. Jason Eldred claims that many of these reports were exaggerated. Jason Eldred, “‘The Just
Will Pay for the Sinners’: English Merchants, the Trade with Spain, and Elizabethan Foreign
Policy,” Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies 10, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2010): 5–28.
34. The Casa de Contratación and the Consejo de Indias back in Spain did handle most cases
regarding commerce and trade in the New World, however, in the case of pirates, numerous cases
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land jurisdiction in their territories. The English saw no reason not to claim jurisdiction
over one of the few territories they could Spanish authority—the Atlantic Ocean. As
legal and colonial scholars have begun to point out, these cases are not all that different
from one another. Explorers and pirates alike drew on much of the same legal language
and colonial custom. The English, for example, did not try to colonize Spanish La
Florida. The Roanoke expeditions went to the edges of Spanish North America,
recognizing effective Spanish occupation. This implies mutual acknowledgement of
certain customs, yet Spain refused to concede to the expanding maritime jurisdiction
being establish by England.
Elizabethan legislation drew important distinctions between piracy and
privateering. Reprisal letters, proclamations, and court rulings all followed specific
language to uphold these distinctions. English lip-service did little to quell complaints.
Numerous Spanish complaints flooded the English courts and Privy Council and
Elizabeth answered them.35 In the same vein as her 1558 proclamation, her 1560
proclamation remained moderate in treatment and language towards pirates by offering
clemency to those willing to come forward. On report from “some of the subjects of her
good brother the king of Spain,” Elizabeth acknowledged the large number of pirates
exist within the Inquisitional courts of the trials luteranos. Luteranos means literally
“Lutherans,” but served as an umbrella term for non-Catholic religions. In many of these cases,
luteranos and piratas are interchangeable for describing “pirates.” For instance, see discussions
in David Alexander, William Collins, and Pierre Sanfroy, eds., Corsarios franceses e ingleses en
la Inquisición de la Nueva Espana, siglo XVI, (Mexico: Imprenta universitaria, 1945).
35. See various Spanish complaints of piracy in Dasent, ed., ACP, 1558-1570, vol. vii, 23;
Stevenson, ed, CSP, Foreign, Elizabeth, I; Robert Lemon, ed, Calendar of State Papers Domestic
of Edward, Mary, and Elizabeth, 1547-80, (London, UK: H. M. S. O., 1856), 85, 85, 86, 136,
164, 169, 176, 203, 219, 226.
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operating along her shores despite “the severity of Justice” her Majesty’s courts
prescribed for the offenses.36 This wording is again important. Elizabeth’s 1558
proclamation provided for only mild punishments of pirates, but she claimed that she
meted out severe penalties for piracy. Spanish mariners and the Spanish Crown did not
likely believe the severity of these punishments, but Elizabeth did technically respond to
Spanish complaints. In the 1560 proclamation she reiterated the invalidity of “certain old
letters of reprisals” issued before 1558.37 This proclamation also called for a registration
of pirates, including their names, where they operated, and even a list of their exploits.38
If seamen followed these orders, the Admiralty Court issued them pardons from court
proceedings they would have faced if captured by the Queen’s ships. Once again, in
closing, the Queen charged her officers to “have a diligent and carefull eye” for any such
piratical offences “as [officials] will answer for the contrary at their utmost peril.”39
Elizabeth acknowledged Spanish complaints and made political overtures to address the
subject of those grievances. Before issuing any more “severe” punishments for piracy,
Elizabeth first gave all pirates an opportunity to turn themselves in and legalize their
exploits. Submission to Elizabeth’s royal authority was emphasized over actual

36. Declaration 1560/1, EEBO.
37. Declaration 1560/1, EEBO.
38. The proclamation read, “Before her Majesty will extend her force of arms or Justice against
any of these sundry Pirates, her Majestie warneth them all to return with speed, either to their
dwelling places, or to the next port that they may attain unto after the notice hereof, and there to
geve knowledge of their names and dwelling places, and of all their enterprises done either by
themselves, or by such in whole company they were, while they were upon the Seas.”
Declaration, 1560/1, EEBO.
39. Declaration 1560/1, EEBO.
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punishment. With this legislation Elizabeth thus began to draw the thin line between
pirates and privateers.
As in the previous document, Elizabeth remained very conciliatory towards
pirates in her realm. She offered them a way to escape prosecution simply by returning
to port and admitting their transgressions. Records of identified pirates could also serve
as a pool of potentially useful privateers in the future. If pirates did as suggested, “her
Majesty [would be] content to show [them] favor and mercy.”40 Should they not take this
opportunity, they would suffer “extreme punishments as they deserved, to the example of
all others” though none of these “extreme punishments” were specified.41 Matters of
religion within England, especially during the first years of Elizabeth’s reign, often
overshadowed any of these proclamations on piracy and Admiralty Court issues and
thereby also overshadowed any efforts to enforce such legislation. This situation affected
the careful crafting of the language of the documents. Elizabeth did not have the time
and resources to effectively deal with these problems.
Some scholars claim that only weak rulers with inadequate naval forces had to
“tolerate” piracy because “it was the only naval power available.”42 Previous English
rulers attempted to use piracy for national profit and witnessed a general spike in piracy

40. Declaration 1560/1, EEBO.
41. Declaration 1560/1, EEBO.
42. N. A. M. Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, 660–1649 (New
York, NY: Harper Collins, 1997), 116.
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in the absence of an effective Royal Navy,43 but Elizabeth hoped that by enticing pirates
to gain new letters and turn in other pirates with the promise of pardon for their own
actions, she might be able to remedy the problem to some extent.44 Whether Elizabeth’s
original intention or not, the jurisdictional frameworks and legal procedure these acts
began to “foster” proved beneficial and significant in the following decades. Most
importantly, other European powers soon recognized these declarations and legal
procedures.
The Admiralty Court grew substantially under Elizabeth. With the expansion of
English maritime endeavors into the Atlantic, English courts saw it as only natural to
extend their jurisdiction to all maritime affairs affecting English property and subjects.
Rising tensions with Spain, especially, contributed to the issuance of yet another piracy
proclamation on 31 July 1564. The opening of this proclamation asserted the Queen’s
“good and perfect peace with all Princes and Countreys” and her desire “with the
assistaunce of almighty God, to continue in the same.”45 Elizabeth commanded that “all
manner of ships and vessels armed for war…shall with all speed return from the Seas and
43. In the thirteenth century, Edward I, for one, also issued royal license to “pirates.” Edward II
and Edward III continued the practice to some extent. The Edwards also began the practice of
summoning royal councils to address English naval affairs. Under Edward III, in 1338, only 14
of 361 ships in English service belonged to king—a situation Elizabeth also experienced during
her early reign. Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, 116–18, 124–28. Hence Elizabeth’s more
favorable attitude towards piracy and privateering as a supplement to her official navy.
44. Elizabeth also employed (whether knowingly or not) some of the tactics of the fabled Henry
V (1413-1422). Henry actively pursued the building of a navy, recognizing the possible
advantages of naval warfare in an infantry-centered world. Henry, unfortunately, did not have the
court system to follow up attacks on pirates that impeded his progress and threatened his
authority. See Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, 221ff. This system only began to blossom under
Tudor rule.
45. 1564 Proclamation, EEBO.
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unarm themselves.”46 The English claimed the right to seize ships that came into English
ports or threatened the Channel with guns unless they had “already given good and
sufficient surety not to offend any of the Subjects of the Kings and Princes with whom
her Majesty [was] in amity.”47 Just how many men followed this order, and how many
the Queen fully expected to do so, is debatable.
Events in the Spanish Caribbean in 1568 changed the nature and importance of
Elizabeth’s earlier proclamations concerning piracy. As of a result of English pirate
activity, Spain lost numerous shipments of gold and silver from its colonies meant to
finance Spanish efforts in subduing the Dutch. Hawkins’ “troublesome voyage”
produced, arguably, the first official acts of war from both England and Spain. The
Spanish viceroy in San Juan de Ulúa ordered the seizure of Hawkins’ ships docked in the
port for repairs. Some of the crew escaped, bringing word of the attack swiftly back to
England. In disguised retaliation, Elizabeth allowed the seizure of a Genoese ship
carrying money for Spanish troops in the Netherlands. The ship, part of a fleet carrying
bullion supposedly amounting to almost £150,000 to pay troops under the Duke of Alva
in the Netherlands, took shelter from bad weather in the Channel in English ports.48
English authorities, eager to seize this opportunity, and in full knowledge of Spain having
loaned the money from Genoese bankers, instantly raised questions about the ownership

46. 1564 Proclamation, EEBO.
47. 1564 Proclamation, EEBO.
48. Amount of the loan stated in Allan Crosby, ed., Vol. IX, Foreign Series, of the Reign of
Elizabeth I, 1569–1571, Calendar of State Papers (London, UK: H. M. S. O., 1874); Pollard,
Political History, 284.
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of the bullion. Legally, the money still belonged to the Genoese as the loan did not
become effective until the money reached Antwerp. The English exploited this technical
loophole. As a “precaution against theft,” English authorities unloaded the treasure.49
Ambassador Despes believed that Elizabeth confiscated the treasure for the express
purpose of damaging Spanish efforts in the Netherlands.50 Despes was likely correct in
this assumption but the seizure of the Spanish bullion was also in response to the recent
attack at San Juan and the gold became a hostage for reparations.
Existing treaties stated that an arrest of English goods required a formal complaint
of grievance and denial of redress.51 Spanish authorities rarely followed such process
before confiscating English goods. For this reason, Elizabeth could technically claim “a
breach of treaty and unwarranted aggression” which gave her justification for seizing
Spanish goods in England and placing Despes under house arrest for his part in the
affair.52 Since Brussels consorted with the Spanish government in this matter, Elizabeth
claimed the right to seize their goods abroad as well.53 On 6 January 1569, England
suspended all trade with Spain and Spanish territories.54 Elizabeth’s subsequent

49. James Williamson, The Age of Drake, (London, UK: Adam and Charles Black, 1938), 99.
50. G.D. Ramsay, The Queen’s Merchants and the Revolt of the Netherlands: The End of the
Antwerp Mart, (Manchester, UK: Manchester University, 1986); 103.
51. MacCaffrey, Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime, 188–95; Geoffrey Parker, The Grand
Strategy of Philip II (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1998), 156; Williamson, The Age of
Drake, 99; Ramsay, The Queen’s Merchants, 90–111.
52. MacCaffrey, Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime, 188–95; Williamson, The Age of Drake, 99.
53. Ramsay, The Queen’s Merchants, 90–111.
54. Crosby, CSP, Elizabeth, Foreign, 1569–1571, 5: 15–17.
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proclamation referred to “circumstances relating to the arrest of her subjects, and their
goods in the Low countries” and protested that their seizure “was done in retaliation of
the stay of certain Spanish ships and money [and] was not correct.”55 Citing her earlier
legislation, this proclamation further claimed that “the said [Spanish] vessels were
protected from the French.”56 Asserting her authority, Elizabeth also stated that: “by all
lawful custom and usage she had a right to borrow the said money, it being the property
of private merchants, and being saved from the perils of the sea on her territory.”57
Again, the language of this proclamation is extremely important especially
considering the rising tensions in the Netherlands. This proclamation proved crucial to
English maritime policy in a few very short years from its publication. In asserting the
English right and practice of protecting not just English subjects, but all of the subjects of
England’s allies from attack and spoil at sea, Elizabeth claimed the right to protect
shipping and prevent threats upon the Netherlands as the Dutch were subjects of the
Spanish king. Elizabeth and her “good brother” Philip claimed alliance and therefore no
grounds existed for arguing against this legislation. After all, Elizabeth claimed she was
protecting his subjects. Presaging the arguments of seventeenth-century lawyer and
scholar, Hugo Grotius, Elizabeth upheld ancient law and custom by showing herself

Three days prior, Dutch merchant Jan Heermans wrote to his colleague, Jan den Vackerren that
“there [was] great talk about a war between the King of Spain and this Queen [Elizabeth].”
Crosby, CSP, Elizabeth, Foreign, 1569–1571, 4:9.
55. Crosby, CSP, Elizabeth, Foreign, 1569–1571, 5.
56. Crosby, CSP, Elizabeth, Foreign, 1569–1571, 5.
57. Crosby, CSP, Elizabeth, Foreign, 1569–1571, 5.
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willing to “submit to arbitration” and to “help the weak and innocent.”58 Once again,
Philip found himself constrained by English jurisdictional claims and diplomatic
maneuvering.
Many factors affected Philip’s actions, or lack of action in this case. At the time,
Spain faced mounting Turkish preparations in the Mediterranean, Dutch unrest, and the
ascension of the new, non-Catholic English Queen. With these distractions, Philip first
attempted diplomacy with England. In fact, some scholars argue that Philip’s somewhat
restrained responses to Elizabethan maritime policy came from a strange protection of the
Queen. Letters from Philip show his apologies for not responding promptly to some of
the Queen’s letters, asking her to keep in communication with him. As one historian
notes, these letters show that, in the early years, Philip missed his best chance to exploit
England’s weakness and keep the Queen dependent on him.59
Philip did not necessarily acquiesce to the authority of the English courts, but he
did not challenge them directly. Dealing with long-distance communication and the rash
actions of his ambassador Despes, while constantly teetering on the brink of war, Philip
reached out to the Duke of Alba in the Netherlands, and even to Mary Stuart, Queen of
Scots. Alba’s inclusion meant one more opinion to consider. Mary Stuart’s involvement
meant further degrading Philip’s relationship with Elizabeth as Mary helped plot a

58. Hugonis Grotii, Mare Liberum Sive de Ivre Quod Batavis Competit an Indicana Commercia,
Dissertatio [The Freedom of the Sea Or, The Right Which Belongs to the Dutch to Take Part in
the East Indian Trade], trans. Ralph van Deman Magoffin, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace Division of International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1916.
Originally Published in 1608), 6.
59. See various dispatches and discussion in Parker, Grand Strategy, 153-163.
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serious of treasonous plots against Elizabeth. A series of victories for the Dutch inspired
Alba to advise Philip against opening another warfront against England at the time.
Philip’s acquiescence to Elizabethan claims over the Genoese seizure came as much from
the strain of ruling his empire as from the legitimacy of the arguments.60
Elizabeth made a conscious, calculated decision to embrace piracy. She and her
government did not support all piracy. Proscribed punishment became more severe and
even “aiders and abettors” became subject to prosecution. In all fairness, despite the
increasing of punishment for such offenses, the wording of the laws by the 1570s and
1580s actually allowed for increased practice of “piracy”—so long as pirates channeled
their attacks in the right direction, meaning away from English concerns. In these years,
the number of actual prosecutions of pirates decreased while the number of now
“privateers” steadily increased.61
As to the privateering licenses themselves, men certainly found illegal ways of
obtaining licenses. The issue of criminality and using criminals to promote settlement
and law offers an intriguing avenue through which to study the development of authority,
and eventually empire itself. Not only did pirates themselves become the subject of
discussion, but also the aiders and abettors and the corruption of courts and governments
that issued or ignored illegal licenses. Certainly, men forged some of these papers, but
60. This incident is discussed by Conyers Read, “Queen Elizabeth’s Seizure of the Duke of
Alva’s Pay-Ships,” Journal of Modern History, v (1933), 443-464; Ramsay, The Queen’s
Merchants, 90-113; and MacCaffrey, Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime, 187-195. For the
Spanish side, Parker includes several letters referencing this situation. Grand Strategy, 155-160.
61. Benton also discusses this “legal posturing” in her work as “…a system of rewards that
required subjects to sustain their ties to sovereigns and seek future patronage on the basis of
evidence that they had advanced crown interests.” Benton, Search For Sovereignty, 24.

37

men could fairly easily obtain letters through legal channels. If seamen acquired these
letters through such official means, the pirate can be viewed in much the same light as the
colonized South American Indians—“subaltern”62 groups who found ways to work
within the colonizing government that meant to police and control them. If
historiography then praises the “manipulation” of Spanish court systems by these
marginalized groups, then pirates deserve some rehabilitation and praise for their
ingenuity of exploitation and adaptation.
Perhaps one of the reasons that English legal posturing proved so successful is
that Elizabeth’s piracy and privateering legislation was much more conciliatory than
persecutory. This argument is not entirely new that there was a very fine line between
piracy and privateering, but the particular posturing and language of royal declarations
and admiralty law deserves greater analysis. Even if the decision to create privateers
from pirates was initially ad hoc, the English crown and government established a
concrete and detailed system to surround that decision. This decision was not simply a
‘quick-fix,’ but rather developed into an integral part of Elizabethan legislation and
foreign policy. Men, pirate or privateer, who strayed from the law faced prosecution.

62. I use the term “subaltern” here for the sake of argument. Based on readings and conference
presentations I have attended, I find a fairly significant disconnect between European historians’
definition and use of the term “subaltern” and that of Latin American historians. For European
historians, subaltern largely means “minority voice.” The Latin American context of the word is
much more complicated. Following Gayatari Spivak’s arguments, I tend to argue that a true
subaltern does not even exist. Minorities’ voices, or “oppressed groups” as Spivak labels them,
certainly exist, but are they necessarily subaltern? It is an issue that certainly needs further
developing between the two historiographies. Gayatari Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in
Postcolonial Studies Reader, ed. Bill Ashcroft, et al (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006
(reprint)), 27–35. See also Matthew Restall, “A History of the New Philology and the New
Philology in History,” Latin American Research Review 38, no. 1 (2003): 113–34.
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The “fine line” symbolized a series of distinctions and laws surrounding
privateering and drawing clear distinctions from piracy. As evidence of dissemination of
these ideas, William Shakespeare’s plays also draw distinctions between the criminal
pirate and the loyal privateer. Pirates, noted through their dress, speech, and port of
origin, are starkly contrasted to loyal soldiers who go “cheerly to the sea” for their
country and sovereign.63 Shakespeare describes base pirates as “white-livered and redfaced,” villainous, and unmanly.64 Pirates remained borderless criminals subject to the
full punishment of the courts. Privateers were subjects of the crown with recourse to
appeal.

63. This description comes from Henry V, 2.2, ll. 201. Shakespeare, Henry V, Barbara Mowat
and Paul Werstine, eds., (New York, NY: Washington Square Press, 1995). Printed for the
Folger Shakespeare Library. Henry V was first performed in 1586 and published in 1600.
64. Shakespeare, Henry V, 3.2, ll. 40-44, 54, and 50-51
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CHAPTER III
FORTIFICATION, SUPPLY, AND FINANCE: ANGLO-SPANISH COMPETITION IN
THE NEW WORLD
As England began constructing their international maritime court and justification
for extending their maritime jurisdiction into the Atlantic World, Englishmen envisioned
the possibility of an overseas empire to rival their Spanish neighbors. Sixteenth-century
legal practices encouraged English seamen to explore, venturing farther into Atlantic
trade routes, by offering them a degree of protection as privateers. The nature of English
imperial expansion, built upon privateering, differed markedly from that of the
established Spanish colonial power. Spain built and held its empire through the
Requerimiento,1 provincial courts, and fortifications. England’s empire grew out of the
establishment of supply bases along the American coastline from which to strike Spanish
Atlantic fleets. Controlling supplies meant prosperity. Fortifications did little good if not
adequately supplied. English maritime strategy in this contest for imperial dominance
resulted in English colonies in North America and the Caribbean, and the decline of
Spanish colonial power.
Some Englishmen made voyages into and across the Atlantic in the fifteenth
century, but those expeditions largely failed. England, and most of Europe, hoped to
emulate the success of Spain. Columbus’ 1492 arrival in Hispaniola first established the
Spanish presence in the New World. Within decades, Spanish influence spread
throughout the Caribbean and Central and South America. Tudor England desired its

1. The “requirement” informed indigenous groups about the Spanish right to colonize based on
religious right. See, for instance, Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession: Europe’s Conquest of
the New World, 1492-1640, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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own such dynasty. As the English ventured into the New World, the English and Spanish
crowns found themselves focusing more and more on their Atlantic policies. Spain began
building fortifications in La Florida and Mexico to combat English privateers. The
disruption of wealth to Spain and profit made by England through these endeavors and
their methods of finance, led to a changing power structure back in Europe and in the
New World.
By 1497, the English also sent ships across the Atlantic. The English sailed north
to avoid crossing into Spanish territory. Pope Alexander VI issued the Treaty of
Tordesillas in 1494 dividing the world between the Spain and Portugal and, as England
remained Catholic at this time, they sought to avoid conflicts with their brethren by
respecting the treaty.2 Sailing the northern route, John Cabot discovered Nova Scotia and
Newfoundland in 1497. The following year, he sailed down the American coast, but got
lost around the Chesapeake. Englishmen hold that with these voyages, the English
discovered America first while the Spaniards occupied themselves with the Indies.

3

Columbus did not actually reach North America until his later voyages. Cabot’s son,
Sebastian, continued his father’s mission and, in finding Hudson Strait, thought he had
discovered the North-West passage to the Pacific.4
Such amicable relations with Spain would not last long. By the 1530s, Henry
2. Pope Julius II revised the treaty’s provisions in a papal bull of 1506. See Paul Gottschalk,
editor and translator, The Earliest Diplomatic Documents on America; the Papal Bulls of 1493
and the Treaty of Tordesillas, (Berlin: P. Gottschalk, 1927). For Julius II, see Christine Shaw,
Julius II: The Warrior Pope, (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1993).
3. A.L. Rowse, The Elizabethans and America: The Trevelyan Lectures at Cambridge, 1958
(New York: Harper Colophon, 1959), 3-4.
4. Rowse, Elizabethan in America, 3-4.
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VIII, the former “Defender of the Faith,” decided to annul his marriage to his wife, the
Spanish princess Catherine of Aragon, in order to marry an English courtier, Anne
Boleyn so that he might finally have a male heir.5 The Pope, trying to balance his
decision within the power struggle among the papacy, the Spanish monarchy and the
English monarchy, would not issue Henry an annulment. Therefore, in 1534, Henry
issued the Act of Succession formally creating the Church of England and officially
severing English ties with Rome and Catholicism. This act also made the young Mary,
daughter of Henry and Catherine, illegitimate and nullified the young princess’
engagement to Charles I/V (1500-1558), King of Spain (1516) and Holy Roman Emperor
(1530).6 Diplomatic ties between England and Spain were shattered.
In the years following the Act of Succession, England found itself too occupied
with court intrigue, Henry’s numerous divorces, and religious matters to focus any
significant attention on colonizing the New World. Issues of trade and authority on the
seas would become an issue again as Mary ascended the English throne in 1553 and
finally married a Spanish king in Charles’ son, Philip II, in 1554. Mary, a Catholic
herself, allowed her husband almost free reign in matters concerning the sea.
Charles almost single-handedly negotiated his son’s marriage treaty to the Tudor
Queen. Philip, a decade younger than his proposed Queen, objected to his father’s initial
treaty. Only after the parties agreed on provisions of the treaty, did Charles present his
son with the offer. Ever proud, the soon-to-be Philip II (1555) objected to certain aspects
5. Henry’s reasoning in this was that Catherine had originally been betrothed to Henry’s brother
Arthur.
6. Statues of the Realm, (London, UK: G. Eyre and A. Strahan, 1810-1828), iii, 471. Printed by
the command of His Majesty King George the Third. 11 vols.
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of the treaty including provisions that any heirs produced by the union would remain in
England, and that those heirs would lay claim to the Low Countries.7 The official
language of the treaty stated that “the Most Serene Prince Philip will enjoy the style,
honor, and kingly name of the realms and dominions pertaining to the said Most Serene
Queen…while preserving the rights, laws, privileges, and customs of the same realms
and dominions.” Mary, first and foremost a Tudor, would not give away complete
control of her kingdom, despite her long-held desire to return England to Catholicism and
rejoin England to her mother’s Spain. Even so, Mary recognized Philip’s objections to
specific terms of the treaty.8
Though Charles did write to his son that, “as to the secret matter,” the Queen
agreed with Philip, in reality, Philip had little to disagree with in the treaty. All in all, the
treaty assured him a fairly equal place on the English throne provided he not promote
foreigners or take munitions from the realm.9
Aside from religious unease, many Englishmen worried that this marriage would
result in England becoming a Spanish province and be dominated by Spanish concerns
not often in alignment with, or in the best interest of, the politics of the English realm.
Soon after the marriage took place, those concerns were realized as the Spanish
7. Harry Kelsey, Philip of Spain, King of England: The Forgotten Sovereign, (London, UK: I. B.
Tauris and Co., 2012), 63.
8. Copia de la capitulación de la casamiento, AGS Estado 807, fol. 36, 2 and Philip’s objections
in escriptura ad cautelam, AGS Estado 807, 36, 1, 4 January 1554.
9. Kamen and Loades agree that Philip did not object too strongly to the treaty. Kamen, Spain’s
Road to Empire: The Making of a World Power, 1492-1763, (London, UK: Penguin, 2002); D.
M. Loades, England’s Maritime Empire: Seapower, Commerce, and Policy, 1490-1690, (Harlow,
UK: Longman, 2000).
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connection brought England into the Franco-Spanish conflict of the 1550s. Though the
marriage treaty stated that “England shall not be entangled with the war between the
emperor [Charles V] and the French king,” Mary did indeed join the fray. England and
France had long been enemies and Mary was eager to please her husband. The marriage
treaty further stipulated that: “Philip, as much as he can, shall see peace observed
between France and England, and give no cause of breach, but may assist in defense of
his lands and revenge of his injuries.”10 On this last statement came the justification for
English involvement according to Philip and his Catholic wife.
This last provision of the marriage treaty also allowed for Philip to assert control
over English seamen, traders, and, most importantly, plunderers and pirates. In June and
September of 1556, the council to the king, and the king writing to Mary from Ghent
addressed the presence of and attacks by pirates. Mary immediately sent out ships
against the pirates.11 Mary’s pursuit of these errant seamen began English intervention
for the Spanish cause. On 9 June 1557, Mary and Philip issued a proclamation licensing
privateers.12 The proclamation allowed subjects to: “equip ships at their own charges for
the annoyance of the French…without penalty.”13 Despite this licensure and its proposed
purpose, the ships were not to be armed, nor munitions taken from any ship.14 Following
Mary’s earlier appeasement of Philip’s entreaties for the discontinuation of English
10. Knighton, CSP Domestic, Mary, 279-280; TNA, CSP 11/11, no. 24.
11. Knighton, CSP Domestic, Mary, 124, 239-240; TNA, CSP 11/9, nos. 13, 33.
12. Knighton, CSP Domestic, Mary, 279-280; TNA, CSP 11/11, no. 24.
13. Knighton, CSP Domestic, Mary, 279-280; TNA, 11/11, no. 24.
14. Knighton, CSP Domestic, Mary, 279-280; TNA, 11/11, no. 24.
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attacks on his ships and their disruption of Spanish trade,15 this proclamation addressed
not only trade in the English Channel (largely to the Netherlands), but extended
prohibitions of trade to include all areas of Spanish trade and also allowed Spain, through
England, to trade in even more parts of the world.
English merchants established trade with regions like East Friesland, one of the
few areas outside of Spain’s jurisdiction. Most of the expansion of English trade,
however, took merchants to the New World and to Africa—areas that Spain claimed rule
over under the Treaties of Alcáçovas and Tordesillas.16 As early as the 1530s and 1540s
Englishmen traded goods through Spain to America. During these decades the practice
of trading directly from England to Brazil also grew. Iberian traders in England helped to
establish direct English trade with Morocco as well.17
Some merchants even began trading with Guinea in West Africa in the 1550s, but
Mary I banned commercial voyages there in response to Philip’s numerous protests.18 On
27 October 1555, the council to the king wrote that the Portuguese ambassador
complained often of English ships trading at Elmina in Guinea. As the ambassador

15. A number of Spanish complaints and letters exist in the CSP Domestic, Mary, as well as CSP
Spanish, for the same years.
16. The Treaty of Alcáçovas, signed in 1479, concluded the War of Castilian Succession between
Spain and Portugal. Aside from settling dynastic claims, the treaty divided the Atlantic between
Portugal and Spain—Spain in the Canary Islands and north, Portugal to the south. The Treaty of
Tordesillas expanded upon this almost two decades later. “Treaty Between Spain and Portugal,
Concluded at Alcáçovas, September 4, 1479,” accessed from The Avalon Project at Yale Law
School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/15th_century/sppo01.asp
17. Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, 11.
18. The CSP entries at TNA contain original letters of the parties involved, including the
Portuguese.
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offered no direct proof as to the nationality of the ships, the council, “[thought] it fair
nothing should be tried which is contrary to justice or impedes the amity which has long
existed between this realm [England] and Portugal,” and did not advise the king to stop
the trade. If such trade was hindered, “it would injure the fortunes of many distinguished
merchants of [Philip’s] city of London.”19 This correspondence came as a response to
Philip’s agreement during the previous months to meet Portuguese objections to English
designs on the Guinea trade.20
By December, the situation changed. On 18 December 1555, the council wrote
instead that, after much discussion, they felt that Philip should order English merchants to
“refrain from departing, as was commanded in the names of your majesties at the start of
last summer.”21 The council wrote further discussed the case of one merchant, Antonio
Guarras, who sought to trade in Guinea, a Spanish-allied port. In a statement to Philip,
they warned the king of the harm caused to the king because of English licensing
practices. By granting licenses too easily, the English Crown exempted these men from
paying the taxes owed in the Guinea trading ports, and to the Crown for trading rights.
Playing upon the diminution of “his majesties’ taxes” thereby, the council sought “to
avoid many deceits always done under pretext of these licences” and urged the queen to
recall these licenses.22 By bowing to Spanish influence in the region and to the concerns
of Philip’s exchequer, Mary and her council supported Philip’s arguments that he
19. Knighton, ed., CSP, Domestic, Mary; TNA, CSP 11/14, no. 4, 124.
20. Brown and Bentnick, eds., CSP, Venetian, vi, 251.
21. Knighton, ed. CSP, Domestic, Mary; TNA, CSP 11/6, no. 78, 141.
22. Knighton, ed., CSP, Domestic, Mary; TNA, CSP 11/6, no. 78, 14.
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possessed the power and right to deny all other nations trade in his domain. After all, he
had the pope’s blessing to do so. The king, with support of his English queen, thus bound
English subjects to the Treaty of Tordesillas. Even though the treaty officially
recognized Portuguese control of Guinea, Portugal remained a Spanish ally. Upholding
Portuguese claims against English encroachment, also gave Philip grounds to expand his
support of the treaty for Spanish lands. Furthermore, in 1556, Philip also convinced
France to end their trade to the West Indies unless under special license from him.23
Needless to say, such license became more difficult to obtain.
In 1558, Philip lost his English ally with the death of his wife, Queen Mary.
Protestant Princess Elizabeth succeeded her sister. While Elizabeth well understood her
new and uncertain position in international politics, she felt no obligation to Spain or to
much of her sister’s political agenda. Elizabeth paid little regard to the Treaty of
Tordesillas or to the papal bulls surrounding the treaty that divided the New World
between Spain and Portugal.24 Even more galling to Philip was Elizabeth’s refusal to
police piracy against Spain in the colonies and throughout the Atlantic that directly
challenged the authority he claimed for himself (and the King of Portugal) in “all the
territories in the Western ocean, island or mainland, discovered or undiscovered” in the
Treaty of Crépy in 1544.25 Philip’s ambassador in London wrote in 1558 that the King

23. Rowse, Elizabethans in America, 7.
24. See again Paul Gottschalk, editor and translator, The Earliest Diplomatic Documents on
America; the Papal Bulls of 1493 and the Treaty of Tordesillas, (Berlin: P. Gottschalk, 1927).
For Julius II, see Christine Shaw, Julius II: The Warrior Pope, (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1993).
25. Quoted in Richmond, The Navy as an Instrument of Policy, 7.
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“deeply resented being interfered with” in his western “navigations.”26 On 29 January
1559, in discussing English negotiations with France, William Cecil, hereafter referred to
as Lord Burghley, related that: “as to the reports made by Spaniards concerning a treaty
[Mary and Philip’s marriage treaty] whereby the realm of England rests bound to them,
[Elizabeth] (thanked be to God) remain[ed] a free prince and owner of her crown and
people.”27
England and Spain had debated nations’ rights to trade for years. The English
argued that the seas were free and Englishmen maintained the right to trade “where there
was water to float [their] ships” while Spain continued to cite centuries-old papal bulls,
royal proclamations, and the theory of occupation to affirm their sole right to trade with
their possessions overseas.28 In 1561, Philip’s ambassador informed him that Lord
Burghley, Elizabeth’s secretary, claimed that “The Pope had no right to partition the
world and to give and take kingdoms to whomever he pleased.”29 This statement again
expressed English disregard of Spanish claims when it came to trade for as the
ambassador also wrote Philip, “Nothing will bring these people to their senses. They
claim to have a right to go to all lands or provinces belonging to friendly states without

26. As quoted in Pollard, Political History, 305.
27. Stevenson, CSP, Foreign, Elizabeth, I, 107.
William Cecil, Lord Burghley, served as Elizabeth’s chief advisor and Secretary of State from
1550-1553 and 1558-1572, as well as Lord High Treasurer from 1572 until his death in 1598.
Wallace MacCaffrey, “Cecil, William, first Baron Burghley (1520/21-1598),” Oxford Dictionary
of National Biography, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004.
28. Woodrooffe, The Enterprise of England, 160.
29. Quoted in Williamson, The Age of Drake, 33.
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exception.”30
The English answered earlier Portuguese ambassadors who complained about
Englishmen trading along the coast of Africa with the argument that only effective
occupation meant the English could not trade in a particular place. So long as English
traders stayed away from forts and traded with independent parties, they could go
wherever they pleased.31 This would certainly be their opinion in the New World as well.
Little heeding Philip’s protests, amid the growing tensions between Spain and the
Netherlands just across the English Channel, Elizabeth increased her promotion and
encouragement of privateering even more in the 1560s and 1570s. Her piracy and
privateering policies in the 1560s were in their infancy, but were by no means a novel
enterprise. But the year 1568/9 would prove a turning point in both these policies and
English and Spanish New World “policies” as well. In that year, John Hawkins made his
third voyage to the West Indies. Hawkins had been a trader (notably a slave trader) under
the reign of Mary and Philip and continued his enterprise under Elizabeth.
Hawkins’ amity with Spanish traders, strained as it was with the growing AngloSpanish tensions in the Atlantic as well as in Europe, reached a violent end in 1568 on his
third “troublesome” voyage.

32

In the summer of that year, Hawkins’ fleet sailed for the

30. Quoted in Woodrooffe, Enterprise of England, 26
31. Woodrooffe, Enterprise of England, 26.
A.L. Rowse also sees Elizabeth’s reversal of Mary’s policies concerning trade and navigation as a
huge change for Anglo-Spanish relations and, practically, as the start of the British Empire. The
Elizabethans and America.
32. Present Day Mexico, Gulf of Mexico coastline, 300 miles from Mexico City. Doran,
Elizabeth I and Foreign Policy, 28. Hawkins, especially in the eyes of the Spanish, was a pirate.
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New World to sell slaves acquired from the African coast—a trade Philip explicitly
denied to Englishmen based on the Treaties of Tordesillas and Crépy. Elizabeth paid
little heed to Philip’s declarations and did not discourage individuals from pursuing
various trade missions. She even lent Hawkins two 700-ton ships to undertake the
voyage.33 With royal ships as escorts, such voyages lost their peaceful appearance and by
setting out armed seemed almost “designed to fight.”34 As the fleet began to sail back to
England, a hurricane battered the ships and forced them down the Mexican coast.
Limping along outside of San Juan de Ulúa, the entrance to Vera Cruz, one of the great
silver export towns of the Spanish Empire, Hawkins’ requested a truce with the Spanish
officials there for a period of a few days in order to repair and supply his broken ships.35

33. After delivering and selling his slaves at the port of Santa Marta and various other ports
along the Mexican coast, Hawkins’ fleet began the trip back to England in August, 1568. A
series of storms forced the ships south towards the Caribbean and Hawkins had to take shelter in
the Spanish port of San Juan de Ulúa. Having claimed the sole right to this trade, the Spanish
highly resented the flagrant disregard of their authority—especially since Hawkins’ shipments
created a price competition in what had been a Spanish monopoly. Philip Gosse, Hawkins:
Scourge of Spain, (New York: Harper Brothers, 1930), 12.
The Proclamation of 1564 acknowledged that English commerce needed protection and ships
could equip themselves for such purposes. For larger scale commercial voyages like those
undertaken by Hawkins or various other English merchants and traders, endeavors that Elizabeth
herself often invested in, Elizabeth even lent her royal ships to “stiffen” the professedly peaceful
expeditions. Pollard, Political History, 312.
34. Pollard, Political History, 312.
35. “I have touched in your island only to the intent to refresh my men with fresh victuals, which
for my money or my wares you shall sell me, meaning to stay only 5 or 6 days here at the
furthest. In the which time you may assure yourself, and so all other, that by me or by any of
mine there shall no damage be done to any man; the which also the Queen’s Majesty of England,
my mistress, at my departure out of England commanded me to have great care of, and to serve
with my navy the King’s Majesty of Spain, my old master, if in places where I came any of his
stood need.” Hawkins, 16 September 1568. Letter quoted in Gosse, Scourge of Spain, 60-61.
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Once in harbor, however, the truce quickly fell apart. The newly-arrived Spanish
viceroy ordered an attack on Hawkins’ fleet. San Juan de Ulúa was one of the better
equipped forts in the Spanish Empire. Guarding Vera Cruz, the launching point for the
plate fleets, San Juan de Ulúa had to be well-equipped. Therefore, a number of Spanish
ships and men stood ready to arm against their Anglo enemies. The English discovered
the plot, but not with enough time for escape. Following the skirmish, only two of
Hawkins’ ships limped back to England. Francis Drake, Hawkins’ cousin and second in
command, managed to make his way back to England on 20 January 1569. Hawkins
arrived at Plymouth on 15 January 1569 and reached London on 4 February 1569.36
The news they brought (and the news that preceded their arrival) prompted
seizures of ships in English ports waiting to transport Spanish monies to the Netherlands.
In response, Margaret of Parma, Philip’s sister in charge of the Netherlands, issued
embargoes on English shipping.37 Following these events, Elizabeth opened her letter to

Hawkins explained his situation and assured the governor he had come in peace and would pay
the current prices for all of his provisions, water, and ships’ materials. As soon as the repairs
were completed, he would leave the harbor and never return. C. Raymond Beazley, Voyages and
Travels Mainly During the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, (New York: Copper Square,
1964), 96-97.
36. Wright, Documents Concerning English Voyages to the Spanish Main, xx. See also Walter
Oakeshott, Founded Upon the Seas: A Narrative of Some English Maritime and Overseas
Expansion During the Period 1550 to 1616, (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1942), 48.
37. The ships carried upwards on £150,000 meant to pay troops in the Netherlands. Amount of
the loan stated in Pollard, Political History, 284. CSP Foreign, 1569-1571. For more discussion
on the seizure and embargoes, see Ramsay, The Queen’s Merchants; Beazley, Voyages, vol. 1,
84. From the State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth, vol. 48, no. 50. The embargo by Alva began on
29 December 1568. Walter Oakeshott, Founded Upon the Seas: A Narrative of Some English
Maritime and Overseas Expansion During the Period 1550 to 1616, (Freeport, NY: Books for
Libraries Press, 1942), 50; Williamson, The Age of Drake, 99. Parker, Grand Strategy, 156;
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Philip with an expression of her sorrow for the “turbulent conditions” of the Netherlands
that required such loans, though closed the letter with a complaint that Alva’s seizure of
English goods and men “were in direct violation of different treaties.”38 She then signed
the letter expressing her “good will and desire for keeping peace.”39 Despite Elizabeth’s
and Philip’s contrivances at peace, they unofficially declared war one another by 1569.40
Philip’s ambassador in London, Don Gerau Despes, whom Elizabeth placed on
house arrest following his conniving with Alva, wrote to Philip that the English “demand
[that they] shall enjoy their liberties…that they shall be free to go with merchandise to
the Indies, and neither in Flanders nor in Spain shall they be molested in person or
property for their heresies.”41 According to Despes, these were “absurd pretensions,” just
as the previous arguments of the English to trade rights upon the sea were fallacious and
illogical.42 Philip also thought it absurd that the English ambassador expected to follow
his own religion in Spain since the Spanish Inquisition's purpose was to make the
Ramsay, Queen’s Merchants, 90-111; Wallace MacCaffrey, Queen Elizabeth and the Making of
Policy, 1572-1588, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 188-195.
38. CSP Foreign, 1569-1571, 15, no. 58.
39. CSP Foreign, 1569-1571, 15, no. 58.
40. The “hotter” Protestants of England saw this act by the Spanish as a declaration of war and
justification for a crusade against the Spanish. But cooler heads prevailed and Elizabeth was able
to avoid an open declaration of war. She sent letters to Philip expressing her regret for this
incident. (Gosse, Scourge of Spain, 92.) Philip accepted her overtures of peace partly because he
recognized that his agents’ held some guilt in the matter, partly because he found himself
consumed with other pressing matters in the Netherlands and in the Eastern Mediterranean, and
he feared an unchecked full-scale privateering campaign. One less enemy was readily welcome.
41. Spanish Calendar, ii, as quoted in Parker, Grand Strategy, 194-195.
42. Spanish Calendar, ii, as quoted in Parker, Grand Strategy, 194-195.
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position of heretics intolerable in Spanish dominions.43 Philip expanded his restriction to
Spanish colonies thus attaching religious justification to his prohibition of English trade
“on pain of death.” 44 Spain insisted on the altruistic, missionizing aims of its actions in
the New World, bringing religion directly into the discussions about New World and
foreign policy.
At least, Philip tried to make it appear so. Philip even went so far as to expel
Elizabeth’s ambassador, Dr. John Man, or “that dogmatising scamp” as Philip referred to
him, from Seville.45 These actions “provoked the counter-resolve to make an end of
Spanish dominion” whenever and wherever possible. Increasingly aggressive English
commercial expansion assumed a “character of a political and religious contest” lacking
elsewhere for the English (particularly referring to the Netherlands).46 Even so, English
maritime expansion remained more political than religious. Englishmen could use
religious beliefs as justification for encroaching upon and raiding Spanish shipping but
anticipated revenues outweighed religiosity.
Increasing imperial competition and heightened political debates spurred changes
in English and Spanish New World policies. At the very least, competition and debate
made New World considerations a staple of domestic negotiations between Spain and
England. For one, the English intensified and expanded the licensing process for
43. See Pollard, Political History; Helen Rawlings, The Spanish Inquisition, (Malden, MA:
Blackwell, 2006).
44. Quoted in Pollard, Political History, 312.
45. Quoted in Pollard, Political History, 285. Man had supposedly called the Pope a “canting
little monk.” Quoted in Parker, Grand Strategy, 156.
46. Pollard, Political History, 307.

53

privateers. They also began making plans for more permanent supply towns along the
North American coast to help aid and offer repairs to privateering fleets operating in the
Spanish Atlantic. In response, the Spanish government increased their funding for the
building and equipping of fortresses along the Mexican, Florida, and Caribbean
coastlines. The events at San Juan de Ulúa and Elizabeth’s response also demonstrated
the inevitable intertwining of the issues of maritime law and foreign policy. Spain, who
attempted to establish their claims in the New World with effective occupation in all
areas, proceeded to address English encroachments on those territories.
In the early sixteenth century, Spain expanded into the southern parts of the
United States from Florida but did little to nothing to solidify their claim there for nearly
twenty years. As diplomacy failed, Spain looked to fortify its New World territories,
quadrupling the amount of money sent there for defense.47 Previously, in 1562 and 1564,
the French established posts at Port Royal Sound in South Carolina, and Fort Caroline in
Florida. French presence spurred Spaniards to action. By 1565, Philip sent orders to rid
La Florida of the French settlers there, eventually ousting the French after a serious of
skirmishes. In this early incident, some part of the Spanish religious fanaticism still
existed, as seen in a soldier’s response to the killings: “Men killed them rather by divine
inspiration than by suggestion of any human intelligence.”48 Religion did not completely

47. Paul Hoffman, The Spanish Crown and the Defense of the Caribbean, 1535-1585:
Precedent, Patrimonialism, and Royal Parisomony, (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State
University Press, 1980), 62, 71. Hoffman includes numerous charts about the Crown’s Caribbean
defense spending, the number of raids against Spanish ships, and some of the losses to the
Spanish treasury thereby. See for examples charts on 12-15, 22-23, and 68 as support for other
figures cited in the dissertation.
48. Quoted in Rowse, Elizabethans in America, 9.

54

disappear from the Spanish justification, but economics and imperial politics dominated
Spanish concerns.
Spain contemplated their own colonies along the North Carolina coast, on the
northern borders of Spanish La Florida in the mid-sixteenth century. Plate fleets, the
common name given to Spanish Atlantic cargo fleets, leaving late from the Caribbean
often encountered hurricanes during their biannual crossings, scattering Spanish ships
and men as far north as Cape Hatteras.49 Such posts would serve as salvaging operations
and protection from Indians for the marooned crew. Reports concerning English attempts
at settlements in the Carolinas and the Chesapeake further convinced Spanish officials of
the necessity of maintaining the Florida garrisons. They had reason to worry. Thomas
Stukely proposed a mission in 1563 to found a post in South Carolina not far from Port
Royal and Hawkins had visited and supplied the troublesome French post in Florida in
1565.50

49. C.H. Haring, Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the time of the
Hapsburgs, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1918), 201-229; Richard Hakluyt, Voyages
and Discoveries: The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English
Nation, (Middlesex, UK: Penguin Books, 1985), originally published in 1589, viii, 303, 307.
50. Woodbury Lowery, “Jean Ribaut and Queen Elizabeth,” American Historical Review, 9, no.
3, (1904): 456-459; D.B. Quinn, “Some Spanish Reactions to Elizabethan Colonial Enterprises,”
in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series, vol. 26, (1951):53-79, 4; James
Williamson, Hawkins of Plymouth, (London, UK: Black, 1949), 65.
Stukely both supported the aims of the Queen and the realm to establish England in the New
World, but also rebelled against the Queen for his entire career. He skirted charges of piracy on
numerous occasions using the existing privateering policies. The queen loaned him ships for his
colonial venture to La Florida, but Stukely spent most of his time privateering rather than settling
a colony and Elizabeth sent a crew to arrest him, to appease the French and Spanish who
complained of his exploits. Stukely continued to alternate between English and Spanish loyalties
for the next two decades after yet another acquittal. Richard Simpson and J. W. M. Gibbs, eds,
William Shakespeare’s The School of Shakespeare: Biography of Thomas Stucley, the Famous
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The English did not just try to wrestle the Americas from Spain. England, more
so than anything, aimed to strike at the heart of Spain. Through privateering, the English
obstructed the flow of wealth from Spain’s colonies to Europe.51 Fears of increased
English speculation in these areas with the intensification of privateering following 1569
renewed the necessity of establishing control in these areas. In 1571 and 1572, three
English ships also attacked St. Augustine. Scholars debate who commanded these ships.
Few believe Hawkins occupied the post despite his connection to the earlier French raids
and rumors he plotted his own raid on St. Augustine in 1570. Spanish commander Pedro
Menéndez de Avilés eventually drove the ships off, though the English put up a fierce
fight.52 Unfortunately for Spain, the shores of the Carolina coast with its many barrier
islands, reefs, and shoals made maneuvering and anchoring large warships impossible.
The numerous light craft that needed to patrol the area proved too expensive an endeavor
for an already thinly stretched Spanish treasury. The smaller, lighter, and more navigable
English ships held the advantage along the northerly coastlines. Further south, Francis
Drake harassed Spanish ports in the Caribbean and Central and South America.
History of the Life and Death of Captain James Stukely, Nobody and Somebody, (London, UK:
Chatto and Windus, 1878); TNA SP 30/5 and Lambeth Palace Library, Carew Papers 1570-1646.
51. Englishmen searched for places to establish supply bases along the American coastline and
among the various islands of the Caribbean. Roanoke in the 1580s served this purpose, though
briefly. Until more permanent English settlements developed, Englishmen occasionally made
agreements with French garrisons in northern Florida, and even with Spanish settlements at times.
For example, see discussions in D. B. Quinn, The Westward Enterprise: English Activities in
Ireland, the Atlantic, and America, 1480-1650, (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press,
1979); Wim Klooster and Alfred Padula, eds., The Atlantic World: Essays on Slavery, Migration,
and Imagination. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2005); and Claudia
Schnurmann, Europa trifft Amerika: atlantische Wirtschaft in her Frühen Neuzeit, 1492-1783,
(Frankfurt am Main: Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verl, 1998).
52. Wright, English Voyages to the Spanish Main, 37-39.
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Taking Drake’s Caribbean raids as a prime example, the impact of the privateers
as a means of policy becomes clear. A fiery, unabashedly anti-Spanish sailor, Drake
accompanied his cousin John Hawkins in 1568. He used his experience at San Juan de
Ulúa as a launch point for his personal privateering campaign in the Caribbean against
Philip II from 1571-1573. In 1571, Drake raided the towns of Nombre de Dios and Venta
de Cruces near modern Panama. Spanish General Diego Flores de Valdés managed to
keep the French and English pirates outside of the cities at bay in early 1571.53 By
March, Valdés handed command over to his Admiral, Gerónimo de Narváez.54 The
French gave up trying to take Venta de Cruces because of Valdés, but Drake paid close
attention to the new general, recognized his impotence, and made the decision to raid the
town. A 1575 Spanish list of raids states that in 1571, “franciso drak” stole over 50,000
ducats worth of goods.55 This amounts to almost fifty percent of Spanish militia
expenditures in the Caribbean at the time.56 Drake searched for places to sell some of the
merchandise and slaves that he acquired from this raid as his ships could not bear the
immense load.57
Drake’s raids and the gold and goods obtained during them benefited English
coffers, harried Spanish forces, and exacerbated the imperial conflict between the two
53. Valdés, who became Chief of Staff to Armada Commander Medina Sidonia, commanded the
Squadron of Castile in the 1588 Armada campaign.
54. Williamson, The Age of Drake, 40-41.
55. Williamson, The Age of Drake, 41.
56. Hoffman, The Spanish Crown and the Defense of the Caribbean, 45.
57. Williamson, The Age of Drake, 41
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powers. On 24 May 1572, Drake sailed once again for Nombre de Dios.58 Much more
care and planning went into this mission than Drake’s previous, minimally successful
raids in Panama. Not deterred for long, Drake prepared for a raid on Nombre de Dios in
1573—specifically the mule trains there that would be loading and unloading the Spanish
Plate Fleet’s stores of gold and silver. Drake received news that the Spanish fleet arrived
on 5 January 1573.59 As Drake camped outside of Panama City planning his next move,
he made alliances with local runaway slaves (cimaroons).60 This relationship proved
very beneficial to Drake. The cimaroons supplemented his dwindling manpower and
held valuable knowledge of the land that aided his planning. Though a number of men
were lost in this attack, the fleets made off with a good deal of gold and silver equaling
approximately £20,000, an amount approximate to half the contemporary national debt of
England.61 What they could not carry they buried to recover at a later date.62 Passing
Cartagena on his way out of the Caribbean, Drake rode boastfully in front of the Spanish
ships there, sailing with his flag of St. George proudly displayed and every streamer, flag,

58. John Cummins, Francis Drake: The Lives of a Hero, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995),
45.
59. Cummins, Drake, 55.
60. While tracking the mule trains through Central America, Drake climbed the Panamanian
mountains in an attempt to spot the “South China Sea,” also known as the Pacific Ocean. As the
first Englishmen to see the Pacific, Drake determined to circumnavigate the world after his
Caribbean adventures. Cummins, Drake, 55-56.
61. Woodroofe, Enterprise of England, 81.
62. Cummins, Drake, 61-63. The Spanish found part of this buried treasure, but the Englishmen
did find thirteen bars of silver and some gold. 63.
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and sail flying.63
Drake’s voyages and subsequent expeditions inspired by him during these years,
helped to contribute to the bankruptcy of Spain in 1575.64 Drake caused constant
disruption in Philip’s finances and communications. During the course of his Panama
raids from 1571-1573, Drake reportedly netted almost £40,000.65 By 1577, Elizabeth
approved Drake’s proposed voyage to the East Indies that resulted in his
circumnavigation of the world.66 Drake’s circumnavigation “stimulated enterprise,
showed a contempt for Spanish strength, and raised the reputation of England throughout
Europe and made the various princes wonder whether Spain were not vulnerable.”67
Upon Drake’s triumphant return to England, he amassed a fortune worth over
£1,500,000, an unheard of sum at the time.68 With such a fortune, Drake could have
financed at least three East India Companies. Drake’s raids along the journey outraged
Philip and Bernadino Mendoza, Spanish ambassador to England, who demanded
63. Cummins, Drake; Woodroofe, Enterprise of England, 80-81.
The image of St. George famously depicted St. George slaying a dragon. For Drake and his
comrades, the dragon signified the Spanish Empire.
64. Of course, Philip’s expenditures in the Netherlands to pay and supply troops for nearly
twenty years at this point also contributed to this state of bankruptcy.
65. Williamson, The Age of Drake, 128.
66. Andrews, Trade, Plunder, and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British
Empire, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 144.
67. Richmond, The Navy as an Instrument of Policy, 10.
68. Woodrooffe, Enterprise, 112; or three million ducats as per Andrews, Trade, Plunder, and
Settlement, 53.
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punishment of the corsair. When Drake arrived in England, Elizabeth took Mendoza
with her to Drake’s ship the Golden Hind, where she proceeded to knight this Sea Dog
and “Master Thief of the Unknown Sea,” as Mendoza referred to Drake.69
Back in the Carolinas, in 1578, and again in 1582, Sir Humphrey Gilbert proposed
voyages to reconnoiter the Carolina and Florida coastlines and establish the colonial base
that Spaniards so feared. Mendoza constantly wrote to Philip reporting Gilbert’s
proposals and opinion towards the project. Elizabeth denied Mendoza’s requests for a
hearing to protest the voyage but he still did his best to sabotage it.70 Gilbert’s mission
failed, but Spanish anxiety rose again in 1584 as Sir Walter Raleigh took the reins of a
Carolina voyage. Spanish intelligence about this expedition suffered as Elizabeth
dismissed Mendoza in 1584, expelling him from the country. At this time as well, Philip
and his first Armada Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Álvaro de Bazán, 1st Marquis of
Santa Cruz de Mudela, began preparations for an “Enterprise of England.”71
Anglo-Spanish competition for Atlantic dominance had a direct impact on
69. Quoted in William Mavor, The Historical Account of the Most Celebrated Voyages, Travels,
and Discoveries From the Time of Columbus to the Present Period, (Philadelphia, PA: Samuel
Bradford, 1802), vol. II, 39.
70. Mendoza went so far as to threaten to have Gilbert’s companions’ throats cut by Spanish
soldiers if they proceeded with the mission. Quinn, ed., Voyages and Colonising Enterprises of
Sir Humphrey Gilbert, (London, UK: Hakluyt Society, 1940), vol. 1, 186-188.
Even though Philip II was widely regarded as a man of letters and wrote about practically every
aspect of Spanish governance and policy, no letters or notes of his have been found thus far.
Therefore, scholars must rely on existing diplomatic correspondence and documents housed in
other national archives (like England).
71. “Enterprise of England” is the commonly used term for the 1588 Armada preparations and
papal-approved invasion of England.
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domestic policy. The domestic English problem of piracy that, once transformed into
privateering, allowed England to weaken Spanish dominance in the Atlantic World, made
the problems of sustaining an empire even clearer to the metropolitan Spanish
government, prompting plans for a Spanish invasion of England proper. As Spain began
building a fleet to send against England, the government funds to send to existing
Spanish posts in the New World for fortification and armament dwindled. Drake once
again took center stage in 1585. After the attack on the English ship the Primrose in
Seville, official war opened between Spain and England.72 Elizabeth gave Drake a

72. The Primrose, a merchant ship under the command of Captain Foster, found itself under
attack from the Spanish in Seville on 26 May 1585 when Spanish officials seized any and all
ships in Spanish harbors. As early as 30 January 1584, Francis Walsingham received the
following letter: “Report by Jacob Whiddon of great preparation in the fitting out of a large fleet
at Lisbon and the collecting of large ships in other parts of Spain and Portugal for the making of
the hugest army by sea that ever was set forth by Spain. To be commanded by the King in
person, to accomplish some acceptable service to God by the subversion of religion in England.”
Sir Geoffrey Carey to Walsingham. Lemon, ed, Calendar of State Papers Domestic, Elizabeth,
1581-1590, (London,UK: H. M. S. O., 1856), 156. Walsingham was Elizabeth’s Secretary of
State between the Cecils, from 1573-1590.
Andrews does not believe that Elizabeth decided to accept war after the Seville attack. He claims
that merchants who lost goods in Spain, upon examination by the Admiralty and with sufficient
proof of losses, received individual letters of reprisal to set forth armed vessels for the capture of
Spanish goods at sea. Issuing individual letters acknowledged the attacks in Seville as “private
wrongs” according to him, not “an act of war.” Elizabethan Privateering, 3. In light of the
Queen’s orders to Drake, I have to disagree with Andrews’ assessment. Elizabeth had known for
years that war would eventually come with Spain though she tried to delay and avoid outright war
for years. She had seen that despite her best efforts to maintain an outward show of neutrality
and compromise, her acceptance and continuance of support for privateering endeavors—coupled
of course with her support for the Dutch—had pushed Philip to action. Philip had to deal with
constant attacks on his Indies shipping which undermined his authority, weakened his finances,
and brought criticism upon him from all of his Catholic allies who constantly badgered him to use
his vast resources to squash the insolent English. Elizabeth’s privateering policies had now
provided her a formidable “navy” with which to act.
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commission to seek out and attack Spanish ships in Spain and the Caribbean.73 Drake
sacked Cadíz and Seville, then made his way to the Caribbean and Santo Domingo which
he caught completely by surprise.74
Overall, Drake’s raids succeeded and though the investors in the expedition and
the sailors received a relatively small return, this expedition did much to discredit Philip
financially as well as militarily. Still hoping to avoid war, Elizabeth sent Philip a letter of
apology for Drake’s conduct saying that she had sent him orders to avoid any hostility.
She expressed her inability to disarm her ships or to prohibit her subjects from trying to
recoup their losses by reprisals so long as Philip made plans to invade England.75
Commenting on the state of Spanish finances after Drake’s raid, the Venetian
ambassador Paravici wrote to Walsingham on 11 September 1587, about the larger
implications of Drake’s success. Paravici expressed his opinion that the “disturbance, the
loss and diversion of the enemy” impaired Spain’s ability to make war just as much as the
“booty” taken aided the English. He further writes that the constant loss of revenues for
Spain, combined with Philip’s increased expenses to compensate for the losses, ensured
that “one year of War in the Indies will cost the Spaniards more than three in the Low

73. Within days of the Primrose’s return, Elizabeth commissioned Drake to organize a fleet to
rescue the other English ships seized by Spain. By 1 July 1585, Elizabeth’s council had
convinced her to broaden the scope of Drake’s mission in order to “cripple” the King’s invasion
fleet before it was ready. The Queen accordingly signed a new commission for Drake.
Woodroofe, Enterprise of England, 164-165.
74. One Spanish letter stated that “the city was entirely unprepared” for the raid. Quoted in
Cummins, Francis Drake, 149.
75. Richmond, Navy as Instrument of Policy, 20.
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Countries.”76 By 1586, losses to English raids and subsequent Spanish borrowing for
armies in the Netherlands and for Armada preparations resulted in the bankrupting of the
bank of Seville and Valencia.77 Atlantic conflict affected continental war preparations
and forced Spain to redirect their attentions.
A large portion of Spanish funds to the Netherlands stopped at this time and
money to the Indies dwindled dramatically as Spain poured what little wealth made it
back to Spain from the Indies into their Armada preparations—preparations which were
set back over a year by Drake’s burning of ships in the harbor of Cadíz in April 1587.78
Drake rushed into the harbor “with more speed and arrogance than any pirate as ever
shown.”79 The damage reported on the Spanish coast reached 300,000 ducats, equaling

76. H. Paravici to Walsingham, 11 September 1587 (CSP Spain, 1586-7) as quoted in Richmond,
Navy as Instrument of Policy, 18.
77. Spain experienced periods of bankruptcy throughout the later sixteenth century and into the
seventeenth century. Philip II declared bankruptcy in 1557, defaulting on loans from the German
Fugger lending house. Other periods of bankruptcy followed resulting in defaults on Genoese
loans as well. Stanley Payne, A History of Spain and Portugal (Madison, WI: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1973), vol. 1, 291-294. Numerous scholars discuss this, including Pierre and J.
H. Elliott, The Old World and the New, 1492-1650, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1970); Elliott, Imperial Spain, 1469-1716, (London, UK: Penguin, 1963); Parker, Grand
Strategy; Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659: The Logistics of
Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1972); Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith, eds., The General Crisis of the Seventeenth
Century, (London, UK: Routledge, 1978); Woodrow Wilson Borah, New Spain’s Century of
Depression, (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1951).
78. See Garrett Mattingly’s definitive work The Armada, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959);
Doran, Elizabeth I and Foreign Policy, 54. See also Parker, Army of Flanders.
79. As related by customs office Agustín de Horozco of the fort of Matagorda opposite the
channel from Cadiz. Quoted in Cummins, Drake, 167.
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approximately 30,000£.80 If Philip thought Drake audacious and bold before, this attack
on Cadíz convinced him of that fact.81
After this attack, which delayed Spanish Armada preparations, Spain could little
expect to send forces out against Atlantic privateers now really concern themselves with
the American coastline. How could they expect to protect lands an ocean away, when
Spain itself was under attack? Englishmen reveled in this. An Elizabethan lawyer and
writer, John Hooker, wrote that “Drake’s voyage in September 1585 inflamed the whole
country with a desire to adventure unto the seas, in hope of the like good success [so] that
a number prepared ships, mariners and soldiers and traveled every place where any profit
might be had.”82 As Drake prepared for his voyages, Philip approved a reconnaissance
mission along the coast of Florida as the Casa de Contratación had sent warnings about
English raiders.83 Santa Cruz tried to assemble a fleet to send out against Drake’s
80. Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement, 53.
10 ducats equal 1£. This conversion is based on various charts from Francis Turner, “Money and
Exchange Rates in 1632,” compiled by Roy Davies, History of Money Project, Exeter University,
(http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/RDavies/arian/current/howmuch.html) and the Medieval and Early
Modern Data Bank compiled by Rutgers University, (http://www2.scc.rutgers.edu/memdb/).
These university projects draw from a number of scholarly sources and indexes of early modern
currency across the globe.
81. In 1588, Don Diego Pimentel, a senior Armada commander captured by the English, told his
captors that: “The reason why [Philip] undertook this war [against England] was that he could not
tolerate the fact that Drake, with two or three rotten ships, should come to infest the harbours of
Spain whenever it pleased him, and to capture its best towns in order to plunder them.” Quoted in
Parker, Grand Strategy, 176. This certainly was not Philip’s main reason for going to war, but
the voyages of Drake did contribute significantly to the Spain’s final break with England and the
decision to go to war.
82. Quoted in Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, 4.
83. Diego Fernández de Quiñones to Philip II, 12/22 June 1585, from Quinn, “Spanish
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expedition in 1585, but could spare and equip only two ships and the ships left Spain very
late in the season. Even though in December 1587 Philip “[had] the plans in his room”
for “three or four forts in La Florida,” these plans never materialized owing to the failure
of the Armada campaign soon thereafter.84
With Spain otherwise occupied, many English privateers intensified their imperial
schemes. Ralph Lane, for one, sailed to the Carolina coast in 1586, where he established
a post at Roanoke, in the Outer Banks of modern North Carolina. Lane brought with
him, among others, the artist John White, Thomas Cavendish, an Oxford professor and
several students. Largely romanticized over the years as the “Lost Colony,” the Roanoke
settlement disappeared a year after its founding. As much as Spain remained occupied by
its Armada preparations, England also felt the strain on its ships and resources. While
encouraging settlement during Spanish absence, the English too needed a certain number
of ships standing ready for defense of the realm. Supply ships did not return to the
colony as needed and the settlers either died or left the area.85 When Raleigh finally
visited to the colony in 1587, he found practically nothing, but he re-established an
English post there. This part of North Carolina was particularly important for English
operations into the Spanish south because it was not only close to La Florida, but the

Reactions,” 10.
84. Battista Antonelli, 2/12 December 1587, CSP Venice, 1581-91, 329.
85. Little is known about what happened to the settlers though scholars conjecture that many of
the settlers who survived starvation and disease probably went to live with nearby Indian tribes.
See David Durant, Ralegh’s Lost Colony, (New York, NY: Atheneum, 1981); Kupperman,
Roanoke; David Quinn, The Lost Colonists: Their Fortune and Probable Fate, (Raleigh, NC:
America's Four Hundredth Anniversary Committee, North Carolina Dept. of Cultural Resources,
1984)
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currents and weather of the area provided better harbor for ships than most areas. The
area also proved better suited to the smaller English vessels able to slip in and out of the
shoals.
When the Duke of Medina Sidonia took over the command of the Armada fleet in
1588, one of his first orders including sending orders to Spanish forces at St. Augustine
to attack the English in the neighboring area and in the Carolinas. Armada campaign
plans interfered once again and Medina Sidonia sent no reinforcements or further orders
for this expedition.86 A Spanish ship did though slip into the Outer Banks in 1588 before
Raleigh arrived there, finding evidence of an English settlement there. The existence of
English settlement worried the Spanish empire.87
The Armada campaigns of the next decade occupied a great deal of both England
and Spain’s naval resources. England called back many privateers and directed
practically all of its much smaller naval force to the coming battle in 1588. Colonization
efforts in America fell into the background for a time out of necessity. Spanish defeats
left the country financially destitute. Spanish New World settlements did not fail in this
atmosphere, but Spanish dominance in the Atlantic diminished greatly and the crown
could not fortify posts there as they would have liked to do. Constant losses from pirate
raids left the defense of the Indies in poorer condition than the first half of the sixteenth
century as decreased finance and supply resulted in “inoperable” galleys.88
At the turn of the seventeenth century, the English revived plans for a fortified
86. Pedro Menéndez Marqués to Philip, 7/17 July 1588, from Quinn, “Spanish Reactions,” 15.
87. Quinn, “Spanish Reactions,” 16.
88. Hoffman, The Spanish Crown and the Defense of the Caribbean, 223.
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settlement in the Chesapeake and in 1607, John Smith founded Jamestown. Atlantic
competition led to the creation of English settlements on the fringes of Spanish North
America and to an increased division between the empires. English victory in the
English Channel prevented Spanish forces from establishing any more forts north of La
Florida, providing the English with an open door to settlement in those “unclaimed”
areas.89 James, who came to the throne in 1603, though completely against privateering,
continued Elizabeth’s expansionist and colonialist aims. After founding Jamestown in
1607, Englishmen soon expanded their settlement mission, taking control of Bermuda in
1609, St. Kitts in 1623, and Barbados in the last year of James’ reign, 1625.90
Another significant outcome of the English privateering ventures came in the
form of trading companies. Resulting from the return of Drake’s circumnavigation, the
Levant or “Turkey” Company received its charter in 1581. Elizabeth invested in Drake’s
voyage and, with the resulting sum of £42,000 pounds, created and invested in the Levant
Company after paying off the entire national debt of England.91 Though not as popular as
some of its successor companies, the Levant Company made great profits. Mediterranean
ports took more English goods than other ports and, by 1612, English merchants
established twenty business houses in Constantinople, while the traditionally dominant

89. “Spanish Reactions,” 20.
90. These Caribbean colonies of the British generally grew out of existing colonies of privateer
exiles. When James had enacted the new piracy laws of 1603 and 1605 a number of British
seamen relocated their operations to the Caribbean rather than be pressed into service in the
Royal Navy.
91. Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement; Cummins, Drake, 125.
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Venetian depots had dwindled to five.92 The profits from the Levant Company in turn
financed the East India Company, one of the most successful trading companies in the
seventeenth and eighteenth century.93 The connection of the Atlantic and the Levant
offered England a steady increase of profits for financing Atlantic expeditions and naval
repairs. Such innovations of these companies by the English coupled with the “rent-afleet” policies of Elizabethan privateering, unlike the Spain’s policies of the government
financing fleets and fortifications, led to vast differences in the nations’ financial policies
and post-Armada economies.
English piracy and privateering in the New World caused Spain and England to
focus their diplomacy on the New World and develop new policies and strategies for
colonization. The debt of Spain, helped along by Drake and his raids throughout Mexico
and the Caribbean, severely hampered Spain’s ability to fulfill its plans to fortify
America. On the other hand, the English used the profits of such missions to fund and
encourage further missions to the New World, keeping Spain constantly on edge and
helping to justify Spain’s decision for the Enterprise of England with the Armada
campaign of 1588. After the Armada, Spain’s dominance of the seas declined and the
English expanded their dominion throughout the known world during Spain’s distraction.
92. Paul Coles, The Ottoman Impact on Europe, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968),
137-138. The Levant Company also appointed consuls to Smyrna and Aleppo to help handle the
increasing trade. Christopher Lloyd, English Corsairs on the Barbary Coast, (London: William
Collins Sons and Co. Ltd., 1981), 83.
93. See Alfred Wood, A History of the Levant Company, (London, UK: Frank Cass and Co.,
1964). In 1600, Elizabeth granted the “Honourable East India Company” a monopoly by Royal
Charter on all trade with the East Indies. Mortimer Epstein, The Early History of the Levant
Company, (New York, NY: Durtton, 1908); T.S. Willan, "Some Aspects of English Trade with
the Levant in the Sixteenth Century" English Historical Review, vol. 70, no. 276, (July 1955),
399-410.
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CHAPTER IV
EUROPEAN ENTANGLEMENTS, IMPERIAL NEGOTIATIONS, AND NAVAL
POLICIES

In the sixteenth century, the Spanish empire reached its pinnacle. Centuries of
Habsburg marriage alliances joined eastern and western Europe from Bohemia to
Burgundy to Portugal. The story of this accumulation has oft been told, and the figure of
Charles V of Spain/Charles I, Holy Roman Emperor marks the beginning and end of a
‘universal’ monarchy unparalleled in the modern world. Charles’ son, Philip, did his best
to maintain and extend the western part of the empire left to him after his father’s
division of the universal monarchy, but Philip and his successors faced ever-mounting
obstacles to their authority. While recent historians have fought to avoid ‘Black Legend’
histories of Spain’s colonial history and decline, this chapter will argue that some such
views cannot be entirely avoided. The Caribbean was a stage set for Spanish domination
of the New World, but miscommunication, bureaucracy, and increasing financial
problems, aside from imperial competition and diplomatic entanglements, created missed
opportunities and military failures that resulted in the loss of Spanish Caribbean
dominance.
Countries’ and empires’ allegiances constantly shifted in this increasingly
connected, yet ever-expanding world. Such considerations in Spain brought the
formation of a universal monarchy, dual/dueling empires, and constant external threats.
For the purpose of this work, Charles V/I (1500-1558) begins this story. Charles was the
grandson of Holy Roman Emperor Maximillian I of Austria and Mary of Burgundy, and
of the famed Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain. Charles’ father, Philip the Handsome,
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became the first Habsburg prince of Spain, marrying Joanna “the Mad” of Castile.1 At
the tender age of six, Charles inherited the Netherlands from his father. Under the
regency of his aunt, Margaret of Parma, Charles remained in the Low Countries until his
coronation as Charles I, King of Spain in 1516. Acknowledged as the first modern king
of a united Spain, Charles gained election as Holy Roman Emperor in 1530, ruling over
the traditional lands of the Holy Roman Empire including Germany, Austria, Hungary,
Bohemia, and the Netherlands. Charles’ dominion included his Spanish inheritance of
Spain proper and the many Spanish colonies of the New World as well as Habsburg and
Spanish holdings on the Italian peninsula and Mediterranean islands. Ruling over such
vast territories proved a daunting task. Therefore, in 1555, Charles abdicated his thrones
and split them between his son, Philip, and his brother, Ferdinand. Charles arranged for
the election of his brother as Ferdinand I, Holy Roman Emperor, while his son became
Philip II of Spain.
This background is essential for understanding the complex relations Spain had to
manage during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Spanish kings, in their traditional
alliance with their Austrian family, found themselves embroiled in wars and uprisings
throughout Bohemia, the eastern Mediterranean, central Europe, and the Netherlands.
The Dutch conflict holds the most relevance for this study.

1. Philip the Handsome was the son of Maximilian I and Mary of Burgundy and Joanna the Mad
was the daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella. R. J. W. Evans, The Making of the Habsburg
Monarchy, 1550–1700: An Interpretation (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, Oxford University
Press, 1979); Paula Sutter Fichtner, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1490–1848: Attributes of Empire,
European History in Perspective (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York, NY: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2003); E. M. Lichnowsky, Geschichte des Hauses Habsburg, (Vienna, Austria,
Schaumburg and Cie Publishers, originally published1843); Andrew Wheatcroft, The Habsburgs:
Embodying Empire (London, UK; New York, NY: Viking, 1995).
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As religious tensions across the English Channel continued to mount in the 1560s
and 1570s, the Elizabethan government could not escape the Protestant rebellion in the
Netherlands or Spanish attempts to maintain control in those provinces while conquering
the New World. Spain continuously struggled to sustain its hegemony in European
politics. All of Elizabeth’s efforts to establish the authority of the Church of England
made England both a sought-after ally and a threat. Catholic Spain, already dealing with
Protestant discontent and uprisings in the Netherlands, certainly did not welcome the
Protestantization of England, while the Dutch hoped that religious affinity would
persuade the English to help the Dutch emancipate themselves from Spanish rule.
Apprehensive of another Catholic neighbor but also wary of provoking Philip’s anger
should she declare support for the Dutch, Elizabeth had to carefully weigh her options
and the opinions of her advisors and Parliament. Elizabeth did not approve of rebels even
on the grounds of religion, but she could not allow Spain to regain its foothold across the
English Channel.
William Cecil shared most of the queen’s moderate views. He was willing to
compromise when necessary to ensure peace and stability and authored much of
Elizabeth’s official policy and correspondence.2 Elizabeth’s court officials had their own
ideas about religion and how to approach foreign policy, but under Cecil, they commonly
deferred to decisions that would benefit England as a whole—not just to further their
particular interests. This is not to say that there was never any dissent within Elizabeth’s

2. MacCaffrey, Queen Elizabeth and the Making of Policy, 12–18; Conyers Read, Mr. Secretary
Cecil and Queen Elizabeth (London, UK: Cape, 1955), 120–30.
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council, because opposition certainly existed among the councilors.3 The Queen fielded
numerous requests and plans of her councilors. Much of the praise of Elizabeth’s
political acumen comes from her ability to promote compromise and find common goals
amongst her council.4 However, the “hottest” opposition to Elizabeth’s policies came
from Parliament. Fairly militant anti-Catholic sympathizers made up the Elizabethan
Parliament. These men wanted decisive, aggressive action against Catholics and official
military support and approval for Protestant rebellions such as that in the Netherlands.
During pulpit debates from 1569 to 1571, men like theologian Thomas Cartwright called
for “the full and whole deliverance” of Protestants everywhere. Parliament remained
divided.
The “politique Machiavels” that had helped bring about the shift towards
Protestantism, focused their attentions on England’s international situation and how that
affected the future of their religion and power. They also saw the need to suppress
political dissidence within English borders. The “hot Gospellers,” as they were known,
remained overly concerned with specific doctrine and forms of church government.5

3. Read, Mr. Secretary Cecil, 131–133.
4. For more details about the particular relationship of Elizabeth and her council and amongst her
councilors, see, for example, the classic works of J. E. Neale, Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments,
(London, UK: J. Cape, 1953-1957), 2 vols.; Read, Mr. Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of
Queen Elizabeth, (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1925); and Read, Mr. Secretary Cecil.
5. MacCaffrey, Queen Elizabeth and the Making of Policy, 16–18. The Lord Keeper Bacon, for
example, opened the Parliament of 1563 with a speech concerning the lack of discipline within
the Church and the “lax regard” for ceremony. MacCaffrey, Making of Policy, 1572–1588, 42.
It can be argued that Elizabeth’s council, by attempting to create compromises between the
factions of Parliament, saw less the need to push their own agendas and beliefs and more the need
to secure domestic stability from that experience. For instance, Knollys, “the most reformminded” of Elizabeth’s councilors, put aside his own agenda to constantly warn members of
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These divisions within Parliament and between Parliament and the court obviously led to
periods of inefficient governance. Elizabeth could get few bills pushed through
Parliament because she also refused to choose either side of the argument. So, facing a
wall in Parliament, Elizabeth found circuitous means to get what she wanted until such
time as she and her council came into accord. What she wanted, and desperately needed,
was money and encouraging the development of a privateering fleet gave her that as well
as greater military defenses.
In this situation, her policies towards pirates and privateering gained importance
and quickly became a cornerstone of her Dutch-Spanish diplomacy. English pirates
attacked Spanish ships carrying supplies and monies meant to fund the Spanish armies in
the Netherlands, conveniently aiding the Dutch without the need for any formal
declarations of war on Spain or support for the rebels.
As Charles had vast and diverse territories under his control, he left much of the
governance of the Netherlands, a fairly quiet set of provinces, to the customary rule of
local assemblies.6 By the sixteenth century, the city of Antwerp in the northern portion
of the Netherlands had become one of the most important trading centers in Europe,
making it a favorite destination of merchants, intellectuals, and opportunity-seekers alike.
With the influx of so many immigrants and traders, Antwerp also became an intellectual

Parliament whose speech intruded on royal prerogative. MacCaffrey, Queen Elizabeth and the
Making of Policy, 60–63.
6. Richard Dunn, Age of Religious Wars, 1559–1715 (New York: Norton, 1979), 40–41.
Charles had put down a revolt in Ghent in 1539, but the uprising did not affect the Netherlands
outside of Ghent and Charles “crushed” it. Charles Wilson, The Transformation of Europe,
1558–1648 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976), 138.
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capital as the city’s population remained more open-minded and compromising in order
to keep and continue to encourage trade there. Protestantism found a home in this
environment. During the Reformation that was sweeping through Europe during this
period, merchants were usually the first groups to embrace Protestantism, and Antwerp
overflowed with merchants. By allowing the exiting Dutch government, the StatesGeneral, to retain much of their control of Dutch affairs, Charles thereby allowed the
increase of Protestantism in the Netherlands through his leniency.
When Philip II succeeded Charles in 1556, he found his rule unwelcome in the
Netherlands. Under a new king, the States-General decided to test their power and voice
their discontent with Philip’s plans for more direct control in the Netherlands. Dutch
nobility censured Spain’s war continued wars with France over religion and in 1558,7 the
States-General insisted on their right to appoint their own tax commissioners.8 Philip
ignored these measures. In addition to disregarding these political assertions of the Dutch
assembly, Philip did not indulge the Protestant faith in his territories as his father had.
Upon the failure of his personal inquisition in the Netherlands in 1559, Philip reorganized
the Church there and pushed Catholic absolutism.9 Philip also sanctioned the Inquisition
in Flanders again in 1570.10 Almost instantly, Dutch Protestants began to organize

7. These Wars of Religion, also referred to as the Italian Wars or the Habsburg-Valois Wars (the
French ruling family hailed from the House of Valois), occurred from1494-1559.
8. Wilson, Transformation of Europe, 138.
9. J. R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620, (London: Fontana, 1985), 1819; Philip also sanctioned the Inquisition in Flanders again in 1570. CSP Foreign, 1569-1571,
no. 135.
10. CSP Foreign, 1569-1571, no. 135.
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against Philip and to solicit aid and support from Elizabeth, the strongest Protestant
leader in Europe.
Elizabeth had reason to aid the Dutch not just because of some religious affinity,
but also out of fear of growing Spanish power across the English Channel. Philip reigned
over a very rich empire that encompassed numerous colonies. In 1559, as a condition of
the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, which ended the long war between France and Spain,
recently-widowed Philip also married the Princess Elisabeth of Valois, the daughter of
the French Catholic King Henri II.11 This Catholic alliance certainly spurred debate in
England. Elizabeth had to begin assessing her resources and reevaluating her domestic
and foreign policies based on these developments.
In the Netherlands, the Catholic regent Margaret, Duchess of Parma and halfsister to Philip II, made her dislike of Protestant England known. The illegitimate
daughter of Charles V, Margaret gained official recognition from her father in 1553 at
age eleven, thus allowing her to take the Habsburg family name of “Margaret of Austria.”
Philip appointed her as regent of the Netherlands in 1559.12 During her rule, Margaret
presided over the Dutch governing council and actively made decisions about taxes and
religion within the provinces. Most of the time she followed her brother’s advice, but she
increasingly came under the influence of Philip’s commander, the Duke of Alva.

11. During a tournament meant to celebrate this union, Henri received a fatal wound. His son
Francis II succeeded him. Frederic Baumgarter, Henry II, King of France, 1547-1559, (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 1998).
12. In 1567 she resigned her post to the Duke of Alva on Philip’s orders. Alva also had charge
of the Spanish militia in the Netherlands to quell the Dutch Revolt. Felix Rachfahl, Margaretha
von Parma, Statthalterin die Niederlande, 1559-1567, (München, Deutschland: Drud und Berlag
von Oldenbourg, 1898).
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Hoping to strike at England economically, Margaret issued an embargo on all
English trade in 1563.13 Margaret claimed that her actions were in response to English
merchants’ protection of heretics and English acts of piracy in the Channel.14 But Philip,
preoccupied with Ottoman threats in the Mediterranean, and without ample evidence of
such claims, ordered Margaret to lift the embargo “unconditionally” in 1565.15 Besides,
the embargo had proved ineffective. When Antwerp closed, English merchants found
various other outlets for their trade.
The wars and jurisdictional debates of the mid to late 1500s created a (fairly)
dramatic power shift in Europe. These seeds sowed the foundation for an even more
significant change in the makeup of the seventeenth-century Caribbean. Whereas the
English engaged in a process of bringing the army and navy under state control, Spain did
not. In numerous instances, the Consulado of Seville actually rejected plans for an armed
fleet to secure regular Atlantic trade. The Councils of State and of the Indies objected to
this dismissal, pointing out the defensive deficiencies of the ships making these
voyages.16 The vulnerable convoy system remained the Council’s preferred method of
transport. Occasionally, armed ships accompanied trade fleets, but this did not constitute
standard practice at the time.17

13. Ramsay, The Queen’s Merchants, 101.
14. Doran, Elizabeth I and Foreign Policy, 15.
15. Doran, Elizabeth I and Foreign Policy, 15.
16. See sources cited in Hoffman, The Spanish Crown and the Defense of the Caribbean, 75.
17. For one instance of trade protection, see account in AGI, Patronato 267, no. 1, R. 34.
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Despite the intricate bureaucracy of the Spanish government, Spain lacked an
effective naval strategy or control over many of her own ships. Elizabeth rented out her
dilapidated ships, but Philip had very few ships of his own/belonging directly to Spain.
According to some figures, nearly two-thirds of Spain’s Mediterranean galleys belonged
to private owners in the mid-sixteenth century.18 Kamen even claims that the crown “had
no vessels at all” for much of the century.19 Spain did have some ships, though other
countries and princes owned the majority of ships in Spanish fleets. According to
Venetian reports, the Mediterranean squadron had eight large ships and six galleons from
Spain. As for the rest of the fleet, twenty-six galleons came from Naples and Sicily, and
eighteen from various other Italian princes.20 These numbers are in contrast to other
scholars who claim that by 1547, Spain had 150 galleys, and over 200 galleys to fight at
Lepanto.21
If the government had no official warships, it stands to reason that there was no
official navy—simply soldiers serving on ships and slaves in the galleys. Spanish galleys
transported goods and monies to and from the colonies. Because of their size and
generally outdated technology, galleys were not readily equipped for the combat awaiting
18. Henry Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire: The Making of a World Power, 1492–1763 (London,
UK: Penguin, 2002), 170.
19. Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 170.
20. Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 305. Naples and Sicily were dependencies of the Spanish
Crown, though not all of the ships from these dependencies belonged to the provincial
government and therefore to the Spanish Crown. Many of the ships remained in the hands of
private merchants and the Crown could not necessarily lay claim to them.
21. Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 305. David Goodman claims that Philip had 150 galleys in
1547. Spanish Naval Power, 1589-1665: Reconstruction and Defeat, (Cambridge: UK,
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 2.
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them at the hands of pirates. For much of the sixteenth century, these fleets had little
protection. The lack of a protective naval policy meant continued threats on the sea.
Spanish kings relied too heavily on outdated papal edicts and the sheer right of settlement
to keep their many overseas possessions. Either that, or the kings believed that the
treasures of the Americas would always fund the hiring of ships from private owners.
While the government did take in significant revenue from the taxing of merchant trade
to the Atlantic, the government did not see the advantages of state versus private trade to
the Indies.
Spaniards constantly lamented the presence of pirates and bandits. Armed men
first sailed with merchant convoys to the Caribbean in the 1520s, but, again, private
merchants conducted this policy, much like English policy. Forty years later, the Spanish
government took strides to make this sort of armament standard for the Armada of New
Spain. The Armada de la Guardia de la carrerra de las Indias, according to official
communication, generally consisted of eight galleons and three smaller pataches
(dispatch ships). Approximately 1,000 seamen and 900 soldiers served aboard these
ships.22 Official plans did not always mean effective deployment.
As at numerous other times, international conflicts hampered domestic efforts. In
response to continued attacks throughout Spain’s Atlantic colonies and the worsening of
diplomatic relations between Spain and England, especially, Philip II passed numerous
decrees limiting the amount of foreigners allowed to travel to and reside in Spain and her
territories. In 1559, 1568, and 1571, decrees stated that all foreign travel would be
22. AGS, Sección Varios: Galeras, legajo 8, Asiento, que los senores...del consejo real de las
indias tomaron con adriano de legaso, Madrid, 1627.
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restricted to Spain and the Spanish Low Countries, punishable by confiscation of all the
travelers’ property.23 One source states that Englishmen found Spain “even more
impenetrable than Italy.”24 These policies continued into the reign of Philip III (15981621) and Philip IV (1621-1665), resulting in a dearth of foreign communities, merchant
or otherwise, and extended into a lack of ambassadorial invitations to Spain as well.
Increased tension resulted from the Spanish Company of Merchants in Spain.
The company consisted of English traders with special license to operate in Spain, one of
the few official exceptions to the policies mentioned above. Even with exception, this
company only operated from 1577-1585, and then again from 1604-1606. During the
years of Philip II’s marriage to Queen Mary I, this company operated with little
opposition on either side, but the succeeding years, saw a significant rise in animosity and
distrust. English trade to the Low Countries represented approximately one half of all
English trade during the mid-sixteenth century, but the Spanish Company ran a close
second. One of the largest trading companies in England, the Spanish Company
employed “many good ships and a great number of sufficient mariners,” aside from the
various independent merchants who operated alongside the company.25 English ships
carried practically all of this commerce for the Spanish Company.26 Eventually, this fact
piqued the anxiety of the Spanish ambassador as he wrote about the “great profit [the
English] make by the Spanish trade,” and how the English “[built] ships without
23. J. N. Hillgarth, The Mirror of Spain, 1500–1700: The Formation of a Myth (Ann Arbor, MI:
University of Michigan, 2000), 7.
24. Hillgarth, Mirror of Spain, 7.
25. TNA, Calendar of State Papers Domestic, 12/75/13, Petition to the Privy Council, 1570
26. Eldred, “’Just Will Pay for the Sinners’,” 7-9
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cessation...thus making themselves masters of the seas.”27 The English used their
position in Spain to springboard their expansion into the Levantine and North African
trade at the end of the sixteenth century, further harrying Spanish trade. This trade
afforded the English significant advantages in the experience of sailing and the training
of sailors. Though many of these merchant ships did remain privately owned, Elizabeth I
made a concentrated effort to keep merchants under the English flag, investing in their
ventures and renting state ships to accompany such merchant ventures.
The navy occupied a very different place in the Spanish political strategy than it
did for other European nations. Naval service in England, under the Tudors and
Cromwell, offered men of lower social status an opportunity for wealth and advancement.
Spanish men could find fame and prestige in the army, but a naval commission did not
hold the same prestige.28 As Spain proper found itself in more conflict with its provinces,
this fact became a crippling weakness for the empire.
Philip II did develop some maritime policies in regards galley schedules and
trade. In order to regulate Atlantic trade, Philip developed the system for the twice-a-

27. Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in Simancas (CSP Spanish), Vol. III,
Don Bernardino de Mendoza to King Philip, 9 Jan. 1581, 72.
England timber stores came from Ireland and Russia. England’s first joint-stock company, the
Muscovy Company (1555), handled the import of Russian timber and pitch as its primary trade.
Jillian Smith, “Shipbuilding and the English International Timber Trade, 1300-1700: a framework
for study using Niche Construction Theory,” Nebraska Anthropologist, (January 2009): 89-102.
University of Nebraska Digital Commons,
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1048&context=nebanthro. See also
Douglas Bisson, The Merchant Adventurers of England: The Company and the Crown, 14741564, (Newark, NJ: University of Delaware Press, 1993); Thomas Stuart Willan, The Early
History of the Russia Company, 1553-1603, (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press,
1956).
28. Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, 260.
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year Plate Fleet crossings to the New World. The problem still remained that many of
these pilots did not come from Spain, besides the Basques. Many Belgians and
Portuguese served aboard these fleets.29 Castilian pilots knew the Mediterranean well,
but contemporaries write that they had practically no knowledge of the western seas,
when they deigned to serve in the navy in the first place. Even when the Great Armada
sailed for England, Spain had to recruit French pilots because they could not even find
suitable Portuguese pilots.30 Spain certainly needed knowledgeable pilots, however, they
also needed pilots loyal to Spain. Should the Luso-Spanish alliance end, Spain had no
guarantee of these pilots’ allegiance.
Spanish sailors considered New World sailing posts a means to an end rather than
an inroad to a naval career. Once in the New World, large numbers of sailors deserted
hoping to establish themselves as farmers or merchants in this new economy. The same
could easily be said of men of most nations, but Spain offered its men less incentive to
see the navy as an adequate career choice. The government did not even see the navy as
something permanent in the early years based on the little attention paid to constructing a
national navy. Occupation as a sailor was also more open to men of varying social and
even racial backgrounds. Crews supplemented their numbers with second sons, poor
jobless men, and the occasional drunk. Many a young or ruined man could find

29. Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 170.
30. Jordan Goodman, Tobacco in History: The Cultures of Dependence (London, UK:
Routledge, 1993), 80.
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employment and “an earthly paradise...[at] the ends of the earth” when he stepped aboard
a ship.”31
Sailor, merchant, and Captain General of the Navy and Fleet of New Spain
(1595), Juan de Escalante de Mendoza (1529-1596), claimed that two sorts of men took
to the sea. The first included those second sons and poorer men who have not the means
or ability for other careers. “Restlessness” and a desire to do “something else” than stay
the course their fathers may have set for them constitute the second class of sailors.32
While some scholars argue that shipboard discipline was particularly harsh, this was not
always the case. In the official Spanish galleons, the government sentenced criminals to
work the ships galleys. Such policies uphold this idea of particularly rigid order onboard.
For other ships, and especially merchant vessels, as the distance widened between the
ship and metropole, discipline and working conditions relaxed.33
Galleon fleets did not necessarily constitute a navy—at least not a sustained naval
force. Galleons used for transporting New World goods were occasionally equipped for
battle, but Spain did not have a permanent naval fleet. To prepare for battle, Spain
loaned ships from her allies and had to undertake building projects. The only truly
31. Carla Rahn Phillips, Six Galleons for the King of Spain: Imperial Defense in the Early
Seventeenth Century (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 26.
32. Huntington Library, Madrid: Itinerario de navegación de los mares y tierras occidentales,
1575,115-116, in 1985 reprint, 26.
Ralph Davis wrote of English seamen that men became sailors “to see the world, to get a good
rate of pay, to get a job of some sort at any price, to do what father did; these were the motives of
those who went to sea; perhaps some went willy-nilly, drunk or unconscious, as the crimp made
up the required crew as best he could.” The Rise of English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth
and Eighteenth Centuries, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1962), 158.
33. Pablo Pérez-Mallaína, Spain’s Men of the Sea: Daily Life on the Indies Fleets in the Sixteenth
Century, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), translated by Carla Rahn
Phillips, 33.
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effective naval battle fought by the Spanish fleet occurred in 1571 at Lepanto.
Continuing tradition, Italian ships constituted the bulk of the Spanish fleet, especially
since the Battle of Lepanto took place in the Mediterranean to stop the advance of the
Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans had conquered much of Bohemia and even marched on
the city of Vienna by 1570. Expanding their dominions also meant expanding their
influence over trade. Venetian trade dwindled as the Turks took over all trade routes east
to Asia and India. Practically all of Europe had depended on and/or benefited from the
Venetian-Asian trade.34 On 7 October 1571, Philip’s Armada under the command of his
half-brother Don Juan of Austria sailed into the Eastern Mediterranean and defeated the
Turkish forces at Lepanto.35 The victory earned the Armada the title of “the Invincible
Armada” and made Philip the true defender of the Christian Faith in the eyes of
Catholics. While Philip gained even more prestige through this venture, he also gained
more responsibility and yet another cause to uphold. Philip found himself stretched thin
trying to review all of his council’s domestic business combined with the
correspondences of his foreign ambassadors. All of this, on top of the rebellion in the
Netherlands, the harassment of Spanish ships in the Atlantic by English privateers, and
constant pressure from the Pope for an “Enterprise of England,” kept Philip and Spain too
34. Eliyahu Ashtor, East-West Trade in the Mediterranean (London, UK: Varorium, 1986); Paul
Coles, The Ottoman Impact on Europe (New York, NY: Harcourt, 1968); Daniel Goffman, The
Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2002); Molly Greene, A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern
Mediterranean (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
35. See Hugh Bicheno, Crescent and the Cross: The Battle of Lepanto 1571, (London, UK:
Cassell, 2003); G.K Chesterton, Lepanto, (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2004); Charles
Frazee, Catholics and Sultans: The Church and the Ottoman Empire, 1453-1923, (London, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1983); Kenneth Setton, Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the
Seventeenth Century, (Philadelphia, PA: American Philosophical Society, 1991).
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distracted to deal with any one issue. Though Lepanto had been a resounding success for
the Spanish forces, the victory was short-lived. By 1574, the Turks mounted an
impressive offensive that reclaimed much of the territory lost to Don Juan between 1571
and 1573.36
As Anglo-Spanish tensions increased, each nation established various embargoes
throughout the 1560s, 1570s, and 1580s. Evidenced in the letters of English and Spanish
merchants, an increase in piracy and mercantile predation followed the proliferation of
privateering licenses during this period. Looking at the Spanish Merchants Company,
English traders entered into agreements with their Spanish partners more than in any
other trade. On the high seas, English traders and pirates operated more freely. In Spain,
however, this group of merchants, having established themselves as a community within
Seville, even complained to the Queen about predatory English ships. Merchants
complained that letters of marque and reprisal would destroy the Iberian trade. The
merchants remained more concerned that the continuance of piracy and maritime
violence meant the seizure of English ships in Spain.37 Occasionally, predatory ships
attacked English ships, but with proper papers, the officials allowed the attacked ship to
go about its business.
Some scholars claim that numerous court cases show that English merchants
offered assistance to many Spanish ships and merchants by handing over licenses issued
to them by the English government, arguing that English merchants took up Spanish
36. Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 186.
37. James McDermott, England and the Spanish Armada: The Necessary Quarrel (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2005), 68–69.
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goods in French ports to carry them into England.38 This does not constitute substantial
proof of even Englishmen’s disdain for piracy against Spain. Some merchants may have
proceeded for these reasons, but English merchants ‘helped’ the Spanish simply because
this meant an assurance that their own [English] goods made it to market. Even though
this small group of merchants occasionally helped Spanish traders, more often than not
English mariners attacked Spanish shipping. As mentioned in previous chapters, these
attacks took the form of court-sanctioned reprisals, privateering, or outright piratical
attacks.
Some scholars argue that England could little afford to antagonize Spain because
of the wealth of trade the English enjoyed with Spanish Habsburg lands.39 As the
Levantine trade steadily increased and English merchants and sailors realized their
advantages in seamanship over Spanish sailors, the English had less and less to fear from
angering Spain. Tension and suspicion between the two nations even resulted in travel
restrictions for any and all visitors. Philip II allowed citizens to travel abroad only for
educational purposes in the 1560s. Elizabeth restricted all travel to Spain or the Spanish
Low Countries on threat of confiscation of the traveler’s property.40 After Philip II’s
death in 1598, Philip III continued these practices as in 1599, Spanish officials even
seized a number of German students in Spain on the suspicion of their being English
traitors.41

38. Eldred, “‘Just Will Pay for the Sinners’,” 11.
39. Eldred, “‘Just Will Pay for the Sinners’,” 13-16.
40. Hillgarth, Mirror of Spain, 7.
41. British Library, MS, Harlow, 382, fol. 13.
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These policies escalated as the Anglo-Spanish War drug on throughout the turn of
the seventeenth century. The “Great Armada” of 1588 only began the Enterprise of
England. Subsequent Armadas sailed to Ireland and the coasts of the British Isles
continuing to attempt an invasion of England.42 Only under truce with James VI/I in
1605, did resident English missions reappear in Spain after forty years of suspension.43
The return of Englishmen to Spain also meant the return of English merchants and
sailors. Though technical peace existed by terms of treaty, the first English ambassador
to return to Spain commented on the “uncharitable and unfriendly” nature of restored
Anglo-Spanish relations.44 Naturally, Atlantic conflict exacerbated these internal
conflicts.
West Indies navigation remained intertwined with Anglo-Spanish negotiations
over the Dutch territories into the seventeenth century. These negotiations brought into
discussion not just English aid to Dutch ‘rebels,’ but also Spanish aid to Irish ‘rebels’
against the English and trading rights to the West Indies. Both sides kept the Indies as a
final talking point. England obviously did not want to give up such a lucrative and
promising trade, and Spain certainly did not enjoy having their authority threatened on
yet another front. Military campaigns to end English navigation in the Indies had failed
his father, so Philip III attempted to make gains through diplomacy instead. Many of his
aims remained the same as his father’s: to defend Catholicism everywhere, to preserve
his Habsburg inheritance, and to regain total control of the West Indian trade. Philip III
42. See, for instance, Wernham, After the Armada.
43. HMC 45, no I (1899), 53.
44. TNA, SP 94/13, fol. 44v, Cornwallis to Salisbury, 22 Feb 1606.
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even contemplated retracting his demands for reparation from English privateering
attacks, if, and only if, the English suspended their western navigations.45 Atlantic and
continental concerns constantly intertwined, requiring Philip to make difficult decisions
about compromise with England, expansion of his empire, and upholding the reputation
of his crown and country.
One of Philip’s audiencieros (legal advisors) believed that England and Spain
could agree to peaceful terms, but, in 1600, the two sides’ biggest concession concerned a
neutral location for their peace talks.46 Both sides continued to look for ways to create
two-front wars for each other, despite their diplomatic show. England continued to attack
Spanish shipping throughout the Atlantic and to aid the Dutch while Spain proposed
armadas to Ireland. The Spanish Council of State did not believe Elizabeth and her
secretaries ever meant to cease their aid to the Dutch, even if they did sign a peace treaty.
Certainly, Elizabeth’s lip-service and covert actions throughout her reign justify the
Council’s fears. The Council further proposed that peace would only benefit the English
by allowing them to rest and rebuild their forces with the prizes won from attacking
Spanish ships.47 When Spain and England negotiated the Treaty of London (1604), the
English believed the peace would only benefit Spain for the same reasons the Spanish
had given for English benefit in 1600.

45. Paul Allen, Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598–1621 (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2000), 37.
46. AGS Estado, 617:163, 1600.
47. AGS Estado, Consulta, 2511, 9 Sept 1600.
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As much as Spanish officials never trusted the English government to follow
through on the peace provisions, the Spanish government did not intend to do so either.
Spain sent an armada to Ireland in 1601, planning to create a base at Kinsale from which
to invade England. Following a decisive victory over this armada, England called off all
further negotiations for nearly a year. When negotiations began again, the English made
no attempts to hide their distrust of the Spanish by continuing extensive naval
preparations.48 Zúñiga, writing from England, declared that Spain had no choice but to
continue supporting the Irish rebels and attempt another Irish Armada.49 He saw this as
the only way to hamper the continued naval preparations of the English after Kinsale.
Privateering promotion remained a part of these preparations after Kinsale. Just
months after Zuñiga’s letter, English privateers attempted an attack on a Spanish plate
fleet on its way to Portugal from the Spanish port of San Lúcar. The English presence
around traditional Spanish ports like Cadíz had prompted the more regular use of smaller
Spanish ports. Under a guard of eleven galleys, the plate fleet still suffered the sinking of
two galleys and enough dispersal of the remaining galleys that the English
commandeered a carrack50 accompanying the fleet. This incident was a victory and
defeat for both sides. For the English, though Spain tried to make little of the prize won,
48. Paul Allen, Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598–1621 (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2000), 80.
49. AGS Estado, consulta, 2023:77, 6 Mar and 1 April 1602.
50. Carracks were smaller, lighter ships than Spanish galleons, traditionally used by the
Portuguese. J. H. Parry’s work remains the standard for early modern exploration technology and
shipbuilding. Age of Reconnaissance, (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1981), originally
published in London, UK in 1963. As Spain ruled over Portugal at this time, they incorporated
such ships into their armada preparations.
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this was not the case. The haul from the carrack, estimated at £40,000, constituted an
entire year’s budget for the English Navy.51 Considering the size of the plate fleet’s
cargo, generally equaling around ten times this amount, the carrack’s haul seems quite
small, yet proved significant for the English government. The incident showed that
English maritime forces successfully and consistently threatened Spanish fleets on both
sides of the Atlantic, but could not completely destroy them. For much of her reign,
Elizabeth relied on such tactics as official strategy—to keep Spain occupied and
weakened wherever possible since she herself could not mount an official force equal to
the size of the Great Armada. In this respect, English tactics represented a long-term
maritime siege or guerilla warfare.
For the Spanish side, the skirmish weakened the English squadron enough that its
commander delayed his plans for a full blockade of the Spanish-ruled Portuguese coast in
order to ensure the safe conduct of the carrack back to England. The King also still
received his three million ducat share of the plate fleet’s eleven million ducat cargo.52
Considering that only roughly thirty percent of the plate fleet’s considerable cargo
actually stayed in Spain speaks for the enormous foreign expenditures of the Spanish
government that hampered Spain’s ability to keep England out of the New World, or
even out off of the Spanish coasts so close to home. Eight million ducats could have built
many a West Indian or Latin American fort or a permanent Caribbean armada. Philip’s
councilors’ fears were certainly justified that the empire could not withstand fighting on

51. HMC Salisbury, 12:183-185, Sir Richard Leveson to Sir Robert Cecil, 15 June 1602.
52. Luis de Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas en la corte de España desde
1599 hasta 1614; Madrid, 1857, 140.
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so many fronts for so long a time, nor could such a large empire survive just by defensive
measure.53 Diplomacy and negotiation became increasingly important for Philip III.
Fortunately for Philip, the soon-to-be crowned James VI/I shared these ideas.
England and Spain spent the better part of five years in direct negotiation over the
Dutch situation. Terms of the proposed treaty always hinged on the West Indies.
England refused to give up their rights of trade and navigation, and Spain bristled at their
refusals and their constant aid to Dutch rebels. Elizabethan holdovers like Walter
Raleigh again forwarded the opinion that peace with Spain would only give the empire
time to “fortify [its] weakness” and begin pushing England out of the Indies. Under
Elizabeth, the riches and rental fees from privateering missions had helped diminish
Spanish wealth and power in the Atlantic. If James lost these riches, only Spain would
profit. With that increased wealth once more, Raleigh warned about the certainty of
another Enterprise of England.54 Instead of heeding the old privateer and politician’s
warning, James sent him to the Tower.
Spain understood the importance of the Indies to English negotiations as well.
Despite the numerous studies existing on the Pax Hispanica and Anglo-Spanish
negotiations in this period, few studies explore the importance of the Indies within these
talks. Historians generally ignore the significant of trade and navigation in the Indies as

53. Letter from IVDJ reprinted in Allen, Pax Hispanica, 54. I have not yet found mention of
how many ducats were thought lost on the sunken galleys from this skirmish.
54. Walter Raleigh, “A Discourse Touching a War with Spain.” Raleigh wrote that “if now the
king of Spain can obtain peace...he will soon grow to his former greatness and pride... [and] it
will not be long ere he remembers his old practices and attempts.” In Oldys and Birch, The
Works of Sir Walter Ralegh, Kt, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1942): 8 vols.; vol. 8:
Miscellanous Works, 309-310.
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an ever-present topic in these negotiations. In many cases, the crown instructed Spanish
councilors to avoid the topic if at all possible. If councilors55 discussed the Indies, their
instructions stated that they never mention the total exclusion of England from the
Indies.56 Under Elizabeth, the Queen’s councilors57 had always made a point to find a
way to discuss the Indies, thereby effectively delaying and often stopping all treaty
negotiations. Elizabeth remained eager to promote the lucrative Indies navigations.
James proved much more willing to make peace between England and Spain
despite some of his council’s resistance.58 James had experienced a lifetime of factional
warfare and political intrigue growing up in Scotland. His mother, the infamous Mary,
Queen of Scots, murdered one husband, encouraged several riots and rebellions in
Scotland and northern England, and plotted with English and Spanish to murder her
cousin Queen Elizabeth. James’ rocky upbringing played into his eagerness for peace as
he ascended the throne of England.59 Spain, recognizing this willingness, attempted to
broach the subject of suspending English trade to the Indies for the first time. Philip III
55. Spanish “councilors” included diplomats, constables, and advisors to the King like Francisco
Gómez de Sandoval y Rojas, the Duke of Lerma and Don Juan de Tassis y Peralta, Count of
Villamediana. Lerma (1553-1625) served as a statesman and cardinal and Tassis (1582-1622)
served as a diplomat. Both men helped negotiate the 1604 Treaty of London as well as the
Twelve Years Truce of Spain and the Netherlands. Allen, Pax Hispanica, 6-8, 106.
56. See documents cited in Allen, Pax Hispanica, 41-43. Even Allen’s discussion of these
Anglo-Spanish negotiations simply alludes to the fact that the matter of the Indies was everpresent. He does not make this fact a significant part of his argument.
57. England’s “councilors” generally refers to the Queen’s advisors (her Privy Council) in
conjunction with diplomats like in the Spanish system.
58. See documents cited in Allen, Pax Hispanica, 116-120.
59. See various biographies including Irene Carrier, James VI and I, King of Great Britain,
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Alan Stewart, The Cradle King: A Life of
James VI and I, (London, UK: Chatto and Windus, 2003).
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did so by first ordering a fleet to remain just off the Western European coast to deter
English shipping across the Atlantic. This did not work as evidenced by the afore
mentioned 1604 incursion. That particular incident in June of 1604 forced a direct
discussion of English Atlantic navigations.60 Spanish conditions allowed free commerce
“in those places where it existed before the war,” noting that this meant expressly
affected the Indies.61 Under James, this provision was generally upheld according to
official practice.62 This treaty, however, did not apply to the number of English seamen
that now operated in the Caribbean in exile thanks to James’ exclusionary maritime
practices.
Spanish officials first conceived of the Armada de la Guardia after Francis
Drake’s continued raids throughout Central America prompted some of the first official
recognition of need for a protective fleet in the Indies. Coupled with the ever increasing
number of pirates in the Spanish Caribbean, Drake’s raids proved the vulnerability of
Spanish naval forces abroad. In response, in 1595, the Council of the Indies pleaded for
the creation of a permanent Caribbean fleet. Alternately called the Armada del Mar del
Sur or the Armada de Barlovento, the proposed fleet would prevent the English
marauders from maintaining their own bases in the Carolinas from which they could
more easily attack the Spanish islands trade.63 Much of the plans for this new Caribbean

60. AGS Estado, consulta, 2557:18, 15 July 1604, AGS Estado 841:77, 99, 20 July 1604.
61. AGS Estado, 841:91, 16 July 1604; AGS Estado 841:100, 23 July 1604
62. See chapter 5 of this dissertation.
63. AGI, sección Gobierno, Indiferente General, 743, no 144, Juan de Ibarra, Consejo de India a
Felipe II, 27 Oct 1595.
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fleet drew from the creation of the Armada of Flanders created to defend Spanish
Netherlands interests in the English Channel.64 The experiences of the Armada of
Flanders and the experience of war with England in the 1580s proved to the Spanish the
need for a restructuring of the traditional Spanish Armada. Dutch ships and sailing
expertise quickly proved a serious threat to Spanish control around the world. The
“Invincible Armada” set out against England failed miserably, motivating Philip to listen
more intently to his shipbuilders’ advice. Pedro López de Soto, one such builder and
inspector of the Lisbon fleet, warned Philip of the need for a completely redesigned fleet
to keep up with the English. López told the king that English superiority rested “solely”
in the “speed and good design” of their ships, coupled with their “efficient artillery and
marksmen.”65
As too often happened, these plans never fully materialized. By the end of Philip
III’s reign in 1610, the number of Spanish vessels dropped below twenty. The number of
vessels did increase to fifty in the following two decades.66 The dearth of adequate
sailing vessels for a nation with the majority of its possessions across the seas
dramatically impacted Spain’s ability to hold those territories. Don Diego Sarmiento de
Acuña, conde de Gondomar, the Spanish ambassador in London from 1613-1622,
expressed his concerns to Philip III over the continued growth of the English fleet.
Acuña reminded Philip that only mastery on the seas secured mastery on land and that

64. R. A. Stradling, The Armada of Flanders: Spanish Maritime Policy and European War,
1568–1668 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 276.
65. AGS, Guerra Antigua legajo 405, no 142, de Soto to Philip II, 23 Sept 1594, Lisbon.
66. Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, 9.
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Spain lagged far behind the competition.67 As further proof of this deficiency, in 1621
English piratas once again skirted Spanish defenses and attacked Cartagena. One of
many continued attacks, the “well-armed” pirates absconded with one thousand bushels
of maiz, more than six million pesos in gold and silver, and caused much damage to the
ports and merchants operating there.68
The damages done by such attacks continued to aid English naval plans while
hampering Spain’s. Unlike James VI/I, his son Charles I (1625-1649) did implement
some ship-building programs in England. Charles I moved England towards a more
professional navy, building larger warships than England traditionally employed under
his successors. Charles’ naval plans paled in comparison to the succeeding revolutionary
government under Cromwell and the Rump Parliament. Cromwell’s biggest strength lay
in his commanding and organizing of the New Model Navy while his Spanish enemy
struggled to build and finance a navy across the empire. At the start of the Civil War, in
1649, the navy consisted of fifty warships and some other smaller vessels.69 Smaller
vessels had been the staple of the English naval force for almost a century, but Charles
continued to build larger ships, much like the Spanish had done. When Parliament took

67. J. H. Elliott and J. F. de la Peña, eds., Memoriales y cartas del Conde Duque de Olivares,
(Madrid, España: Alfaguara, 1978-1980), 2 vols.; vol. ii, 141-1443.
68. Huntington Library, Viage y sucesso de los caravelones, galeoncetes de la guarda de
Cartagena de las Indias, y su costa. Y la grandiosa vitoria que han tenido contra los costarios
piratas en aquel mar, este ano 1621. Los quales en al hazian grandes robos, y por esto cestava
las contrataciones, con gran daño de las costas y vecinos de Tierra Firme., Barcelona, 1621.
69. J. R. Powell and Edward Timings, eds., Documents Relating to the Civil War, 1642–1648
(London, UK: Navy Records Society, 1963), 69–72.
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over, some of their first plans included building twenty-five new ships of a more agile
and versatile design.70 The navy planned to add thirty more such ships by 1652.71
In general, more of the lower classes supported the Roundhead movement than
Charles I’s Cavalier followers. (“Roundheads” was the name given to the Army and
supporters of Cromwell and Parliament. “Cavaliers” supported king.) The Roundheads
wanted to curb the excesses of the King and the pro-Catholic leanings that led him to
favor traditional French and Spanish enemies at the expense of English concerns. The
navy, already consisting of more lower-class men looking for whatever employment they
could find, sided with Cromwell and his Roundheads as the Stuart kings stripped the
navy and held little respect for sailors.72 Even the Restoration diarist Samuel Pepys
lamented the poor administration of the Navy under the Stuarts before and after the
Interregnum (the period of Parliamentary and Cromwellian Commonwealth rule between
the Civil War’s end in 1649 and the Restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 1660). A
Royalist supporter, Pepys still commended the revolutionaries for their naval policies.
The maintenance of the Commonwealth army eventually drained the
government’s resources, but the Commonwealth Navy benefited from well-managed
finances and an incredible increase in ships.73 Over the course of the Interregnum, the
70. Mary Anne Everett Green, Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1649-1650, (London,
UK: Longman and Co., 1875), 59, 82. Hereafter identified as CPSD 1649-1650.
71. Mary Anne Everett Green, Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1651-1652, (London,
UK: Longman and Co., 1877), 429. Hereafter identified as CSPD 1651-1652.
72. This is an oversimplification. The Stuarts did not hold the navy in as high regard as
Elizabeth and later rulers. Goodman, Spanish Naval Power, 260. No island nation could survive
without some navy, but the Stuarts were happy to remain at the edges of Spain’s empire.
73. Pepys, The Royal Navy, 37-38.
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navy added over 200 ships to its force.74 Naval forces had made England great, defeating
the Invincible Spanish Armada, and beginning the fight for New World dominance. The
Stuart kings readily constricted English maritime expeditions to the New World on the
complaints of Spain, but Cromwell determined to make England a naval power once
more.
Under Cromwell, the navy once again held an important place in the operation of
the state. First and foremost, Cromwell realized that he needed to prove his might abroad
as much as at home. He did so through promotion of the New Model Navy. Though
scholars give most attention to the Roundhead Army for its unprecedented scale and
professionalization at the time, they too often ignore the navy. Control of the navy meant
protection of English trade, blockading of efforts to aid Charles I and his Cavalier army,
and a show of the might and right of the Roundhead cause to the rest of Europe.
Cromwell’s navy effectively controlled the English coastlines, collecting enough customs
to finance itself.75
This show of strength alone served as a deterrent to most foreign powers to send
aid to Charles I. Though Charles did receive some foreign support, without control of the
Navy, Charles could not effectively negotiate with other European crowns for
intervention, as evidenced by the failure of Spanish alliance with the English King in

74. R. C. Anderson, Lists of Men-of-War, 1650–1700, (London, UK: The Society for Nautical
Research, 1959), vol. 7, 5–8.
75. Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, 2–3.
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1642.76 Cromwell recognized this failure in his predecessor and made the navy the
instrument of his imperial ambitions to solidify his place at the head of the English
government, earning respect from his enemies. Lord Clarendon wrote that Cromwell’s
greatness abroad rivaled his power at home.77 While the European powers debated
supporting the King or the Commonwealth, Cromwell definitely gave them reason to
debate.
In 1628, Charles made a final effort to revive the Committee on the Navy. His
use of “ship-money” taxes to expand dockyards and build his lumbering warships had
contributed greatly to rising revolutionary arguments. Charles had also forbidden the
Navy to attack Spanish ships advancing on Scotland in the 1630s, as well as forbidding
intervention against attacks by Barbary pirates. Effectively tying the hands of the Navy
and showing his concerns to please Spain to be greater than his concerns for England,
Charles made it easy for men to see more promise in the Commonwealth Navy than in his
own. Even before the outbreak of Civil War, seamen abandoned their posts. For
example, in 1636, 220 of the 250 men aboard the St. Andrew simply vanished from its
roster.78 Like other sailors before them, many of these repaired to the Caribbean where
the New Model Navy came to recruit them just a few short years later.

76. J. R. Powell, The Navy in the English Civil War (Hamden, UK: Archon, 1962), 6. Though
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Some men did desert back to the Royalists. Many of the mariners who did so
came from the corps of gentleman-captains. In fact, no gentleman-captains remained and
no captains remained that had commanded a man-of-war before 1637.79 The New Model
Navy was now a proving ground for men who wished to raise their status in the corps and
in society.
Again repeating Elizabethan practice, Cromwell and the Commonwealth hired
merchantmen and errant seamen to supplement naval forces. Alongside these personnel
practices, Cromwell once again encouraged privateering, especially against the Spanish
as an inroad to naval service. With these policies, the New Model Navy acquired over
100 ships taken as prizes to add to its building program.80 The Venetian secretary in
London in 1655 wrote that the navy brought Cromwell “friendship and repute in every
part of the world.”81 At the start of the Restoration, the state still claimed 161 ships of
impressive caliber. Pepys called it “a naval force such as no English monarch had ever
possessed.”82 In that same year, 1661, the French fleet only had twenty ships.83 Noted
previously, Spain had fifty state-owned ships, less than half of the English fleet. The
English fleet owed its strength to the reinvigoration of naval policy and administration
under Cromwell.

79. Powell, The Navy in the English Civil War, 21.
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The decades of 1620-1650 remain marked for the intense and varied domestic
wars that occupied England and Spain. Under Philip III and Philip IV, Spain struggled
with numerous European wars including wars in Italy, aside from the ongoing conflict in
the Netherlands. Philip III set a course for his son that demanded success in the
“damnosa hereditas” Netherlands.84 Coupled with increasing imperial competition in the
West Indies, these wars left Philip IV almost constantly at war. England found itself
entering into civil war in the 1640s. Obviously, these events hold importance for this
project. The overstretching and overtaxing of Spanish resources made it possible for
Englishmen to gain a foothold in America and the Caribbean, with little (or
underfunded/uncoordinated) resistance from the Spanish. Comparatively, the English
government found itself consumed in an uprising that led to the end of the centuries-old
monarchy and created an entirely new governmental structure. Understandably, these
domestic events affect the amount of focus these two nations could pay to their overseas
colonies, no matter their importance. In the case of the English, the new government’s
need for support and resources created a renewed interest in the Atlantic World as a place
to build a new republican empire.

84. R. A. Stradling, Philip IV and the Government of Spain, 1621–1665 (New York, NY:
Cambridge University, 1988), 5.
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CHAPTER V
STUART EXILES, SPANISH JAMAICA, AND THE WESTERN DESIGN

Despite the importance of Jamaica within Caribbean colonial history and within
seventeenth-century European politics, modern scholars have largely overlooked this
period of the island’s history. Not since Francisco Morales Padrón’s masterful work,
Spanish Jamaica, written half a century ago, have scholars explored the importance of
the island before Cromwell’s Western Design. Even the histories of the Western Design
in Jamaica have largely failed to recognize the value of the island or its role in politics.
For Spanish historians, Jamaica remained a backwater of little value. For English
historians, the Western Design remains a failure on all accounts. Archival research
shows that the need for a reevaluation of these traditional arguments.
Spanish documents reveal that Spanish officials and settlers warned the
government about the need for greater defense of the island citing the large number of
pirates already operating there. They further iterate how detrimental the loss of the island
would be for the whole of Spanish America. Padrón notes that early twentieth-century
scholars also largely ignored the island, claiming that Jamaica’s role dwindled after the
1523 conquest of Mexico.1 Spanish settlers did not establish a large-scale encomienda
system on the island as in many of the empire’s other colonies. Even so, Jamaica sat at a
particularly strategic point of the Spanish trade routes, making it an important asset for
the empire, albeit an overlooked one.

1. Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, 44.
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For a century, Spain failed to secure the island and Cromwell’s New Model Navy
exploited that weakness. The Western Design did not achieve its main objective of
acquiring Hispaniola, however, after recruiting exiles from the neighboring islands, the
Commonwealth forces easily overtook forces in Jamaica. The exiles that the New Model
Navy recruited drew from rover communities established in the Caribbean following
James VI/I’s early seventeenth-century reversal of Elizabethan privateering policies.
James’ proclamations cancelling Elizabethan letters of reprisal led to emigration of many
Englishmen to the Caribbean and to the creation of rover communities throughout the
Caribbean basin.2 Regretting his predecessor’s encouragement of the “surprising and
taking” of Spanish ships at sea, James deplored the eagerness with which English
mariners annoyed and spoiled Spanish shipping.3 James offered seamen one month to
uphold his new peace treaty with Spain and to “stop going warlike to sea.”4 Any mariner
not heeding James’ proclamations faced “being reputed and taken as Pirates,” having
their goods and lands confiscated, and risked a death sentence.5 The language of this
proclamation differed greatly from early Elizabethan “letter-transfer” legislation where

2. See chapter 2.
3. TNA, James VI/I, Proclamation concerning Warlike ships at Sea, Greenwich, 23 June 1603;
“To Mariners, Cancelling Letters of Reprisal which they had from Elizabeth,” SP Domestic,
James 14/1/111, May 1603.
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James 14/1/111, May 1603.
5. TNA, James VI/I, Proclamation concerning Warlike ships at Sea, Greenwich, 23 June 1603;
“To Mariners, Cancelling Letters of Reprisal which they had from Elizabeth,” SP Domestic,
James 14/1/111, May 1603.
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seamen need only switch out their licenses for a Tudor seal. The new Stuart king, much
more eager for peace with Spain, aimed to reverse all such Elizabethan maritime practice.
English seamen first showed their disdain for this discontinuation by ignoring the
proclamations. Six months after his first proclamations, James lamented the continued
depravity of English seamen.6 Facing increasing numbers of “rogues” and “incorrigible”
attacks at home and abroad, James decided to expand his earlier decrees. Should
mariners continue their predations, James sentenced them to banishment in The New
Found-land and the East and West Indies.7 In doing so, James unwittingly increased the
very same piracy to which he objected.
The men affected by these proclamations then created their own communities in
the various islands of the Caribbean, setting the foundation for Cromwell’s success in the
Caribbean. The French and Dutch reminded James of the popular discontent with his
policies, prompting the King to issue some of the first increases of piracy punishment
statutes since Henry VIII.8 Showing mariners’ contempt for James, the Habsburg
ambassador to the Netherlands related that English mariners resented the King’s attempts
to curb prize acquisition and hinder what the mariners saw as a favorable war with

6. Proclamation for the due and speedy execution …persons, Woodstock, 17 Sept 1603. In
James Larkin and Paul Hughes, Royal Proclamations of King James I, 1603–1625., (Oxford, UK:
Clarendon Press, 1973), 52.
7. Proclamation for the due and speedy execution…persons, 17 Sept 1603. Larkin and Hughes,
Royal Proclamations of King James, 53.
8. Note on Proclamation Uppon the Peace with Spain and the Archdukes, Whitehall, 19 Aug
1604. In Larkin and Hughes, Royal Proclamations of King James, 91.
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Spain.9 Englishmen seamen enjoyed the living they had made under the late Queen.
Privateering had become an occupation. Turning again to Shakespeare, who served as
court playwright under Elizabeth and James, the character of Othello represents the
conflicted position of privateers in James’ early reign.10 The figure of the brave sailorgeneral fighting for honor and reputation, yet always seen as an outcast describes the
attack on privateers’ identity and reputation in this period.11 Despite their service to the
nation in the Armada campaigns, like Othello, privateers earned little to no praise from
their king.12
James, hoping for peace at last with Spain, meant to change this but offered
mariners little alternative but punishment for their occupations. Within a year of James’
succession, the Admiralty Court executed more men for piracy than it had in almost four

9. Vienna Privy Council, 44:30, June/July 1603. In Larkin, and Hughes, Royal Proclamations of
King James, 31.
10. Othello was first performed in 1603 and published in 1622. Shakespeare, The Tragedy of
Othello, the Moor of Venice, Barbara Mowat and Paul Werstine, eds., (New York, NY:
Washington Square Press, 1993). Printed for the Folger Shakespeare Library.
11. Literary scholars have constantly debated the problems of the character of Othello as a true
citizen, yet still a Moorish outsider. The idea of the Moor, the Turk, and the “other” in general
was not new to the English, but now the expansion of the Levant trade gave them more direct
interaction with Eastern peoples. Here was another uncivilized figure that quickly became
associated with the marginalized figure of the pirate—especially since Barbary pirates were often
Moors or Turks.
Shakespeare is also reflecting his own situation in the figure of Othello. Having been the court
playwright of Elizabeth, he has glorified her in numerous plays and supported her rule. Now, if
he wants to remain in royal favor, he must change all that and accept James’ view of things.
Shakespeare can still vilify pirates, but now in doing so, he would be attacking a much larger
group in which many of the men have lived at court and received titles. The brave privateer was
quickly being erased.
12. Othello, 1.1, ll. 27-30, 36-37.
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decades.13 Spain, expectedly, applauded the changes made to piracy and admiralty law to
uphold James’ new policies and the new peace with Spain. Robert Cecil, the English
Secretary of State from 1590-1612, remained wary of some of these new maritime
provisions.14 Writing from Spain on a diplomatic trip, Cecil, the Earl of Salisbury,
expressed his concerns over the future of English naval power. Spain expected to pick up
the pieces left as England stepped up its prosecution of pirates. Officials expected to buy
confiscated ships, seize more English ships coming into Spanish ports, and thereby
expected the English navy to diminish in size and power.15 The navy did significantly
decrease in terms of manpower.
When James ordered English reprisal letters rescinded, many mariners took their
skills to the Caribbean and the Mediterranean. A number of these men operated as true
pirates: not beholden to any one Crown and preying indiscriminately. Others still gained
letters of marque and merchant licenses from various foreign princes generally in the
Italian or Ottoman states. This phenomenon grew to such a point within such a short
time that James began issuing Proclamations for revocation of Mariners from forreine
services beginning in 1605.16 James issued versions of this proclamation again in 1609,
1622, and 1623. Just as Elizabeth could not effectively curb piracy during her early
reign, James could not keep seamen loyal to England.

13. TNA, Proclamation for the search and apprehension of certain Pirates, 12 Nov 1604; HCA
1/5/4-11. Other executions carried out from this search found in HCA 1/5/71-73 July 1605.
14. Robert Cecil succeeded his father William Cecil, Lord Burghley.
15. TNA, SP 94/10, 147, Nov 1604.
16. TNA, Thetford, 1 March 1605
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The exodus of “able and skillfull Mariners” from England went against the
“allegieance and duty of a subject.”17 Even Shakespeare moved into the Caribbean with
The Tempest, one his few non-European plays. Drawing from the emigration of English
seamen and from the numerous travel narratives appearing in England, Shakespeare once
again mirrored English piracy policies in his plays.18 English seamen continued to reject
these policies. Making peace with Spain and changing decades-old maritime traditions
constituted its own sort of betrayal to many English seamen. Therefore, they felt that
they owed little to a sovereign who did not take their concerns into account, especially
when that sovereign resorted to more forceful punishments. Increasing piracy
punishments for the first time in almost a century, James also openly encouraged
impressment of his own subjects. James instructed port officials and naval officers to
press into service any seamen found committing piracy or in the service of any prince but
the King of England.19 For twenty years, many seamen refused to join James’ navy,
prompting the King to allow impressment of men into service. This did not help the
loyalty issues already rampant between the King and his mariners, resulting in the
continued exodus of seamen from English shores.

17. TNA, Proclamation for better furnishing the Navy and Shipping of the Realme, with able and
skillful Mariners, Windsor, 6 Aug 1622.
18. The Tempest was first performed in 1611 and published in 1623. Caliban fits the
increasingly non-national pirates of the Caribbean and Prospero represents the money-hungry
seamen who preys upon shipping and lies in wait for shipwrecks. The play is also significant for
colonial studies exploring the relationship of the characters to indigenous groups in the New
World. Shakespeare, The Tempest, Barbara Mowat and Paul Werstine, eds., (New York, NY:
Washington Square Press, 2004), Printed for the Folger Shakespeare Library.
19. TNA, Proclamation for better furnishing the Navy and Shipping of the Realme
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Both Spain and England extended their control over American territories during
the seventeenth century, continuously clashing over the right to settle these lands.
Spain’s inability to mount an effective defense against English marauders and England’s
growing wealth and power from such attack allowed England gradually supplanted Spain
in the New World—at least in North America and a number of Caribbean islands.
European wars and internal strife constantly occupied these nations’ primary attention.
The growing importance of the Americas and the Caribbean forced each nation to reevaluate their policies.
In the 1650s, the Caribbean played a significant role in Anglo-Spanish politics
and Jamaica stood at the forefront of this renewed focus. During the reign of the first
Stuart Kings of England, Jamaica served as a refuge for English mariners, pirates, and
exiles, operating in and around the traditionally Spanish island. The failure of the
Spanish government to secure the island once they acknowledged its importance to the
empire opened the door for a revolutionary English leader to take hold of the island and
begin a new phase of English expansion, and ultimately, empire.
Discovered by Columbus on his second voyage to the New World, Jamaica
proved a crucial possession for further Spanish voyages into Mexico and north into Cuba
and La Florida. In 1514, King Ferdinand allowed settlers to the island to possess their
own ships and trading vessels for use throughout the Caribbean.20 Several colonists
wrote that Jamaica held numerous stores of livestock and other resources useful to the
colonization efforts in nearby territories. Francisco de Garay, the second Governor of the
island, from 1514-1523, informed the king of the abundance of produce as well. He
20. Decree, 14 Jan 1514, quoted in Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, 38.
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claimed that “the colonization of Terra Firma will not cease, because of a shortage of
supplies” to come from his island.21 If the island had no other significance to the Crown,
it did at least provide a steady supply of food and resources for the conquering armies.
These supplies had also been “essential” for Vasco Nuñez de Balboa on his expedition to
discover the South Sea.22 Occasionally, the government did recognize the importance of
promoting settlement on the island. One of these few promotional policies occurred in
1521. The Spanish crown waived custom duties on personal goods for any Spaniards
who chose to settle in Jamaica.23 The scale of encouragement for such policy remained
minimal until the English took the island over a century later.
By the beginning of the seventeenth century, despite the strategic location of the
island and the amount of resources there, only one fort existed on the island. Especially
with the regular crossings of the Vera Cruz Plate Fleets between Cuba and Jamaica, the
island needed greater fortification. The Admiral Ménez de Avilés and the Abbot Don
Francisco Márquez de Villalobos informed the king once more of the island’s deficient
security. Numerous other accounts outline these fears. Some of them speak to great loss
of resources and trade security, and more still relate the constant appearance of piratas
and corsarios. Letters to the Spanish ambassador in London, Don Gerau Despes
reiterated this fact by relating news of bienes robados of the English in 1570.24 Other
letters to Despes related how pirates wait at the harbours to trade slaves and attack the
21. Quoted in Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, 38.
22. Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, 43.
23. Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, 31.
24. AGI, Patronato, 265, R14, 1570.
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“five good ships” defending the island.25 The governor, Licado, also warned the king of
the dangers of losing the island. He asked for more defense measures and an end to the
negligent rule of Columbus’ descendants.26 Some of the problems in constructing forts
on the island stemmed from the mismanaged government on the island. Columbus and
his descendants had received numerous rights to the island resulting in an almost carte
blanche management of the island. Over the course of Jamaica’s history, these Columbus
descendants, the King himself, various audiencias (courts), and still more governors or
admirals gained charge of the island. Few extended periods of time existed when the
island had one efficient or effective hierarchy of government.27 This disorganization led
to the government’s continued disregard of Jamaica. The Spanish government did little
to answer these complaints and send the requisite goods and men to defend the island for
over a century.
The location of the island, central to practically all Spanish-American trade,
created an environment ripe for piracy. A steady flow of contraband trade existed for
most of the island’s history, participated in by settlers, pirates, and government officials
alike. The amount of traffic encircling the island further attested to its strategic
importance. Surprisingly, despite Padrón’s research and that of Irene Wright, very few
scholars have promoted the importance of Jamaica within the colonial Caribbean.28

25. AGI, Patronato, 265, R15, 20 July 1571.
26. AGI, Santo Domingo, 177, 22 Feb 1586.
27. Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, 71–73.
28. Padrón, Spanish Jamaica; Wright, Spanish Documents Concerning English Voyages to the
Caribbean; Wright, Documents Concerning English Voyages to the Spanish Main.
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English historians of the early modern Caribbean deal with these works even less than
Spanish historians. Revisiting these documents and archives proves the need for a
reevaluation of Jamaica’s place within early modern Caribbean history and within the
larger imperial conflict for dominance in the New World.
At the start of the seventeenth century, one Spanish Governor, Fernando
Melgarejo Córdoba (1596-1606), did actively address the importance of defending
Jamaica’s coastline. He made plans to construct new forts and to create a small naval
fleet to remain in the island. The Armada de la Guardia de la carrerra de las Indias
mentioned in the previous chapter sailed as protection to the Plate Fleets only. The
armada’s plans made no considerations for defending coastline forts in the Caribbean
islands. Melagrejo, moreso than the Spanish crown, realized that forts meant little if the
sea remained open and free.29 Even though Melgarejo wrote up these plans, he never put
them into motion. Generally acknowledged as one of the more corrupt of a number of
corrupt Jamaica governors, Melgarejo constantly undermined his own efforts. Colonists
reported how the governor sold gunpowder to passing ships no matter their nationality
because of the inflated profit he could earn. Melgarejo also dismissed the island’s
official armsmaker leaving the island no resident manufacturer of munitions.30
Therefore, even if Melgarejo followed through on his ambitious defense plans, the ships
and forts had no readily available firepower. As other nations, especially the English,
recognized the situation in Jamaica, piracy steadily increased. England had already

29. Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, 130.
30. AGI, Santo Domingo, 177, 1604.
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begun establishing supply bases in the Caribbean in places like Barbados and around the
Carolina coast in the sixteenth century.
Jamaica loomed as a new prize directly in the heart of Spanish trade to add to
these existing possessions. During the first half of the seventeenth century, since
Melgarejo’s dismissal of the island’s armorer, the crown never assigned a replacement.
While the militia suffered from this lack or arms, the Jamaican cabildo (Spanish colonial
administrative council) claimed that at least the majority of settlers could help defend the
island. The cabildo iterated the hunting experience of the settlers saying that they
“[were] skilled shots of such calibre that when flint pieces, gunlocks, and cocks were
lacking, with gun barrel and stock in one hand, and a length of fuse in the other, there
were [still] able to fire those arms.”31 When the English landed just a few years later,
these skilled shots fell short.
The increase in piratical attacks during the end of Melgarejo’s term prompted
Phillip III to take some sort of action. Philip III sent out a galleon fleet in 1608 that did
little to stem the growing tide of piracy.32 The 1620s saw steady attacks by the English
and Dutch primarily. Some sources total the losses of this period at around 700,000
ducats.33 In response, Philip IV also gave orders in 1627 for the creation of another fleet
to sail to Jamaica and Santo Domingo.34 Padrón claims that “it was known and
understood that the cure and the salvation [of the Empire as a whole] lay with the sea,”
31. AGI, Santo Domingo, 178B.
32. Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, 131.
33. Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, 131.
34. Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, 131.
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but this does not seem to be the case.35 Even though the Spanish kings occasionally sent
ships to the Jamaica, no continuous dedicated policy to do so existed throughout the
seventeenth century. When Philip IV finally sent a military engineer, Juan Bautista
Antonelli, to the island in the 1630s, the report stated that Jamaica had too small a harbor
for bigger ships and was therefore not likely to be as coveted an island,36 though much of
the contemporary correspondence shows evidence to the contrary. Antonelli did not
address the existence of the smaller, lighter ships of the English pirates that navigated
such harbors much more easily than Spanish galleons. Unfortunately, an internal rivalry
between the Cuban and Jamaican governors made moot Antonelli’s plans for and further
consideration of Jamaica’s defenses. Desiring the completion of his own new fort, the
Cuban governor, Lorenzo de Cabrera y Corbera (1626-1630), detained Antonelli.37
Without the supervision of one of Spain’s chief military engineers, little to nothing
changed defensively in Jamaica for the next two decades.
Losing the trade routes encircling the island could have devastating consequences
for Spanish America. Once lost, Jamaica would be practically impossible to recover.38
Don Carlos de Ybarras, slated as the Captain of the Armada de la guardia de la carrera
de las Indias, in 1634, related the amount of trade to the island, claiming that frigates
brought three to four hundred people to Jamaica. He estimated that within a year this
35. Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, 131.
36. Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, 131. There are two Juan Bautista Antonellis, a father (1550-1616)
and son (1585-1649) who worked as engineers for the Spanish government throughout the
Caribbean and Central America.
37. Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, 132.
38. AGI, Real Cedula, Santo Domingo, 1126, 1631.
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population would produce a revenue of at least ten thousand pesos. As the enemy
recognized the island as “an island of many provisions,” Ybarras entreated the King to
recognize the need for protection of this wealth. Ybarras referenced the continued need
for an Armada de Barlovento to guard the island.39 Also in 1634, the Marquis de
Cadereita tried to convince the King of the fertility of the island’s sugar and tobacco
crops that easily enticed other nations to make attempts on Jamaica.40 Citing the ease in
which enemies came and went from Negril Harbor, the Marquis asked again for
protection of the island and the valuable wood and resources enemies gained there.41
Letters to the King in 1638 became more concerned about the lack of protection afforded
Jamaica. Claiming that the government had done nothing to protect the island for two
and a half years, letters reported how the island “would easily be overrun” by enemies
who “will be owners” of the island if fortification plans did not proceed quickly.42 On
various occasions, the Spanish Crown sent out directives to Cuba, Hispaniola, and other
nearby islands to send supplies and support to Jamaica. Rarely did the other governors
actually follow such orders and rarely did the Crown enforce them.
The governors of Santiago de Cuba, especially, showed an intense animosity
towards their Jamaican neighbors. Padrón claims that this “friction...was one of the most
outstanding features” of seventeenth-century Caribbean governance.43 By the mid39. AGI, Santo Domingo, 178B, 19 Sept 1634.
40. 25 Sept 1634, AGI, Santo Domingo, 178B.
41. Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, 135.
42. AGI, Santo Domingo, 178B, written from Santo Domingo, 8 Dec 1638.
43. Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, 85.
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seventeenth century, as the fragility of Jamaican defenses became a ticking bomb for
Spanish power in the Caribbean, the King sent orders that the Greater Antilles turn all of
their attention and efforts towards Jamaica. The Cuban governor, for one, flatly
refused.44 These disagreements only added to/amplified the powerlessness of the Crown
in the Caribbean.
Engineer Antonelli had tried to reassure Philip IV that the island had adequate
artillery for defense in 1635, claiming that the island housed at least eight large
cannons.45 Antonelli had barely even seen the Jamaican armaments as the Cuban
governor kept him detained with Cuban fortification projects. Contradicting Antonelli’s
reports, the Duke de Veragua responded that the island had very few and “ill-preserved”
muskets and cannons with little gunpowder to even use in them. The Duke resorted to
ordering Captain Jacinto Sedeño and Captain Albornoz to travel to Cartagena or Santo
Domingo to purchase as much ammunition as possible, but reminded the King that
gunpowder is “quite expensive.”46 As his predecessors noted, the lack of defense meant
that pirates constantly interfered in the island’s trade and supplies, forcing inhabitants to
resort to bartering amongst themselves. Luckily, settlers found abundant fruit, fleeces,
and meat to help sustain them despite their poverty of currency. Veragua petitioned for a
number of ships to regularly police the surrounding waters, citing the “well known need

44. Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, 84–85.
45. AGI, Santo Domingo, 178B.
46. AGI, Santo Domingo, 178B, 1638.
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to preserve this island,” its importance for Spanish colonial navigation, and the damage
that would result from Jamaica’s loss.47
Jamaica occupied a significant place within the Spanish Caribbean. In 1643,
Captain Juan de Arencibia noted that only one of these eight cannons fully functioned.48
Misinformation and slow progress constantly plagued the defense of the island. The
King approved requests to send ships to Jamaica with war supplies in 1644. By 1651,
seven years later, the original petitioner, the Duke of Veragua, had not even procured the
ship.49 The archives show a constant stream of correspondence in the 1630s and 1640s
about the necessity of defending the island. If the Crown questioned the importance of
the island, these documents also repeatedly described the amount of foodstuffs and goods
available there. Simply because the government was preoccupied with other wars or
favored islands like Cuba and Hispaniola, did not make Jamaica any less important to the
supplying of the colonies, nor did it make Jamaica any less strategically placed amidst
Spanish trade and therefore increasingly desirable to pirates and the expanding English
empire (as well as to Dutch and French sailors looking to expand their trade and
influence). Already, in 1640, Spanish enemies occupied San Christobal, Dominica, and
other coastlines within easy distance of Jamaica. Officials, as always, wrote about the
“known risk of losing the island” with the enemy ever close and better armed than much
of Jamaica’s settlers.50
47. AGI, Santo Domingo, 178B, 1638.
48. AGI, Santo Domingo, 178B.
49. AGI, Santo Domingo, 178A.
50. AGI, Santo Domingo, 178B, 15 April 1646.
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The lack of defense of Jamaica, or its fairly easy conquering by Cromwell
eventually, has less to do with the “worthlessness” of the island than with the inefficient
governance and supply of the island by the Spanish government. The island deserved
more attention simply because the loss of control in the surrounding trade routes would
be even more detrimental than the island might be useful. Still, despite this recognition
and correspondence requesting support, little to nothing came to fruition. As in the case
of the famed Armada almost a century prior, the Spanish government remained mired in
its own bureaucracy. For twenty years, Jamaican governors, colonists, and the King
himself had recognized the need to fortify and protect the island as it could be a valuable
asset to the empire, but did little to follow through on those plans.

English Civil War and a New ‘Design’

The missed opportunities for properly defending Jamaica against attack during the
seventeenth-century “siesta of Spanish history”51 paved the way for English occupation
of the island in the 1650s. Even though Jamaican residents experienced pirate attacks for
almost a century,52 the island remained inadequately fortified and, in 1654-1655, an
official English fleet sailed west to capture the island and gain prestige for their new
government. That fleet, commanded by Army General Robert Venables and General-at-

51. Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, 216.
52. Padrón claims that by the start of the seventeenth century, Jamaica “was already announcing
its future as a corsair laboratory.” Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, 143.
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Sea William Penn, did not sail under royal flags, but rather under the flags of the
revolutionary Interregnum regime led by Oliver Cromwell.
Ending the English Civil War in 1649, Cromwell’s army toppled the Stuart
monarchy and introduced England’s first Parliamentary government. As with the leader
of a new regime, especially a revolutionary one, Cromwell knew he must find a way to
establish his new government’s authority and earn the official recognition of the
European powers in order to make his revolution permanent and not just another
rebellion. With this goal in mind, Cromwell crafted his “Western Design” to found an
official colony in the lucrative Caribbean while also striking at the heart of the mighty
Spanish Empire, thus aiming to prove England’s dominance in the ongoing imperial
competition for the New World.
Before Cromwell turned his sights westward, he needed first to secure victory
over the Charles I and his Cavalier supporters. Stuart succession to the English throne in
1603, under Charles’ father James VI/I, initially troubled Englishmen. James VI of
Scotland, the late Elizabeth’s cousin, had proved himself an adequate and peaceable king
in Scotland.53 Englishmen did not vehemently challenge James’ succession, though
neither did they take to the streets to celebrate it. James’ alienation of many of his
subjects, chiefly through his maritime policies and affinity for peace with Spain left his

53. James’ mother, Mary, Queen of Scots (1542-1567), had so embroiled factionalism in the
country that she was forced to renounce her claim her claims to throne in favor of her infant son.
This did not stop Mary from continuing to stir up controversy and debate throughout the British
Isles until her execution in 1587 for plots of treason against Elizabeth. The legacy of Mary
weighed on the minds of Englishmen as James prepared to take throne, however, a series of
compromises over religion, primarily, eased much of these tensions. See Gordon Donaldson, The
First Trial of Mary Queen of Scots, (New York: NY, Stein and Day, 1969); Antonia Fraser, Mary
Queen of Scots, (New York, NY: Bantam Dell, 1969).
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reign filled with tension despite its superficial stability. Constant compromise and
negotiations both at home and abroad characterized James’s reign. Furthermore, the
mass emigration of valuable skilled mariners during his reign did little to curry favor
within the realm. At least under James, England remained fairly politically stable.
Charles I managed to undo any domestic goodwill his father had worked to build.
Within twenty years on the throne of England, Charles saw the country plunged
into civil war and witnessed the end of the English monarchical state. Other scholars
have told the story of the English Civil War at length. They explain the deepening of the
internal political, religious, and social divisions of early seventeenth-century England and
how those divisions led to greater Parliamentary power and the diminution of absolute
monarchy in England.54 Charles incensed his subjects with his “Eleven Years Tyranny,”
his period of personal rule when he rarely called Parliament into session. Englishmen
also took great offense to Charles’ skirting of tax policies by employing archaic duties on
the use of the King’s forests, issuing illegal monopolies, and levying taxes like shipmoney without Parliamentary approval. Englishmen did not oppose paying all taxes,
even ship-money, but they objected the haphazard application of those taxes and the royal

54. Simon Adams, “Early Stuart Politics: Revisionism and After.” In J. R. Mulryne and
Margaret Shewring, eds., Theatre and Government Under the Early Stuarts, (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1993): 29–56; Charles Carlton, Going to the Wars: The Experience
of the British Civil Wars, 1638–1651, (London, UK: Routledge, 1992); Christopher Hibbert,
Charles I: A Life of Religion, War and Treason, (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007);
Christopher Hill, Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution, (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press,
1965), 333; Hill, The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution,
(New York, NY: Viking Press, 1972); John Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer, eds., The Civil Wars: A
Military History of England, Scotland, and Ireland 1638–1660, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press, 1998); McElligott and Smith, eds., Royalists and Royalism During the Interregnum;
Powell and Timings, eds. Documents Relating to the Civil War.
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imposition of them.55 Though Philip IV offered Charles little help, Spain was embroiled
in its own series of provincial uprisings and internal turmoil.56 With no other recourse,
Charles called the “Long Parliament” in 1640, which lasted until 1653 when the
Roundhead army dismissed it. In this Long Parliament, Charles’ desperation forced him
to cede many royal rights and agree to Parliamentary demands, like regular Parliamentary
sessions.57 The continued devolution of debate between Parliament and the King spread
through the country and resulted in Scottish and Irish rebellions, and eventually turned
into a full-blown Civil War. Finally, in 1649, the Roundhead Army defeated the
Royalists. A tribunal tried and executed Charles I, beginning the Parliamentary rule of
the Interregnum period lasting from 1649-1660.
Colonists also felt the effects of the Civil War. English Civil War scholars remain
overwhelming Euro-centric, rarely mentioning how the war affected the colonies.58 Only
recently have scholars begun to explore the dissemination of pamphlets abroad and
colonists’ reactions to the war,59 despite the fact that only six of the 24 British colonies

55. John Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer, eds., The Civil Wars: A Military History of England,
Scotland, and Ireland 1638–1660, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998), 11.
56. John Lynch, The Hispanic World in Crisis and Change, 1598-1700, (Oxford, UK: Blackwell,
1992), originally published in 1969; Stradling, Philip IV and the Government of Spain.
57. “Triennial Act,” in Statutes of the Realm, vol. 5: 1628-1680 (1819), 54-57.
58. McElligott claims that Roundhead scholars have been much apt to take up the mantle of an
Atlantic history of the Civil War, whereas Royalist scholars have remained “doggedly Anglocentric.” Jason McElligott, “Atlantic Royalism? Polemic, Censorship and the Declaration and
the Protestation of the Governour and Inhabitants of Virginia,” in McElligott and Smith, eds.
Royalists and Royalism During the Interregnum, 214.
59. McElligott, Smith, and Pestana are some of the first scholars to extensively discuss the
significance of the Civil War as it pertains the Caribbean. McElligott and Smith, eds., Royalists
and Royalism During the Interregnum; Pestana, English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution.
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publicly declared for the king and rebelled against the Puritan regime. The rebellious six
were Antigua, Barbados, Bermuda, Maryland, Newfoundland, and Virginia.
Most colonies, being so far detached from the mainland and so reliant on their
neighbors in the smaller, tougher environment of colonial life, tempered their opinions
about the Civil War. Needing the mainland for trading and therefore survival, the
colonies tended to accept the Commonwealth even if many inhabitants did not agree with
it in principle. The most vehement Royalist supporter, Virginia, joined the
Commonwealth by the end of 1649.60 In Barbados, during 1649-1650, there existed a
“Treaty of Turkey and Roast Pig” meant to keep peace among the settlers. The treaty
stated that “whosoever named the word Roundhead or Cavalier, should give to those that
heard him a shot [young hog] and a turkey...to be eaten at his house who made the
forfeiture...that they might enjoy the company of one another.”61 Though Barbados
played host to a population with a majority of exiled Royalists and Cavalier supporters,
many of them hesitated to declare for the King, favoring the “Treaty of Turkey and Roast
Pig” for as long as it lasted. Barbados, like Jamaica, welcomed exiles from either side of
the fight.62 Even as divisions in the colony grew, Cavaliers and Roundheads alike
continued to engage in friendly communication and cooperation for the sake of the

60. “The Draft of an Act concerning the settling of the plantation of Virginia under the
government of the Commonwealth, to be presented to the Council of State, for presentation to
Parliament,” TNA, SP 25/123, 173.
61. Nicholas Darnell Davis, The Cavaliers and Roundheads of Barbados, 1650–1652, Forgotten
Books reprint, 1883, 6.
62. See also Geoffrey Smith, “Royalists in Exile: The Experience of Daniel O’Neill,” in
McElligott and Smith, eds., Royalists and Royalism During the Interregnum, 106.
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colony’s success.63 Any resistance to the Interregnum regime seemed to dissipate
because, by 1652, the Commonwealth regained control of all the Caribbean islands.64
The Commonwealth understood the importance of the colonies more so than the
Stuarts. Whereas James and Charles saw colonial possession more as their right in the
expansion of their kingdom, the Commonwealth, and Cromwell in particular better
understood the economic and political necessity of gaining control of the colonies. An
“Oath of Engagement” was required of all Englishmen departing for the Americas to
ensure, at least nominally, the support of Englishmen in every corner of the realm.65
Especially at the start of Commonwealth rule, the government monitored colonial
correspondence and publications as much as possible.66 A united England meant further
proof of the Commonwealth’s legitimacy to the rest of the world. The scheme worked as
Spain officially recognized the new “Republic of England” in 1650.67 France remained
more skeptical of the new regime and kept up their engagement in the Dutch War until
1654 in order to avoid the issue. Cardinal Mazarin used the time to devise a scheme to
divert an English-Spanish alliance by playing up the wealth of the Indies to Cromwell.68

63. Davis, Cavaliers and Roundheads of Barbados, 55, 80–86.
64. McElligott, “Atlantic Royalism?” in McElligott and Smith, eds., Royalists and Royalism
During the Interregnum, 215.
65. TNA, SP 25/146/123; 138; CO 1/11/14.
66. McElligott, “Atlantic Royalism?” in McElligott and Smith, eds., Royalists and Royalism
During the Interregnum, 214.
67. Stradling claims that this was made “with indecent haste.” Stradling, Philip IV and the
Government of Spain, 297.
68. Ambassador Quirini writing to the Senate from Madrid, 22 Feb/4 March 1654, CSPV 16531654.
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Having already recognized the importance of the Caribbean, Cromwell began
preparations to attack Spanish forces both for the wealth he expected from prizes and for
the respect he expected to earn from other European governments. By 1654, Cromwell
and his army disbanded Parliament. Cromwell ruled under the title of “Lord Protector.”
Some of his councilors proposed attacking Spain proper, but Cromwell preferred to
attack the Americas first and foremost. Cromwell believed that a Caribbean island “of
substantial size,” won under the name of the Commonwealth, “would come in more
useful than Barbados where Royalist had previously been sent.”69 In the same vein of
thinking as Elizabeth, Cromwell believed that striking at Spanish colonies in the
Americas would help his new regime acquire necessary financial gains. Unlike his
General John Lambert, The Protector believed that Spain remained too distracted
elsewhere in its empire to retaliate for an island attack as quickly and violently as General
Lambert warned.70 Using this to his advantage in the Indies, Cromwell asserted his force
as legitimate ruler of England, kept Spain distracted, and gained valuable resources to
continue his imperial plans.
In the Caribbean, Cromwell recycled Elizabethan privateering policies and
diplomatic justifications for such endeavors and gained the valuable Atlantic colony he
saw as crucial to the establishment of his new political rule. Having kept the support of
69. Quoted in Timothy Venning, Cromwellian Foreign Policy, (London, UK: Macmillan Press,
1995), 47.
70. Venning, Cromwellian Foreign Policy, 49.
As occurred so often in the history of Jamaica, the Spanish crown largely ignored reports from
the island about a possible English invasion in 1654. The Spanish ambassador in London, Don
Alonso de Cárdena, warned Philip IV of English preparation for an expedition to the Indies,
“specifically against Santo Domingo.” Quoted in Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, 182–83.
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the Navy throughout the Civil War, Cromwell had the full force of naval power at his
disposal.71 During Christmas 1654, the Western Design fleet sailed for Barbados with
sixty ships and four thousand soldiers where it picked up a dozen more ships and at least
five thousand more soldiers from among the settlers, local militia, and the “unruly set” of
exiled mariners that operated in the surrounding waters.72 General Venables recruited
more “unruly” men in St. Kitts. After failing to secure Hispaniola, the navy found
success in Jamaica, thanks in part to the continued recruitment of exiles and pirates. On
28 November 1655, having won Jamaica, the Lord Protector issued a charter for the
establishment of an official English city at Port Royal, Jamaica, to be the capitol of the
new Commonwealth colony. Cromwell further declared that “Within the tropics where
there is never Peace, and without the tropics where Peace yet it, there shall now be War
with Spain...We will maintain Jamaica, send reinforcement after reinforcement to it; we
will try yet for the Spanish Plate Fleets...and have no peace with Spain.”73 With this
expedition…and with the help of Caribbean pirates and exiles, Cromwell gained
recognition and peace with France, proved his might against the Spanish foe, and set out
to plant the foundations of one of England’s most lucrative colonies.

71. See J. R. Powell, The Navy in the English Civil War, (Hamden, UK: Archon, 1962).
72. S. C. Lomas, ed., The Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell with Elucidations by Thomas
Carlyle, (London, UK: Methuen and Co, 1904), 465.
73. Lomas, S. C., ed., The Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell with Elucidations by Thomas
Carlyle, 467.
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CHAPTER VI
“SODOM OF THE NEW WORLD” AND THE EMPIRE:
EXILE COMMUNITIES, ENGLISH POLITICS, AND PORT ROYAL, JAMAICA,
1655-1692
Cromwell’s Western Design represented the triumph of English imperial
endeavors against their Spanish enemies. The official chartering of the city of Port Royal
and the establishment of Jamaica as an English colony was the culmination of a centurylong cycle of piracy legislation. Cromwell’s forces conquered the island thanks in large
part to the help of exiled mariners who continued their pirating ways in the area after
Stuart rulers discontinued Elizabethan privateering policies. For these mariners’
assistance, Cromwell offered them a way to rejoin the English state in settling the colony
for the empire. Having lived as exiles and pirates, many of these men did not exactly fit
the ideal of an English “gentleman,” useful though they may have been to the expansion
of the empire. Cromwell himself further complicated the social makeup of the island by
exporting Irish dissidents and other criminals to settle the island and work its developing
plantations. This social makeup quickly earned Port Royal the title of the “Sodom of the
New World.” A colonial capital, made up of barely legitimate citizens, yet integral to the
development of an English Atlantic empire, Port Royal constitutes an ideal case-study for
exploring the changing status of pirates and criminals in English politics and Caribbean
settlement.
In the latter half of the sixteenth century, the English began to expand their
overseas influence. By the seventeenth century, this influence developed into a push
towards empire and permanent settlement of new lands in Africa, North America, and,
most importantly for this study, the Caribbean. One of the most fabled of these English
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settlements lies on the central southern coast of the island of Jamaica—the city of Port
Royal. The politics of three English rulers shaped the development of this city.
International politics and the profits from booming seventeenth-century trade further
determined the importance of the city and determined what kind of men would come to
reside in Port Royal. A burgeoning buccaneer city even before its semi-destruction by an
earthquake in 1692, Port Royal embodied the best and worst of life in the Caribbean and
held an important place in seventeenth-century English New World policy.
Not just a trading center, Port Royal and the island of Jamaica deserve study as
places where European revolution and war intersect with the formation of a new Atlantic
World and the emergence of a new, revived culture of piracy. Surprisingly few studies
exist that deal solely with the history of Port Royal. Much of the scholarship on the city
remains embedded in larger political histories of Anglo-Spanish conflict in the Caribbean
or in social histories of seventeenth and eighteenth century piracy. Most literature
focusing chiefly on the city itself comes from archaeologists. At Texas A&M University,
in particular, the Underwater Archaeology Program has conducted one of the largest
excavations of the sunken portions of the city, diligently mapping the city streets and
houses and inventorying goods.1
In the seventeenth century, European settlers and seamen saw Port Royal as an
especially important city because of its easily accessible harbors, but also because of the
protection of the port offered by several outlying barrier islands. The island of Jamaica
itself offered an ideal base for planning attacks on (largely Spanish) settlements in Cuba,

1. Donny L. Hamilton, “The Port Royal Project,” Nautical Archaeology Program, Texas A&M
University, http://nautarch.tamu.edu/portroyal/

124

Hispaniola, Panama, Mexico, and other parts of Central and South America (see maps
below). Such a position put Jamaica in the

Figure 1: Detail of Caribbean from Emmanuel Bowen, “A New and Accurate Chart of the West
Indies.” Found in John Harris, Navigantium atque Itinerantium Bibliotheca [A Complete
Collection of Voyages and Travels], 1748. Courtesy of the Norman B. Leventhal Map Center at
the Boston Public Library, http://maps.bpl.org

125

Figure 2: Detail of Port Royal from Nicolaum Visscher, “Jamaica,” 1680. Courtesy of the
Jamaica Parish Reference, http://prestwidge.com/river/jamaicanparishes.html

middle of the most lucrative trade routes between the Americas and Europe making
Jamaica a highly prized locale for pirate- and privateering-minded men and crowns.
Some scholars claim that Jamaica may not have been particularly important by
pointing out how little attention Spain gave to the island.2 Seeing Jamaica as a feverridden backwater, Spain left behind minimal military forces on the island to defend it.
While Jamaica did not produce the gold and silver that Spaniards had grown accustomed
to finding throughout the rest of their American holdings, the island offered other
advantages that growing numbers of pirates and eventually Spain’s enemies, chiefly the
English, recognized and used to their ultimate advantage. Even in the case of the English
mission for Jamaica, during the Interregnum period of the 1650s, many people claimed
2. Kris Lane, Blood and Silver: A History of Piracy in the Caribbean and Central America,
(Oxford, UK: Signal Books, 1999), 100-105, J.H. Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire,
(Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1990), 256-260. See also discussions in Chapter 4.
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English efforts on the island were a failure, but the policies begun during this period
would make Jamaica a rich and valued possession of the Restoration empire.3 Though
the Interregnum and rule of Cromwell lasted less than a decade, the policies of the period
in regards to Jamaican settlement requires re-examination. The plantation schemes that
flourished on the island into the eighteenth century started under Cromwell. Without
Cromwell’s recycling of Elizabethan privateering policy to incorporate wayward
Caribbean mariners back into the governmental fold, England would not have settled Port
Royal and the island would not have become the jewel of the Restoration colonies.
Many English privateers and pirates left England for the Caribbean hoping to
continue the lucrative lifestyle they had enjoyed for decades and escape the tyranny
brewing under this new king. With no other options left to them besides little pay and
squalid conditions in the Royal Navy, as many as 10,000 Englishmen left the country by
1615.4 As many as 300,000 Englishmen migrated to the Caribbean during the course of
the seventeenth century.5 These numbers amount to sixty-eight percent of all Atlantic
travelers that made the Caribbean their destination.
Once in the Caribbean, Englishmen created bases of operation and settlement
much like the bases that existed along the English and Irish coastlines in the sixteenth
3. Pestana, English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 180.
4. Oppenheim, M. The Naval Tracts of Sir William Monson. London, UK: Navy Records
Society, 1902–14.
5. Alison Games as emerged as one of the preeminent scholars of seventeenth-century British
Atlantic migration. “Migration” in David Armitage and Michael Braddock, eds., The British
Atlantic World, 1500-1800, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 37-42; Games, Migration
and the Origins of the British Atlantic World,(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2001); see
also Burnard, “European Migration to Jamaica,” 796-94. J.H. Elliot estimates the numbers at
200,000. “Afterword,” in Armitage and Braddock, British Atlantic World, 242.
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century.6 In these areas, Englishmen also joined with other seamen and exiled men from
other European nations. No longer working for a government, these men followed no
restrictions as to who they could attack. Without national ties, or, at least as national ties
dissolved in favor of survival and prosperity, these men created international
communities of what could now once again be termed “pirates.” Over time, these
settlements grew and many remained autonomous of any national government—at least
for significant periods of time.
Imperial competition in the Caribbean made possible much of this autonomy.
Spain and England dominated most of the Caribbean and the Americas, but the French
and Dutch also entered the fray during the seventeenth century. Cuba, Jamaica,
Hispaniola, Bermuda, and Barbados were some of the few Caribbean islands under direct
control of a European crown. The French occupied Martinique, St. Kitts, and Saint
Domingue. The Dutch most notably occupied Curaçao, Tobago, and Aruba. As
evidence of the intense competition for these islands, St. Kitts, for one, came under
control of the English, French, Spanish, and again the English in less than a decade from
1623-1630. In the absence of official crown control of many of these islands, exiles and
pirates more easily established rover communities throughout the Caribbean.
Rover communities inhabited much of the island of Tortuga, for example, in
1625. Tortuga lay just off the north-western coast of Spanish Hispaniola. Exiled seamen
joined with the rebel and runaway indentured servants on the island. These rebels lived
off the land and managed to establish trade in cattle and hides with passing ships from
various European nations. On the island, the men adopted the indigenous method of
6. Compared to places like Studland Bay in Ireland.
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smoking meat called “buccan.” In French, the term, “boucaine” and “boucanier” came to
identify not just the meat-preparation method, but the men who practiced it. By the time
the English gained a foothold in the area, around 1630, the title of “buccaneer” extended
to any pirate in the Caribbean.7 Most Englishmen stopping by the island did so on their
way to the English colony at Providence Island though a number of them either stayed or
returned to Tortuga when promises on Providence Island went unfulfilled.8
Providence Island, the other English Puritan colony, founded off the coast of
Nicaragua in 1630, also had an impact on English Caribbean designs. Planning a colony
of the Puritan Massachusetts colony, the founders envisioned Providence Island as a new
attempt at a godly society free of the corrupt control of England-based merchants that
plagued the Massachusetts colony.9 Historians have largely argued that the venture
failed, resorting to slave labor, falling into the same political corruption as its parent
colony, and encouraging barely legal privateering.10 Despite the Puritans dislike of these
criminals, the colonists received valuable geographic and navigational information from
these men11 in the same way that the Western Design later made use of some of these
very same men. Many of the men involved in settling Providence Island, like Richard
Pym, also served in the Civil War Parliament that overthrew the king and elevated
7. See Carl Ortwin Sauer, The Early Spanish Main. Berkeley, CA; University of California
Press, 1966.
8. For more on the Providence Island Colony see Kupperman, Providence Island.
9. Kupperman, Providence Island, x.
10. Kupperman, Providence Island, 5–6.
11. William Dampier, aut, Sir Albert Gray, ed., A New Voyage Round the World, 1697 (New
York, NY: Dover, 1968), 30–33. Stanley Pargellis and Ruth Lapham Butler, eds., “Daniel
Ellffryth’s Guide to the Caribbean, 1631,” William and Mary Quarterly 1 (1944): 273–216.
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Cromwell. In one of his speeches to Parliament, Pym claimed that “at least sixty
thousand able persons of the Nation, many of them well armed, and their bodies seasoned
to [the] Climate,” lived in the “rich and fruitful” Caribbean, just waiting for the
government to help support their colonial endeavors.12 These settlers’ experience in the
colony, and failure, taught them valuable lessons that Cromwell took care to note.
Despite the relatively small size of the island and its proximity to the larger island
of Santo Domingo, both the French and the Spanish forces experienced great difficulty in
wresting control of the island from the buccaneers that called it home. During the 1630s
and 1640s, Spanish officials took note of the growing lawlessness of Tortuga and sent
expeditions to defeat the French and English settlement there. In 1653, though Spanish
forces finally won the battle, they abandoned the island after only eighteen months. The
financial constraints the empire experienced by the late seventeenth century affected
Spanish defensive efforts and kept Spanish forces from mounting an offensive against the
English military. An English merchant named Elias Watts, coming from Jamaica,
recognized an opportunity and created a trading center on the island with the blessing of
the Jamaican governor. Once there, Watts headed plans to begin attacking Spanish
Hispaniola with the help of the Frenchmen left behind from their earlier defeat. By 1660,
the French regained Tortuga, but kept the island open to buccaneers of all nationalities.13
Buccaneer culture began in early seventeenth-century Tortuga, but the island was soon
overshadowed by the attention afforded its Jamaican neighbor.
12. BL, Richard Pym, A Speech delivered in Parliament (5 April 1640) by a worthy Member
thereof…concerning the grievances of the Kingdome, (London, UK: Printed for R. Lownes,
1641), 38.
13. Lane, Blood and Silver, 97-102.
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Figure 3: Island of Jamaica and Isle de la Tortue (Island of Tortuga) from Nicolas de Fer, “L’Isle
S. Domingue of Espagnole Decouverte l’an 1492” (The Island of Saint Domingue of Spain
Discovered in the year 1492). Paris, 1723. Courtesy of John Carter Brown Library, Brown
University

Changing of the Guard: A Lord Protector and a New Colony

Development and settlement in the Caribbean drew special attention in the
seventeenth century as the Caribbean became the staging place for continental European
conflicts. As mentioned earlier, English-sponsored privateering in the Caribbean allowed
Elizabeth I to strike at Philip II of Spain without officially entering into war. AngloSpanish conflict in the Atlantic mirrored and played out diplomatic tensions from
European courts. The Atlantic also served as the proving ground for European leaders.
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Just as Elizabeth used maritime policies to increase her royal prerogative, Oliver
Cromwell looked to the Caribbean to establish himself as a strong leader when his
Roundheads overthrew the English monarchy in 1649.
Jamaica and its flagship city of Port Royal became key for Cromwellian politics
and continued to hold a significant place in English economics for a century to come.
Though Adam Smith claimed in The Wealth of Nations (1776) that seventeenth-century
Jamaica was useless and “an unwholesome desart, little inhabited and less cultivated,”
contemporaries prized the island that sat “in the Spaniard’s bowels and in the heart of his
trade.”14 Following the pattern of settlement of Bermuda in 1612 and the Bahamas in
1648, Cromwell began plans for his own Caribbean colony. Cromwell did so realizing
that the future of Europe lay in controlling the Atlantic and that, as a revolutionary leader,
he needed to solidify his place at the head of the English government through a show of
might.
Furthermore, Cromwell, like Elizabeth before him, was keenly aware of the lure
of piracy. Monetary gain and a degree of autonomy enticed men to engage in piracy. If
channeled/controlled, piracy afforded the government a great deal of profit with little
expense. As Elizabeth before him, Cromwell also needed to garner as much support for
his regime as possible, from any group necessary. Much of the navy sided with
Cromwell and the Parliamentarians, but the navy always needed more skilled recruits.
Many members of the New Model Navy resorted to piracy during the naval expeditions

14. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, (1776) as
quoted in Nuala Zahedieh, “Trade, Plunder, and Economic Development in Early English
Jamaica, 1655-1689,” in The Economic History Review, New Series, vol. 39, no. 2, (May, 1986),
187; 215.

132

of the revolution and the existing communities of rebels at places like Tortuga and Port
Royal allowed men an even easier entree into that life.15 As Richard Braithwaite wrote
about the seventeenth-century mariner in 1631, “necessary instruments are they, and
agents of main importance in that Hydrarchy wherein they live; for the walls of the state
could not subsist without them.”16 If men willingly went to sea, Cromwell decided to
make use of them. The Caribbean also proved a useful place to deposit all of the new
regime’s enemies and prisoners of war. This exportation scheme caused its own
problems, but Cromwell’s rule ended before those problems affected his rule in any
dramatic way.
Aside from establishing his authority in England proper, Cromwell hoped to
solidify his power by adding an Atlantic colony of his own to the English empire.
Cromwell also expected that by extending his rule into the Caribbean, showing his
forces’ might to the other European empires, would force those governments to
acknowledge the new Protectorate over the still-exiled Charles II. Therefore, in 1655,
Cromwell sent an expedition to capture the Spanish island of Santo Domingo, following
in the wake of the Dutch seizure of Spanish Curaçao and French encroachments into
Spanish Hispaniola. The expedition picked up many of its crew from places like
Tortuga.17 Cromwell and his officers knew that rover communities existed in the
Caribbean and used them to their advantage to attack Spanish settlement. Spanish

15. Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker deal with this issue to a degree in The Many-Headed
Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic,
(Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2000).
16. Quoted in Linebaugh and Rediker, Many-Headed Hydra, 143.
17. Lane, Blood and Silver, 102.
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sources even spoke of the number of maroons inhabiting Santo Domingo and its
neighboring islands, noting the “recruitment” of these maroons by Spain’s enemies.18
Robert Venables, one of Cromwell’s top generals, notably recruited a “miscellany” of
naval veterans, deserted Royalists, and other errant seamen from Barbados before setting
off to Jamaica.19 Part of his “Western Design,” Cromwell expected the capture of Santo
Domingo to once again assert English authority in the Atlantic.
The Anglo-Spanish competition for Caribbean control during the Western Design
resulted in England acquiring an important future sugar colony and presaged centuries of
conflict and revolution in the Caribbean basin.20 Spain retained control of Santo
Domingo failed, but England still managed to garner a victory from this mission. Hoping
to salvage their reputations after such a defeat, the fleet decided to sail to Jamaica before
returning to face Cromwell. The initial failure of the mission constituted the first military
defeat of Cromwell’s career, however, the mission to the Caribbean did result in the
acquirement of a much desired Caribbean colony—even if the benefits of that colony did
not materialize immediately.
The initial Western Design expedition took a toll on the Commonwealth forces.
Despite the “immense droves of wild cattle,” hogs, and grain, the Jamaican climate did
leave a number of soldiers ill or dead. The Army suffered greatly in the Jamaican
climate, but few sources note sailors suffering in the same way. This serves to bolster
arguments that many of them serving with the New Model Navy, and especially
18. AGI, Santo Domingo 1, 49, 22 April 1603.
19. Lomas, ed., Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, vol. ii, 465.
20. The French joined in the fray over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
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supplementing the Western Design forces, already possessed notable experience in the
Caribbean. Having spent time living and operating in these islands made them much
more adaptable to Jamaica, allowing the English to establish a considerable presence on
the island despite the flagging Army.
Research not only shows the importance of Jamaica and its port cities in the
seventeenth century, but also offers a discussion of the maroon communities that
inhabited the island. One scholar calls the taking of Jamaica a “thinly veiled act of
piracy,” but the battle was no different than any other over land in the Caribbean.21
English ships moved quicker and easier through the ports of Jamaica. Spanish forces
could not match the English offensive, despite their efforts. A number of scholars try to
minimize the success of the English, but others chronicle the strong Spanish resistance to
English forces, citing numerous documents from the Spanish archives.22 Well-known
captain and privateer, William Jackson also operated out of the island. Along with other
former Providence Island commanders, Jackson’s reports from Jamaica about the
vulnerability of the Spanish empire helped persuade Cromwell of the right and necessity
of planting an English colony in the Spanish Caribbean.23
Once again, privateers helped defeat Spanish forces. Settlement at Port Royal
looked promising. Whatever the circumstances of the English occupation of the island,

21. Eliga Gould, “Revolution and Counter-Revolution,” in Armitage and Braddick, British
Atlantic World, 206.
22. Irene Wright, “The Spanish Resistance to the English Occupation of Jamaica, 1655-1660,” in
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fourth Series, vol. 13, (1930), 117-147.
23. Vincent Harlow, ed., The Voyages of Captain William Jackson, 1642-1645, Camden
Miscellany, (London, UK: By the Royal Historical Society, 1923), vol. xiii, 5-30.
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once there, the English did establish an unprecedented state presence at Port Royal.
Some scholars claim that Jamaica only drained the English treasury under Cromwell, but,
militarily, the English fleet so impressed the Spanish governor of Florida that he issued
pleas for massive fortifications at St. Augustine in response and called for local
munitions-makers and militiamen to attend the fort.24 Cromwell re-instated Elizabethan
policies of issuing letters of marque in order to encourage men to join his Jamaican
endeavor. After the English won the island, Cromwell continued those policies.
“Sodom of the New World”
In 1655, Cromwell issued an official charter for the city of Port Royal and made
Jamaica a state colony. By bringing the city under state control, Cromwell offered
protection and rights to the exiled men who inhabited the island, many of whom joined
the English fleet against the Spanish defenses. Englishmen did not jump at the chance to
move into the city, however. Elites in the early seventeenth century remained hostile to
settler recruitment campaigns in England.25 The young American colonies could little
spare settlers nor could the work-intensive colonies developing on islands like Barbados.
With no new or legitimate colonizers arriving in Jamaica and Port Royal, its population
remained that of new state citizen-mariners, New Model Navy officers, and migrants

24. Blair Worden, “Oliver Cromwell and the Sin of Achan,” in Derek Beales and Geoffrey Best,
eds., History, Society, and the Churches, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1985),
125-145.
25. Pestana, English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 179.

136

looking for new beginnings like the early city chronicler, and migrant himself, John
Taylor.26
English Caribbean colonies generally took the form of sugar plantation colonies
and Cromwell did not wait long to remake Jamaica in that fashion. The capture of the
island increased the land available for cane production tenfold.27 Cromwell need only
find men to work the land. Indentured servitude helped populate North America and
Cromwell employed the practice to populate Jamaica as well. By the 1650s, he also
began sending political dissidents and prisoners of war to the colony. Nearly ten
thousand Irish, Scottish, and English men found themselves “condemned to colonial
servitude.”28 Arriving in the colony these men joined with the already present, roughand-tumble military men. Mariners who had, and did, dabble in piracy rounded out the
population. Congregating around the capital and chief port of Port Royal, these men
helped to earn the city the title of the “Wickedest City on Earth.”
By the end of the 1650s, Cromwell dismissed his Parliament and begun ruling
England as a dictator. He could do little to stem the growth of lawlessness and
licentiousness in Port Royal. Trying to hold on to the last shreds of his revolutionary
empire, he allowed the city to remain amenable to pirates and other miscreants and
migrants in the Caribbean. He helped along the growth of that population. Before the

26. See James Robertson, “Re-writing the English Conquest of Jamaica in the Late Seventeenth
Century,” in the English Historical Review, vol. cxvii, no. 473, (September, 2002), 813-839.
27. Zahedieh, “Economy,” in Armitage and Braddick, British Atlantic World, 57.
28. Gould, “Revolution and Counter-Revolution,” in Armitage and Braddick, British Atlantic
World, 206. Number taken from David Eltis’ massive study on The Rise of African Slavery in the
Americas, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 2000), 50-52.
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House of Lords as early as 1646, a prison warden asked permission of the Lords to send
his prisoners to the Atlantic colony.29 Not only did the government routinely ship rebels
and delinquents to Jamaica, but one contemporary diarist also wrote that during the
1650s, the government “took up many loose wenches at London, to send over to
Jamaica.”30 Furthermore, during this time, in order to bring more trade and capitol into
Port Royal, the English Colonel in the city, Edward Doyley, invited pirates from nearby
Tortuga to make Jamaica their new base of operations.31
The presence of these marginal, outcast groups helped Port Royal gain the
reputation of the “Sodom of the New World” by the 1660s. The island’s population
clearly divided between those attempting to make Jamaica a sugar colony, and those who
were either merchants or the dregs of society that resided in the city. When Charles
Leslie wrote his New History of Jamaica in 1739, he described Port Royal as a place
where “wine and women drained [men’s] wealth,” and a place where gambling and
drunkenness became national pastimes.32 During the 1660s and 1670s, scholars estimate
that Port Royal contained one tavern for every ten men in the city. Of the two hundred
buildings crammed onto only fifty-one acres of land, at least forty-four where taverns,
29. Quoted in Pestana, English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 187.
30. Alan MacFarlane, ed., The Diary of Ralph Josselin, 1616-1638, (New York: Oxford
University, 1976), 363.
31. Quoted in Pestana, English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 199.
32. A new and exact account of Jamaica wherein the antient and present state of that colony, its
importance to Great Britain, laws, trade, manners and religion, together with the most
remarkable and curious animals, plants, trees, &c. are described : with a particular account of
the sacrifices, libations, &c. at this day in use among the negroes, Printed at Edinburgh by R.
Fleming, microfilm copy courtesy of College of William and Mary.
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while the majority of the other buildings housed merchants and trading firms.33

Figure 4: “Plan de la Ville de Port Royal” (Plan of the City of Port Royal) by J.N. Bellin,
published in his “Le Petit Atlas Maritime,” 1764. Courtesy of the Jamaica Parish Reference,
http://prestwidge.com/river/jamaicanparishes.html

33. See tables in Lane, Blood and Silver, 106; and Zahedieh, “Merchants of Port Royal,” 577,
and “Making Mercantilsm Work: London Merchants and Atlantic Trade in the Seventeenth
Century,” in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Sixth Series, vol. 9, (1999), 147, 148.
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Figure 5: Plan of Port Royal based on a pre-1692 map, with corrected scale by Donny Hamilton
based on his excavations of the city. Courtesy of Texas A&M University Nautical Archaeology
Program, “The Port Royal Project.”

140

Little changed in Port Royal under the returning Stuart king, Charles II, who
regained the throne during the Restoration of 1660. Charles did nothing to overturn
Cromwell’s colonial policies. By 1683, John Taylor conveyed the propaganda
circulating around England that the (Cromwellian) conquest of Jamaica actually occurred
during the seventh year of “His Majestys Reign,” and that when the king “came to
exercise His Royal Authority [he] was pleased to own what his Subjects had
done…which was the same as if he had Commissioned them.”34 In exile, Charles
claimed that continuous rule as King of England, but official Spanish, Dutch, and French
diplomatic recognition of the Commonwealth proves otherwise. Charles wisely
continued the move towards the sugar plantation complex encouraged by the Lord
Protector that eventually made Jamaica one of the wealthiest colonies in all of the
seventeenth-century Caribbean.
After facing initial defeat, gaining an island some considered worthless, Cromwell
determined to reinforce the island, to keep after the Spanish Plate Fleets of the
surrounding seas, and to “strive with the Spaniard for the mastery of all those seas.”35
Cromwell’s recruitment policies, though they initially seemed like failures, also came to
fruition. In 1640, Charles I reigned over almost fifty thousand colonial subjects, but by
1660, under Charles II, nearly two hundred thousand people resided in the British

34. Quoted in Robertson, “Re-writing,” 820.
35. Lomas, Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, vol. ii, 467.
Capp argues that the English did not try to secure their position in Jamaica and that the island was
“poorly placed” for attacks on the Spanish. Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, 89. Chapter 4 of this
dissertation, however, proves this statement false.
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Atlantic colonies.36 Cromwell’s expansionist policies precipitated the island’s population
boom.
Privateering, or piracy, depending on one’s national leanings, remained the order
of the day in Port Royal. Such men built the city and continued to run it despite
government legislation throughout the latter half of the seventeenth century and into the
early eighteenth century. John Taylor never once questioned the legitimacy of
privateering campaigns on the island. Taylor’s beliefs represented the general
assumption in Jamaica that such campaigns, especially against Spanish ships, “not only
provided a prosperous trade, but [were] a thoroughly laudable policy.”37 Port Royal
offered plenty of trade to entice such men and plenty of merchants to handle that trade.
The proliferation of merchants mentioned prior amounted to almost half of the
population of the city. In the period from 1686-1692, nearly half of the probate
inventories of Port Royal list the deceased as “merchant.” Shipping registers from one of
the busiest North American ports, Boston, from 1698-1714, listed only one in ten men as
a merchant.38 Scholars assume that privateers or pirates would not be listed as
“merchants” in their wills—if they left wills at all—but such evidence is hard to make
any distinction.
36. Pestana, English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 225.
37. Quoted in Robertson, “Re-writing,” 827.
38. Zahedieh, “The Merchants of Port Royal,” 570.
In discussing trade and merchants in Jamaica, Nuala Zahedieh remains the preeminent scholar on
the topic. One of the first scholars to work extensively in the seventeenth-century port registers
and trade logs of Jamaica, she has amassed a great deal of information regarding the economic
life of Port Royal.
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Once again, this legitimate trade did not mean that veiled privateering missions
and piracy lessened in any way. Piracy generally follows busy trading routes. The vast
amount of trade available in and out of Jamaica, however, as well as the abundance of
letters of marque issued under Cromwell and the general feeling of peace and
contentment with the Restoration and the end of civil war in England did not encourage
piracy in the Caribbean as existed earlier. During the 1660s and 1670s though, reports of
piracy dwindled. Granted, when the English crown began issuing anti-piracy legislation
once again in the 1680s, incidences of piracy increased.39 Contraband trade never
dwindled, but piracy did for a time. Even with a slight decrease in piracy, the character
of seamen in the port city remained the same. An official license did not a gentleman
make.
Privateering coupled with sugar production produced a dual economy in Jamaica
that reversed the tide of envy from flowing towards Spain, to England. Many
unsuccessful trading ventures turned into “piratical assaults.”40 An official in the city
claimed that “the damn’d privateering humour reigning so much in the minds of [the]
people” kept them from seeing anything contradictory about their policies or commerce
and/versus plunder.41 In 1690 alone, the fleet leaving Jamaica for England carried an
estimated £100,000 in bullion. The island’s sugar exports for 1689 only equaled
£88,000.42 The amount of trade through Port Royal rivaled the traditional trade of the

39. See again various Calendars of State Papers and Admiralty Court Records.
40. Zahedieh, “Merchants of Port Royal,” 587.
41. Quoted in Zahedieh, “Merchants of Port Royal,” 587.
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English, and other Europeans, through Cadíz, Spain.43 For this reason, and because
duties and laws were less strict in Port Royal, the Jamaican capital supplanted Cadíz as
the favored trading port for many English merchants.
Port Royal also rivaled North American ports. In 1688, 102 ships came into
Barbados, 226 to all of New England, and 213 came into Port Royal alone.44 From 1655
to 1671, sugar works in Jamaica grew from only seven, to 57, and by 1685, maps of the
island showed 246 sugar works.45 More and more ships came into the harbor and more
men came to trade. Between 1663 and 1670, the number of privateers in Port Royal grew
exponentially from 15, to 2,000 men and over 20 vessels.46 This progress came as a
result not of England pouring out her coffers, but out of an expansive contraband trade in
the seventeenth-century Caribbean. Location was certainly key in this and Charles II’s
decision to leave much of Cromwell’s works in place also helped the city and its trade
grow. As the Laws of Jamaica stated, the English drained “the benefit of the Spanish
gold and silver mines [without] the labour and expense” of working them.47 English
Jamaica became a fully-actualized mercantilist state.
Even in the seventeenth century, the residents of Port Royal so tolerated piracy
and privateers that Captain Henry Morgan, largely considered a pirate (though he
42. Zahedieh, “Merchants of Port Royal,” 584.
43. Zahedieh, “Merchants of Port Royal,” 593.
44. Zahedieh, “Merchants of Port Royal,”570.
45. Zahedieh, “Trade, Plunder,” 207.
46. Zahedieh, “Trade, Plunder,” 215.
47. Quoted in Zahedieh, “Trade, Plunder,” 222.
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technically held license from the Crown), served as the lieutenant-governor of Jamaica
for just over five years.48 Morgan, by some accounts, accompanied Venables’ Jamaican
forces in 1655 and operated in and around the island for the next thirty years.49 As pirate,
privateer, and governor during these years, Morgan witnessed the growth of Port Royal
and Jamaica from rover communities into a “proper” town and plantation colony. Port
Royal’s population numbered between four and six thousand.50 Including the growing
number of slaves brought in during the seventeenth century to work the new sugar
plantations, the entire island claimed a population upwards of 350,000 by the turn of the
eighteenth century, a population parallel to the city of London at the time.51 Port Royal
remained a predominately pirate or buccaneer city, despite the influx of plantation
workers and businessmen after 1655. The city became famous equally for its wealth and
its depravity. In such a transient city as Port Royal remained, taverns and brothels
abounded making it an excellent stopping-off point and hideout for such well-known
pirates as Blackbeard by the turn of the eighteenth century.
Despite its storied past, Port Royal deserves mention for more than just its
48. Stephan Talty, Empire of Blue Water: Captain Morgan’s Great Pirate Army, The Epic Battle
for the Americas, and the Catastrophe that Ended the Outlaw’s Bloody Reign, (New York:
Crown, 2007).
49. Tatly, Empire of Blue Water, 17-20.
50. Elliot, Games, Lane, and Zahedieh all have varying numbers, but it is a safe assumption to
claim that Port Royal had least 4,000 inhabitants by 1692. A 1680 census showed just over 3,000
legal residents in the city. This census material taken from “An Account of Both Masters and
Servants of Port Royal Parish,” 26 May 1680, as found in Zahedieh, “Merchants of Port Royal,”
570.
51. David Eltis' numbers are considered the most accurate. Rise of African Slavery. See also
previous footnote.
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colorful characters and grand legends. The Caribbean gained great importance in
European politics beginning in the sixteenth century. Jamaica and its English capital at
Port Royal represented the end result of those policies as well as a continuation of them.
Elizabeth I sent men to settle Roanoke, North Carolina to serve as a base for pirate
attacks against the Spanish Plate Fleets leaving Mexico and the Caribbean, but those
expeditions failed until the establishment of Jamestown in 1607 under James VI/I. The
eventually successful colony at Jamestown, coupled with lessons learned from failed
colonies like Providence Island, provided important foundations for later English
settlements. Cromwell, with much the same motivation as Elizabeth, tried to take
Spanish Hispaniola and directly take over Spanish trade, but ended up with a strategic
base for attack in Jamaica.
Cromwell’s policies and his plans for the island helped make Jamaica into a very
wealthy colony by the end of the seventeenth century even though he did not live to see
that development. Instead, Charles II, the returned Stuart monarch, reaped the benefits
until his domestic attentions drew him away from international politics. In the absence of
strong government, Port Royal reverted back to its licentious ways. Perhaps as divine
intervention, an earthquake leveled the city in 1692. Thousands died in the initial quake
and thousands more died from disease and injury in the months that followed. Much of
the city was rebuilt and Jamaica itself continued to be an extremely prosperous colony for
the English through the nineteenth century, but Port Royal, with a third of the city
underwater, never again reached the same heights in politics and culture.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
The study of early modern piracy encompasses discussions about the strictures of
law and changing definitions of criminality in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
England, especially, expanded its Admiralty courts specifically to address the increase of
piracy in this period. The Crown began to recognize the profits made from piracy and
developed legislation to help the government benefit from the practice. For centuries,
piracy, or at least contraband trade, remained a standard practice of war. In England, the
government not only accepted the existence of such illicit practices, but embraced
transforming pirates into privateers. These policies affected imperial competition in the
Caribbean and the nature of English settlement in Jamaica.
Piracy and Anglo-Spanish interaction in the Atlantic World coalesced to form a
maelstrom of political and social unrest that transformed early modern European
governance. A striking cycle of English maritime legislation and social integration
developed from Elizabeth I’s 1569 “Proclamation Against the Maintenance of Pyrates” to
Cromwell’s 1655 chartering of the city of Port Royal, Jamaica. Through the 1569
proclamation and a series of Admiralty Court reforms in the 1580s, Elizabeth redefined
domestic piracy to channel criminal behavior against English interests into
internationally-focused, state-sponsored privateering.
Realizing her own military and judicial weakness, Elizabeth encouraged piracy so
long as it proceeded under pro-English guidelines. Religious and political dissent at the
beginning of Elizabeth’s reign hampered her government’s ability to police domestic
piracy. In search of money and support, Elizabeth expanded the granting of privateer
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licenses to include a number of seamen once labeled as pirates. Privateering exploits
benefitted the government economically as the state and crown often shared in the profit
of spoils acquired by raiding Spanish plate fleets and Atlantic trade routes. AngloSpanish tensions, predictably, deteriorated over these policies. By integrating previously
“criminal” men into the fold of government, Elizabeth expanded her royal prerogative
and base of loyal subjects.
James VI/I, in an effort to end a century of conflict between England and Spain,
reversed many Elizabethan maritime policies. His reversal of these policies, deference to
Spain, and ultimate alienation of privateers prompted a significant emigration of English
seamen. Beginning in 1605, men who had become privateers found themselves once
again labeled as pirates. English mariners found themselves facing prosecution, possible
execution, and loss of wealth and any title they may possess. In response, thousands of
English seamen refused James’ command to enter into naval service and fled to the
Caribbean. In exile, these men frequented the Caribbean and North American ports
established during the privateering decades. Charles I’s reign continued most of James’
policies. England established a handful of colonies from Jamestown to the Caribbean
under these rulers, but the government dealt with continued piracy and a loss of
knowledgeable seamen for the realms’ navy. The rover communities these men
established in places like Jamaica gained strategic importance again during the
Interregnum rule of Cromwell.
Much like Elizabeth during her early reign, Cromwell needed to establish his
prerogative and find military support to solidify his new rule against domestic and
foreign opponents. Offering legitimation of the rover community at Port Royal, Jamaica
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in return for service and loyalty to the state, Cromwell made criminals into legitimate
English citizens once again. By the seventeenth century, the Atlantic World served as an
important proving ground for European rulers. European economies and industry grew
ever more dependent on New World materials. Procuring a Caribbean colony became
essential for establishing wealth and prestige, forever changing the future development of
the islands. In this vein, Cromwell crafted his “Western Design” mission to conquer
Spanish Hispaniola in 1653/54. While Cromwell did not gain his initial object of Spanish
Hispaniola, his men did win the battle for Jamaica. With the plantation system started
under Cromwell, the island grew into one of England’s most lucrative sugar colonies.
To accommodate privateering, the state accorded the practice different powers at
different stages: if a privateer armed with a mandate from a government attacked vessels
of a rival nation for private purposes, he was considered an authorized privateer; without
a mandate, he remained a pirate, though the attacks might be aimed at the same ships, in
the same manner, and with the same results. Because of their occasional incarnation as
government agents, pirates often reflected the peculiar relationship between dominant
and subordinate elements in early modern England. Their changing roles serve as an
indicator of the nation’s attitude toward imperialism, from its aggressive policy in the
Elizabethan years, to its restrained posture during the reigns of Kings James VI/I and
Charles I, and to a renewed fervor under Cromwell. Violence and crime in the empire
thus forced the formation of new definitions of identity and metropolitan imperial aims
and administration.
As the project moves forward, it will take into account discussions of social and
national identity, exploring criminality within the state and the development of “English”
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versus “Spanish” identity and the creation of new “Caribbean” identity. Studies of the
New World no longer focus solely on colonization and “local” politics, but have begun to
encompass more connected studies of the worlds and governments on both sides of the
Atlantic. The Atlantic World was formed by interactions between various European
countries and the peoples of the Americas, therefore, it seems only fitting that studies of
the area naturally be composite and interrelational. National histories also inform the
study of Atlantic civilizations, or the study of the Atlantic often becomes a nationalistic
tale of the home country’s colonizing efforts. Recent trends have moved towards these
national and even ethnic studies of Atlantic interaction, but also towards a separate
Caribbean history within these emerging studies.1 The relationship of national and ethnic
histories to this “new” Caribbean history raises questions about transatlantic government,
identity formation, and colony-metropole relations.2 This argument, in turn, anticipates
the work of scholars of the modern period who have shown how colonial engagements
shaped social life and government reform in nineteenth-century England.3
By looking at these relationships in early modern Caribbean, the project pushes
colony-metropole arguments back into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, instead of
1. Kenneth Steele claims that these studies have helped to “disintegrate” [sic] traditional colonial
history “while providing valuable new comparisons that are interracial, intercolonial,
transatlantic, and global,” while also making colonial history “more demanding, more diffuse,
and more Atlantic.” Kenneth Steele, “Exploding Colonial American History: Amerindian,
Atlantic, and Global Perspectives,” Reviews in American History 26, no. 1 (1998): 73–74.
2. “Colony-metropole relations” is a common term used to describe the relationship between a
colony and its ruling, or home, country.
3. Catherine Hall, Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination 1830–
1867 (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 2002). Susan Amussen makes this argument in
studying gender and identity between Jamaica and England in the late seventeenth century.
Caribbean Exchanges: Slavery and the Transformation of English Society, 1640–1700 (Chapel
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 2007).
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the traditional nineteenth- and twentieth-century focus of colony-metropole studies.4 To
highlight this relationship, the project builds upon the transient soldier experience and
incorporation of pirates and exiles rather than planter society. The experience of the
colony in Jamaica created new debates about social issues and government authority back
home in England.
The final years of the study, focusing on Port Royal, 1655-1670, begin to explore
how the experience of this seventeenth-century colonial settlement mirrored and
challenged European ideas about nationality and citizenship. Recently published works
have shown how Caribbean living influence “English” character and society.5 Men could
not be good citizens if their true English character was corrupted by tropical living—an
influential idea that continued into the twentieth century and formed a cornerstone of the
European “civilizing mission” throughout the world. It was the duty and right of all good
men and good citizens to spread their ideas to all those world populations “less fortunate”
than they.6

4. This argument draws most notably from the work of Catherine Hall. Informed by national and
postcolonial studies, Hall’s Civilising Subjects takes as its theoretical framework the transition of
thought and culture that occurred during the postcolonial moment. She claims that this was a
time when “the foundational histories” of both the metropole of England and her colonies “began
to unravel” and “imperial legacies came to haunt” English identity. In this moment, the ties, as
well as the disjunctures, between the metropole and the colony became increasingly obvious. The
metropole and colony, and the identities of the people living in each, greatly influenced each
other and deserved study within the same framework. Though she sees colony-metropole
relations as largely a study of power relations, Hall also understands that identity and
governmentality figure into this discussion. Hall, Civilising Subjects, 5-9.
5. Amussen, Caribbean Exchanges; Pestana, “English Character and the Fiasco of the Western
Design.”
6. See discussions of the “civilizing mission” in Alice L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The
Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa 1895-1930, (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1998); Cooper, Frederick, and Ann Laura Stoler, eds., Tensions of Empire: Colonial
Cultures in a Bourgeois World, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997); David
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Ideas about masculinity and “Englishness”, the domestic sphere, class, English
rights and entitlement changed in Jamaica—largely because of the avenues provided by
the political upheaval in England during the mid-seventeenth century. Cromwell’s
Western Design affected English character and “worthiness.”7 Though many people saw
the Design as a failure, the control of Jamaica gave England their largest colony at the
time. The conditions on the island—climate and disease—made many an Englishmen on
the island second-guess the worth of Jamaica. In response, the government launched a
rhetoric campaign about English masculinity and manhood. English propaganda
portrayed the failure to enact an “aggressive policy” in the Atlantic as “effeminacy.” The
failure of the soldiers and colonists to subdue and cultivate the island in its early years
was seen as a “failure of manliness.” No true Englishman would accept such failure and,
therefore, questioned whether these men fit into English society if at all.8
Life on the island of Jamaica offered a social mobility unattainable in England.
Pirates and exiled privateers first settled the island, soldiers arrived to subdue the island,
and for much of the Cromwellian regime, the English government deported thousands of
prisoners and indentured servants to establish the sugar plantations on the island.9 As the
sugar plantations became more successful, more genteel men wanted to speculate in the

Lambert and Alan Lester, eds., Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Careering in
the Long Nineteenth Century, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Levine,
Philippa, ed., Gender and Empire, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004)
7. Pestana, “English Character and the Fiasco of the Western Design,” 3.
8. Pestana, “English Character and the Fiasco of the Western Design,” 10–12.
9. Games, Migration and the Origins of the English Atlantic World, 322; Burnard, “European
Migration to Jamaica.”
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Jamaican enterprise. Combining these various classes, on top of the social issues raised
by slave interaction in the colony, caused a rift in traditional social structures. Jamaica
offered an “expectation of mobility” that “undercut the creation of a stable colonial ruling
class.”10 By the turn of the eighteenth century, the elites on the island, as well as those
men who had worked themselves up to plantation owners and “middle class” status,
began voicing their discontent towards the state’s recruitment policies.11 Life in the
colonies “[disrupted] the traditional class relations” of England with plantation mobility
and direct power over “subject peoples.”12
Debates about “true” citizenship soon emerged. Colonial settlers felt as though
the metropole did not recognize them as true English citizens. They felt as though the
arm of the state constantly strove to take away their basic “English” rights and liberties.
Lower class Englishmen further used this language and the toppling of the crown to argue
for more rights as well. Citizenship, identity, and government intertwined. Since
Jamaica had no schools, Englishmen generally sent their children back to England for
education.13 Writers, like Anthony Trollope in the nineteenth century, also travelled back
and forth between the Jamaica and England. The constant flow of goods, information,
and people kept the metropole and colony in close contact. Colonists knew of political
events as they happened back home and vice versa. Settlers saw themselves as

10. Amussen, Caribbean Exchanges, 148.
11. Pestana, English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 179.
12. Hall, Civilising Subjects, 65.
13. Amussen, Caribbean Exchanges, 217.
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“extensions” of the mother country and expected to be treated the same whether in the
Caribbean or in England.14
The years of Civil War and Restoration created the largest opening for these sorts
of debates for some time. With the rise of the Protectorate, some of the rigidity of
English class structure disappeared. A “shared Englishness” took its place. The settlers
of the English Atlantic were redefining their relationship to the metropole (as distinctly
Atlantic) while at the same time redefining their own place within metropolitan politics.15
Proving how politically savvy they were, colonial planters used the language of the
revolution, “the suppression of tyranny and the protection of liberty,” to their
advantage.16 Planters in Jamaica argued that land ownership in the New World paralleled
land claims in Ireland that carried titles for their owners. Lower-class Englishmen
holding land in the Caribbean argued for equal status and rights to their metropolitan
brethren.17 Such claims and resultant debates challenged traditional English social and
political views.
English historians often gloss over sixteenth- and seventeenth-century colonial
history if it does not concern the northern American colonies or slavery. Both Spanish
and English historiographies have long ignored the significance of Jamaica within this
period of imperial competition. Furthermore, English historians have staunchly refused
to say anything positive about Oliver Cromwell and his rule and have almost completely
14. Hall, Civilising Subjects, 15.
15. Pestana, English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 158.
16. Pestana, English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 158.
17. Pestana, English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 165.
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ignored the Caribbean in regards to the English Civil War. “Pirates, Exiles, and Empire”
argues for a reexamination of the importance of Jamaica within Anglo-Spanish
diplomacy and imperial competition. Jamaica occupied a strategic place in a century of
English and Spanish politics and social change as the site of imperial competition and
integration of pirates and exiles as legitimate citizens.
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